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President Trump Announces Meeting with Kim

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President Trump announced his intention to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in May. This decision defies diplomatic precedent. It’s not unexpected from a presidency that consistently defies expectations. President Trump promised to do politics differently, and this decision is consistent with that promise.

While diplomacy is the preferred method of resolving international conflict, it is a complicated process. If mishandled, the most well meaning diplomatic engagements can fall apart quickly and more problems can emerge. The upcoming meeting between the two leaders arouses many questions, concerns, and hope too. Will something good emerge from direct talks? We will watch closely and see. In the meantime, we have history to guide us in anticipation.

Strategy

The Professional Military Education podcast has covered a range of issues related to strategy and diplomacy. In an interview on the book Strategy, the author Sir Lawrence Freedman discussed strategy as “the art of creating power.” Two sides mutually agreeing to direct talks indicates that each feels that they have some leverage to use in negotiating with the other. The United States has its vast economic and military resources. Tight sanctions have been in place for months and the U.S. does not show any signs of giving them up. North Korea may feel emboldened by their missile tests which now clearly demonstrate their capability to strike the United States directly. Furthermore, North Korea has always maintained a bargaining chip by virtue of the thousands of artillery cannons that stand poised and ready to strike Seoul, South Korea at a moment’s notice. Each side has escalated to the point where they might be in a position to negotiate. For example, the U.S. loosens sanctions if North Korea halts missile tests.

Iran

In an interview with Jay Solomon about his book The Iran Wars, Mr. Solomon chronicled the process in which U.S. sanctions ultimately pressured and brought Iran to the negotiating table. However, sanctions took a long time to bring about the necessary pressure. In the meantime, U.S. diplomats engaged with their Iranian counterparts to lay the groundwork for a final agreement. During this time, President Obama never met directly with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini. But, he did send him several personal letters. Perhaps President Trump and President Obama have more in common than people realize. President Obama believed that he could use his personal influence to affect foreign policy. Does President Trump believe that he can have a similar affect with respect to Kim Jong Un?

North Korea’s Objectives

In separate interviews with Dr. Kori Schake and Bruce Bechtol, a North Korea expert, there seemed to be a consistent narrative related to Kim Jong Un’s intentions. Both theorized Kim’s objective to be regime preservation. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a way to project power at home and abroad. In domestic politics, these weapons can engender immense national pride and solidify Kim’s support. From the perspective of international relations, nuclear weapons gives North Korea legitimacy. The world can’t ignore a nuclear weapons capable North Korea. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence becomes a means of self-preservation. Kim Jong Un knows that he is less likely to go the way of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Qaddafi in Libya. However, one can argue that with artillery pointed at Seoul, deterrence doesn’t require nukes.

A meeting with President Trump gives Kim the legitimacy he seeks. The question is whether it is enough legitimacy to cause him to abandon his nuclear weapons program. For the moment, the U.S. President’s actions show that the U.S. takes North Korea seriously. Whether that gives the North Korean leader the credibility he seeks both at home and abroad is still to be determined. In the meantime, suspension of missile tests and less aggression on the part of the U.S. and South Korea are short term steps towards peace. For the sake of many innocent lives, we should hope that they lay the groundwork for long term peaceful solutions.

Russia

The final interview that is worth listening to is with Steven Lee Myers on Vladimir Putin. Mr. Myers discusses in his book how both Presidents Bush and Obama sought to engage with Vladimir Putin and re-establish better relations with Russia. However, as Mr. Myers explained Mr. Putin felt consistently snubbed by the inconsistency of U.S. talk with action. The most prominent example relates to the handling of Libya in which Mr. Putin saw the U.S. spearhead regime change after pledging only “humanitarian intervention.” Additionally, under the Bush administration, tensions persisted over the Iraq War as well as American withdrawal from the ABM treaty. All of these examples demonstrate how talk without consistency of action can give way to mistrust which fuels further animosity. This is something to consider as world leaders meet especially if preconditions aren’t firmly handled before the meeting.

 

World Conflicts in Review

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There are a significant amount of potential world conflicts. The U.S. confronts major strategic challenges in North Korea, Russia, China, and Iran. Additionally, the U.S. continues to support military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. As a result, smaller conflicts fall beneath the headlines. But, it is important not to lose focus on them. Here is a brief overview of some world conflicts with analysis.

Latin America: Conflict in Venezuela

The Venezuela Emergency
Venezuela in a state of crisis. (Image Source: NYT)

Violent protests continue across Venezuela. Government forces battle against protestors with tear gas, rubber bullets, and water canons. On the other side, anti-government protestors fight back with Molotov cocktails and rocks. The country is fraught with economic and political challenges, and the government under President Nicolas Maduro edges closer to dictatorship. Maduro, who succeeded Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chaves in 2013, seeks to re-write the constitution on July 30 through a national constituent assembly. Fear grips Venezuelan democratic proponents that the assembly is a power grab to dissolve democracy and concentrate political power under the president.

A Country in Chaos

Venezuela’s economy is in shambles. Inflation soars while basic goods and services such as food and medicine are unavailable. Attacks are carried out against opposition lawmakers by armed bands of “colectivos.” These groups operate like paramilitary organizations targeting protestors and lawmakers.

Furthermore, there have been reports of defections within the Venezuelan police. Recently, a helicopter attack occurred in June against the Venezuela Supreme Court. Since that attack, a police officer named Oscar Perez has claimed responsibility and vowed to carry out more attacks.

The situation in Venezuela remains grim. Violence seems likely to continue in the run up to July 30. Depending on the outcome, the country could fall deeper into turmoil. From a military perspective, a full-scale insurgency could occur. In such a scenario, an opposition group such as the one Oscar Perez claims to represent would need to recruit and mobilize forces. They would likely employ guerilla-style tactics at first, and seek to evolve toward conventional military operations. From the lens of warfighting, the goal of the militant opposition would be to develop a well-organized rebel force. However, this is not easy. Additionally, the Venezuelan military would deploy in force against such a group as they have against anti-government protestors.

Asia: Battle in the Philippines

ISIS has gained a foothold in the Philippines. (Image Source: WSJ)

On May 23, 2017, ISIS militants in the Philippines stormed the city of Marawi in the southern province of Mindinao. For nearly two months, Philippine forces have been fighting back. It is estimated that nearly 500 people have been killed in the fighting. The Philippine government under President Rodrigo Duterte established martial law in the southern province through the end of 2017.

Conflict in the Philippines represents the evolving strategy of ISIS. As mentioned in previous posts, ISIS like al-Qaeda seeks to take advantage of areas of the world that are unstable and majority Muslim. In areas where the government has little control, ISIS sees an opening. In this case, the militants have formed a “coalition” under the banner of ISIS. Mindinao has long been a pocket of Islamic extremism.

In Marawi like Mosul, the battle has turned into a siege. It is difficult for the military to remove the ISIS militants from urban terrain once they have gained a foothold there. Over time, the Philippine military should be able to win the battle for Marawi. But, it will take time. Additionally, high casualties and massive refugee flows will continue in the fierce fighting.

Africa: War Against al-Shabaab

Somali President declares war on al-Shabaab. (Image Source: Africa Review)

Al-Shabaab is a Islamic based militant group in East Africa. The group, which has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, operates principally in Somalia where lack of a strong central government allows them to operate unimpeded in many areas of the country. However, this paradigm could shift soon. February 2017 saw the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed. He was elected on the campaign promise to eradicate al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups.

The U.S. has stepped up military operations in Somalia. In May, a U.S. Navy Seal was killed in Somalia. This was the first death of a U.S. troop since 1993 when the Black Hawk Down incident occurred in Mogadishu.

President Mohamed declared war on al-Shabaab in April. In doing so, he also issued a 60 day amnesty period to militants. But, the amnesty has now expired. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to pledge support to the Somali government in the fight against al-Shabaab and other extremists.

Somalia’s war and U.S. support could reshape the country significantly. Somalia has been the classic example of a “failed state,” but only in the sense that the central government itself is ineffective. However, there are cities such as Mogadishu that have local economies, public services, and a functioning government.

The political scientist Charles Tilly famously assessed, “The state makes war and war makes the state.” In observing Somalia’s war against al-Shabaab, it will be interesting to analyze to what extent this statement is accurate.

Middle East: Clashes in East Jerusalem

Israeli security forces clash with protestors at the Al-Aqsa mob in East Jerusalem. (Image Source: WSJ)

In reference to the Charles Tilly quote, Israel is a modern example of a state that has grown strong through war. Since 1948, it has been at war many times. At the moment, it is not formally at war. But, recent events at the al-Aqsa Mosque could lead to intensified military operations.

In 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza after three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered. Thousands of people died in the conflict.

On July 14, 2017, three Israeli security guards were shot at the al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem. Two of them died. In response, Israeli security employed metal detectors under the justification of persistent security threats. The metal detectors caused an uproar of protests among Palestinians. They took to the streets on July 21 after Friday prayers. Israel responded forcefully to the protests.

Furthermore, on the same day of the protests, a Palestinian stabbed to death three Israelis at a settlement in the West Bank. Events at the al-Aqsa Mosque appeared to have inspired the killer, who was shot and killed by an Israeli soldier. The IDF raided his home on Saturday, July 22.

The events in East Jerusalem have echoes of 2014. Israel may respond more aggressively to these attacks and others. Israel’s response typically provokes more Palestinian attacks. As a result, tensions escalate, and the cycle of violence continues.

Iraq Claims Victory in Mosul, Now the Hard Part

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Earlier this week, Iraq claimed victory over ISIS in Mosul. Iraqi forces launched the assault in October 2016. Nearly eight months later, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared Mosul liberated from ISIS. His speech came three years after ISIS seized Mosul and nearly one third of Iraq’s territory. On Twitter, Prime Minister Abadi announced the challenges of reconstruction while praising his troops for their bravery and hard work. Iraq should be proud of their victory on the battlefield. But, now the hard work begins.

How Wars End

It is a mistake to think that wars end on the battlefield. They don’t. If Iraq and its coalition partners fail to translate tactical success into strategic victory, more people will die at the hands of ISIS. Indeed, ISIS will return in force.

The difficulty for Iraq is that there are numerous players involved in the coalition against ISIS. When the fighting ends, these groups will have a divergence of political and strategic interests.

Kurdish forces have done significant amounts of work in the coalition. They have been amongst the strongest and most capable fighters. However, Turkey regards the Kurds as a threat. Turkey is a NATO member. But, in their opposition to the Kurds, they have been complicit in facilitating ISIS operations. This presents many complications for the U.S. and Iraq.

Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. (Source: WSJ)

Furthermore, Iraq is a mostly Shiite country. Shia militias backed by Iranian Quds forces were able to play a major role in the fight against ISIS. However, the U.S. is wary of Iran’s influence. Furthermore, there will have to be reconciliation with Sunni Arabs. In this area, religious divisions create another set of difficulties. Sunni tribes welcomed ISIS in 2014 as they feared the repression from the Iraqi Shiite government, which was then run by Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki.

All of these ethnic divergences complicate political reconstruction. Additionally, ISIS will remain in Iraqi cities and shift to counterinsurgent tactics. As the Iraqi government seeks to rebuild cities, ISIS will try to launch terrorist attacks in Baghdad and other Shiite cities. The goal will be to draw Iraqi security forces out of Sunni cities. This was a tactic developed during the Iraq war when Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) existed under Zarqawi. It is known as the “belts strategy.”

What’s Next for Mosul?

The city of Mosul is in ruins. There are thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) otherwise known as refugees. Rebuilding Mosul will be a major challenge as the destruction of Mosul’s homes and infrastructure has been significant. The first priority has to be stability of the city and region. With improved security and restoration of basic services, the goal is then improvement of economic conditions. Next, long-term political institutions will need to reflect the concerns of Sunni tribes. The U.S. will have to play a role in this process if it wishes to see Iraq stabilized.

Iraqi soldier in Mosul. (Source: Washington Post)

The rise of ISIS in Iraq occurred due to a confluence of circumstances such as the Syrian Civil War and the Sunni tribes that welcomed ISIS as Sunni protectors. As Joby Warrick explained in his book Black Flags, these tribes turned on AQI when the U.S. launched its surge strategy in 2007. But, when the U.S. withdrew forces from Iraq in 2011, conditions changed. Political winds shifted, and ISIS was able to capitalize on popular support from Sunni people. Thus, despite the U.S. success in counterinsurgency nearly ten years ago, strategic decisions negatively affected its ability to maintain long-term security. That will have to change. In my interview with Mr. Warrick, we discussed the rise of ISIS in detail.

Is ISIS Done?

As mentioned, ISIS tactics will change. Although their loss of physical territory is a blow, their ideology continues to persist and influence many people. They will look for different ways to exploit areas of instability where Sunni Muslims live. In an al-Qaeda playbook called The Management of Savagery published in 2004, al-Qaeda defined this strategy. The goal is to expand their influence, build cells, and provide security in destabilized areas from the Maghreb to southeast Asia.

Additionally, ISIS inspired supporters, who operate on the fringes of the organization, are still a threat. The potential for individual acts of violence is strong. Moreover, ISIS fighters from Iraq and Syria will likely regroup and use their training and experience to carry out attacks potentially in Europe and the United States.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has consolidated their own base of support in Syria. They continue to maintain a long-term vision of striking the “far” enemy i.e. the United States.

Victory in Mosul is positive. It is an outstanding development. But, it is a tactical victory. There is a lot of work that remains to turn tactical success into strategic victory. For a more in depth discussion on “How Wars End”, check out the interview I did with Gideon Rose. Mr. Rose discusses the topic of how wars end based on his book of the same name.

How to Deal with the North Korea Threat

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“The Worst Problem on Earth”

In examining how to deal with the North Korea threat, it is clear that there are no good options. Every strategy is cringe worthy. Easy answers are elusive. History is always a good teacher, but the situation today is unique for several reasons.

North Korea has the equivalent of a gun pointed at the head of a major metropolitan city: Seoul, South Korea. Seoul bustles with nearly twenty-five million people between the city and surrounding area. Residents in Seoul enjoy liberties such as free commerce, free speech, diverse religions, and political activism. It also has many leisure activities like shops, bars and restaurants.

North Korean artillery exercise. (Source: The Sun)

In a matter of moments, 8,000 artillery cannons positioned across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) could destroy Seoul. Thus, as Kim Jong-Un’s regime relentlessly pursues an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, there are only a few realistic strategies. In the July cover story for The Atlantic, Marc Bowden, author of books such as Black Hawk Down and Guests of the Ayatollah, explores these options. With each option his position is clear, “It’s not going to be pretty.” It may not be long until North Korea has the ability to strike a major American city with an ICBM. If they are able to put a nuclear warhead on it, things could become catastrophic.

North Korea’s Objective

It is important to understand what motivates North Korea. What is their primary objective? Bowden has an interesting conclusion about Kim Jong-Un. He writes that his decisions are very much rational and calculated. While western media enjoys depicting North Korean leaders as unhinged and crazy, this is actually a mistake. They have survived and maintained their regime over three generations.

Western media have frequently portrayed North Korean leaders as crazy such as the portrayal of Kim Jong-Il in the movie, Team America World Police. (Image Source: The Hollywood Reporter)

Furthermore, considering the position that the U.S. finds itself in today, North Korea has boldly endured multiple presidential administrations and different strategic approaches while continuing to pursue their agenda. What is their agenda? The goal for North Korea is fairly simple and it involves the eventual reunification of Korea. As Professor B.R. Myers explained, “The whole point of the military-first policy is ‘final victory,’ or the unification of the peninsula under North Korean rule.” Myers has said that the goal of North Korea would be peace treaties with the South, followed by a North-South confederation, the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, and in the long-term a fully unified Korea.

With the recent election of South Korean President Mun Jae-in, parts of that strategy have become more practical for the North especially the peace treaty and confederation. Thus, in understanding North Korea’s motives, it is important to realize the extent to which a united Korea remains the end state. Professor Myers explains, “To a radical Korean nationalist, the division of the nation, the race, is an intolerable state of affairs.” North Koreans want to reverse the status quo. They want one Korean state.

Four Strategies

Marc Bowden discusses four specific strategies that the U.S. can practically consider to deal with North Korea. They include: Prevention, turning the screws, decapitation, and acceptance. “Prevention” involves a full-scale military assault undertaken before the North has the ability to employ nuclear tipped ICBMs against the U.S or its allies. “Turning the screws” involves limited use of military force in a kind of tit for tat that will show the North Korean regime that the U.S. will not bluff or hesitate to escalate actions as needed. “Decapitation” involves the ability to overthrow the regime internally primarily through targeted assassinations. Finally, the strategy of “acceptance” is as the name suggests simply accepting things as they are and allowing for time to work the situation out in a better direction.

 Prevention

This is the most simple strategy in terms of the overall objective, which is to destroy North Korea with force and remove the Kim dynasty. While it seems straightforward, there are a multitude of risks and planning considerations. First, the sheer amount of casualties cannot be understated. Multiple nations are at risk of nuclear and chemical attacks from North Korea. Besides South Korea, another one of these nations includes Japan and it’s capital, Tokyo, which has a population of 38 million people. U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea would also be at risk of attack. Furthermore, world markets would be in a free fall overnight. There would be millions of refugees. Additionally, it would raise the possibility of conflict with China due to a unified Korea with U.S. military troops on its border.

Bowden writes that a U.S. or even a South Korean military intervention would be successful. We would win. But, the risks are enormous. How would the U.S. and South Korea mitigate a retaliation from the North? Bowden writes, “The brightest hope of prevention is that it could be executed so swiftly and decisively that North Korea would not have time to respond. This is a fantasy” (Bowden 69). Bowden believes that the costs of even a “perfect first strike would be appalling” (Bowden 70).

The idea of prevention is not new. On 15 April 1969, North Korea shot down a U.S. spy plane, an EC-121 and killed 31 Americans aboard. To this day North Korea celebrates this shoot down as a “badge of national honor.” Additionally, the Nixon administration considered a range of options including nuclear strikes. However, they declined to take military action.

A U.S. EC 121 spy plane was shot down by North Korea on 15 April, 1969 killing 31 Americans. (Source: Naval History Blog)

Turning the Screws

On 26 March 2010, North Korea sank a South Korean Navy ship, Cheonan. Turning the screws strategy would necessitate a U.S. or South Korean response. It is a strategy that advocates a tit for tat. If North Korea acts out of line, the U.S. and its allies will respond with equal or greater force. The hope is that events do not escalate any further beyond response and counter-response. However, Bowden concludes, “Any limited strike would almost certainly start an escalating cycle of attack/ counterattack” (Bowden 72).

On 26 March 2010, North Korea sank South Korean warship Cheonan killing 46 people. (Image Source: BBC)

This strategy contains significant risks similar to the prevention strategy. A lot depends on the North Korean leader’s response, and Bowden writes that Kim’s “power is absolute, and pugnacity is central to it.” It does appear that this is the strategy currently being employed by both the U.S. and North Korea. As the North tests missiles, the U.S. and South Korea conduct military exercises. Conversely, when military exercises are conducted, the North will test missiles. This type of back and forth is called the “provocation cycle.” Provocation cycles can be preludes to much more drastic action to include full-scale war.

Decapitation

The decapitation strategy is a covert one. It relies on the CIA and intelligence agencies. The intent is to remove the Kim regime through assassination or a military backed coup. However, due to the nature of the North Korean regime, it is incredibly hard for spy networks to penetrate the North. North Korea has frequently accused the U.S. and South Korea of attempting to assassinate their leader.

There are also plans for special forces teams to strike the North Korean leader. However, as Bowden explains, such an action would disregard a U.S. policy prohibiting political assassination (Bowden 73). This strategy contains an enormous amount of risk. Bowden suggests that the best hope is that it happens “within Kim’s inner circle.” This is reminiscent of the U.S. hope that Saddam Hussein would be removed by a military coup. The line used to be, “I can’t tell you who the next leader of Iraq is going to be, but his first name starts with ‘General.'” This military coup never occurred in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. chose to conduct a military intervention, which overthrew Saddam’s regime in 2003.

Could a covert raid work? An image from the popular movie Zero Dark Thirty about the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. (Image Source: EW)

Acceptance

With the final option, one has to ask the question, “Would you be comfortable with North Korea having the ability to strike Los Angeles with a nuclear weapon?” If the answer is yes, then acceptance is preferable. As Bowden explains, acceptance is the sobering reality that “It’s a done deal.” North Korea will have nuclear tipped ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. Now what?

This seems to be the worst strategy, but Bowden suggests it is most practical. Furthermore, he cites the Cold War as setting a historical example for it. The acceptance strategy comes down to buying time. Maintaining the status quo is the basis for the strategy. Meanwhile, the U.S. develops more options such as improved anti-missile capabilities and creating conditions for disarmament talks. This strategy is vague because there are not a lot of good options right now. But, it relies on buying time to develop more options that don’t involve millions of lives lost on either side.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (Image source: Wikipedia)

The article concludes that “North Korea is a problem with no solution… except time” (Bowden 77). It also assumes that Kim will not use his nuclear tipped ICBMs. It places trust in the assumption that Kim is not a “madman.” Ultimately, he wants self-preservation for his regime. But, President Trump has tweeted, “It won’t happen.”

 

Conclusion

As previously stated Bowden’s conclusion points to acceptance as the only viable option. To gain some insight on what the acceptance strategy looks like, South Korea is the best guide. They live under the constant threat of destruction from the North. Bowden summarizes South Korea’s acceptance with a quote from one resident, who said, “Since I have been living here so long, I am not scared anymore. Even if there was a war now, it would not give us time to flee. We would all just die in an instant” (Bowden 77).

On July 4, 2017, North Korea successfully tested a missile with a range that could potentially hit Alaska. In response, the U.S. conducted military exercises with South Korea. This included two B-1B bombers escorted by fighter jets. The war on the peninsula never officially ended in 1953. As such, it continues on a limited scale to this day. The entire situation is a giant tinder box. As military thinkers, it is important to understand the range of options. Mark Bowden’s article helps further this understanding.

B-1B bombers
B-1B bombers conducting a military exercise. (Image source: NBC)

 

Source: July/ August 2017 Cover Story for The Atlantic, “How To Deal with North Korea“, Mark Bowden

Colonel John Boyd: American Strategist

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I have been focusing on strategy and strategic thinkers in anticipation of the release of my interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman, author of Strategy: A History. In his book, Freedman discusses the contribution of Colonel John Boyd to strategy. Colonel Boyd was a fighter pilot, who served in the United States Air Force during World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Throughout his career, Boyd studied dogfighting principles, and looked at the ability of an aircraft to maneuver into positions of advantage where it could shoot down an opposing aircraft. After Colonel Boyd served in Korea, he was assigned to the Air Force’s Fighter Weapons School where he gained the moniker “40 second Boyd,” which referred to the fact that he could out maneuver an opposing aircraft in forty seconds or less. In his career, Boyd studied science, mathematics, and history in an effort to develop theories of warfare, maneuver, and also develop ideas for the ideal fighter aircraft. As part of a relentless drive to explore his theories of maneuver, Boyd earned an engineering degree from Georgia Tech. Colonel Boyd is widely known in business and military circles for his popular idea of the OODA Loop. “OODA” stands for observe, orient, decide, act. The principle of the OODA Loop became extremely important to military thinkers, who were interested in “maneuver warfare.” The purpose of the OODA Loop is to generate a cycle of decision-making that is quicker than the enemies’ decision-making cycle. The goal is for friendly forces to observe, orient, decide, and act at a pace that is greater than the enemy. The Marine Corps championed this philosophy, and codified it into its doctrine on Warfighting and Tactics.

 

Boyd’s Work and a Break from Attrition Warfare 

The Marine Corps has embraced the work of Colonel Boyd because of its emphasis on the “mental domain” (Freedman 199). Warfare based on “attrition” typically refers to a mass of forces trying to overcome another mass of forces. Vietnam is seen as an example of attrition warfare because the U.S. prioritized “body counts” as a metric for success in combat. However, despite the fact that the U.S. could achieve higher casualty counts, the strategy did not disrupt and shatter the enemies will to fight. As a result, in the post-Vietnam era, the mental and moral component of warfare has been developed as a more effective component of strategy. With respect to Colonely Boyd, Sir Lawrence Freedman writes:

Boyd distinguished between attrition warfare, focused on the physical domain and using firepower as a destructive force, and maneuver warfare, focused on the mental domain where the aim was to generate “surprise and shock” by using ambiguity, mobility, and deception. (Freedman 199)

Although Colonel Boyd never wrote a book explaining his ideas, they exist in a series of briefs that he gave when he was working at the Pentagon. One of these briefs is called “Patterns of Conflict.” At the beginning of the brief, Boyd describes the goal to “collapse adversary’s system into confusion and disorder causing him to over- and under-react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading.” This encapsulates the principles of a “friendly OODA Loop” moving faster than an “enemy OODA Loop” in an effort to shatter the enemies’ cohesion.

 

Here is Colonel Boyd’s illustrated depiction of the OODA Loop from “The Essence of Winning and Losing.” It is important to see that the OODA Loop relies on a series of feedback loops that inform decision making. It must be emphasized that this process does not have to be hasty or rushed. Speed is relative to the enemy. This process only needs to happen quicker than the enemies’ ability to observe, orient, decide, and act. With the feedback loops, we see several criteria upon which success is based. The ability to communicate important information in a timely manner is crucial. Thus, any organization, military or otherwise, must look to implement systems of organization in which the right information flows to the right people at the right time.

The process of effective decision-making is a major part of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps understands it. Furthermore, the emphasis is on giving leadership at all levels especially the tactical and operational levels the ability to make fast, intelligent decisions that contribute to the success of the mission. In a paper entitled “Destruction and Creation,” Colonel Boyd wrote:

Decisions must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change.

This paper was part of Boyd’s thinking on the second law of thermodynamics and entropy in which he studied the way mental concepts developed in environments of chaos and uncertainty. In his conclusion, Boyd writes, “These mental concepts are employed as decision models by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions needed to cope with their environment—or to improve their capacity for independent action.” Again, we see the influence on how military thinkers would develop the idea of empowering small unit leaders to be able to make decisions in environments of chaos and uncertainty, which the Marine Corps recognizes as part of the nature of war. Furthermore, by decentralizing actions and empowering small units, the Marine Corps recognizes the ability of small units to achieve large victories and defeat larger units. Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that military thinkers like Bill Lind would develop these concepts based on historical models such as the blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg based operations were based on destroying the “will of the opposing high command by creating unexpected and unfavorable operational and strategic situations” (Freedman 200). Freedman mentions that the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting published in the 1989 FMFM-1 explained warfare by maneuver as a process in which a physically superior foe could be defeated if “his moral and physical cohesion” was destroyed (Freedman 201).

 

Boyd’s Contributions to the Military

If one has a mental caricature of a stubborn, iconoclastic Colonel, Boyd seems to fit the stereotype perfectly. He was famous for his brash and combative nature in voicing his ideas. Robert Coram is the author of a comprehensive biography called Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. In the biography, Coram mentions that Boyd occasionally became heated in debates to the point in which he would shove the lit end of his cigar into the tie of a co-worker at the Pentagon. In the book, Coram paints a detailed portrait of a man who approached all aspects of norms and etiquette within the Pentagon with a devil may care attitude. Indeed, Boyd’s single-minded focus on promoting his theories caused him to neglect considerations of his own personal promotion and pay. When he retired from the military, he famously did not want to be paid for his work as a consultant. Unfortunately, Coram describes Boyd’s character as having an adverse affect on his family too. Thus, in many ways, Boyd’s greatest strength- his passion for his work- was also the source of his greatest flaw- neglect for those closest to him.

Nevertheless, Boyd endeared himself to a cohort of followers, who became known as the “acolytes.” These individuals were determined to promote Boyd’s legacy and ideas. They responded to his infamous decree that one must either decide to “be somebody or do something.” In terms of his contributions to the military, Boyd applied his theories of Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) in the F-15 and F-16 program. The E-M theory was instrumental in developing aerial tactics. Coram writes the following of E-M:

It provided a scientific means by which the maneuverability of an aircraft could be evaluated and tactics designed both to overcome the design flaws of one’s own aircraft and to minimize or negate the superiority of the opponent’s aircraft, and, finally, it became a fundamental tool in designing fighter aircraft.

Much of Coram’s book documents Boyd’s fight to develop the F-15 and F-16 into fighter aircraft capable of winning dogfights. As a result, Boyd frequently clashed with people in the Pentagon who wanted to weigh the aircraft down with needless technology that did not maximize the efficiency of the platform. Coram shows that Boyd was also fighting the institutional wisdom of Air Force strategists, who focused on the Air Force’s ability to fly long range missions to drop conventional munitions, but had neglected the function of the Air Force to fight battles in the air.

Perhaps one of Colonel Boyd’s greatest contributions to the military came through the relationship he had developed with Dick Cheney, who met Boyd when Cheney was a member of the House of Representatives. When Cheney became Secretary of Defense, he was a key figure in planning for the Gulf War that would take place as part of America’s military effort to liberate Kuwait from Saddam’s Iraqi Army. Coram writes that Cheney overruled initial plans of General Norman Schwarzkopf in favor of plans that applied maneuver principles that Boyd had talked with him about. Part of Boyd’s influence on strategy involved bypassing enemy center’s of gravity, which the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz called Schwerpunkt, and creating confusion and chaos in the enemies’ systems. The following excerpt from Coram’s biography illustrates how Colonel Boyd’s ideas had such a profound impact on military operations during the Gulf War:

What is still not generally known to the public is how well the Marines performed in the Gulf. Brigadier General Mike Myatt, a graduate of the Fort Pickett free-play exercises and a man intimately familiar with Boyd’s work, was then commander of the 1st Marine Division. Three days before the war officially began, Myatt’s men raided deep behind Iraqi lines. They bypassed strong points, forgot their flanks, and penetrated so deeply and caused such confusion that the Iraqi Army rushed in reinforcements against what they anticipated would be the main thrust of the American invasion. Then they began surrendering by the thousands. Nowhere can be found a better example of Boyd’s ideas on “folding the enemy in on himself” than in the fact that some fifteen Iraqi divisions surrendered to two divisions of Marines.

Coram writes further:

Everything successful about the Gulf War is a direct reflection of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict”- multiple thrusts and deception operations that created ambiguity and caused the enemy to surrender by the thousands.

The quick and decisive defeat of the Iraqi Army by coalition forces was a remarkable achievement. Combat operations were declared over within 100 hours from the time they began. Despite strategic blunders that occurred after combat ended, it is clear that at the tactical and operational levels, the American military had proven capable of executing fantastic blitzkrieg-style maneuvers. Considering the fact that the previous war America had fought in Vietnam was based on attrition, the Gulf War was a remarkable turnaround. It was vindication for military strategists like Boyd, who had worked for years to promote a style of warfare based on maneuver.

In his late years and after his death, the Marine Corps honored Colonel Boyd more than any other branch of service. In fact, Boyd is hardly mentioned by the Air Force to this day. But, he is revered by the Marine Corps. Coram wrote, “When Boyd died, Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak wrote a moving tribute in a defense journal saying Boyd was the architect of America’s victory in the Gulf War.” Coram also explains that many Marines attended Boyd’s funeral to pay homage to a man, who had influenced the doctrinal publication of Warfighting.

 

Conclusion

Colonel Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” is an excellent presentation to read and study. Marines will recognize that many of Boyd’s ideas appear in our doctrine, and directly impact the logic and thinking of our tactics. Robert Coram’s biography is extremely well-written, and worth reading not only as an entertaining look at an influential military leader, but also for some fascinating history on the Air Force, stories on the inner workings of the Pentagon, and to see how one man can have a positive impact on the institutional inertia of large organizations like the Department of Defense. Finally, the website Slightly East of New is a good place to find Boyd’s work as well as articles and resources related to his life and thinking.

Cited in this Post:

Strategy: A History

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
 

Secretary Mattis Update on the “Defeat ISIS Campaign”

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The following video is an update from Defense Secretary James Mattis on the “accelerated” campaign against  ISIS. Below are several highlights from the address from May 19, 2017, and some analysis. Secretary Mattis begins by describing two “significant” changes that have been directed from the President:

Change #1: Delegation of authority to the “right” level to quickly move against “enemy vulnerabilities.”

Analysis: The military and the Marine Corps (where Secretary Mattis served for 40+ years) are strong advocates for the principle of decentralized execution. I’ll provide some clarity on this with a very broad and generic summary of how this might look at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, this means small unit leadership executes plans and makes decisions to accomplish a mission. The tactical level is typically led by NCO’s and company grade officers at the team, squad, and platoon level. The operational level, for example, may refer to battalions and brigades conducting campaigns, which we know generally as deployments. For Marines, this would be the equivalent of a MEU, UDP or SPMAGTF. The strategic level refers to delegation to Combatant Commanders to make decisions in their area of operations. Thus, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, planning is “centralized,” but the execution and decision making are ultimately conducted by those who are closely involved in the execution of the plan i.e. the squad on patrol, the battalion on a MEU, or the combatant commander overseeing his area of responsibility, which would be central command or CENTCOMM in the case of Iraq and Syria. Marines such as Secretary Mattis understand the importance of making decisions at the lowest possible level to generate tempo and to be quicker than one’s enemy. If this sounds a lot like Colonel Boyd’s OODA Loop cycle then it’s important to note that Boyd had a major impact on the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting. In delegating responsibility, the goal is to allow leaders closest to the fight to make critical decisions that will put pressure on the enemy and to maintain pressure until the enemies’ will to fight breaks down.
Change #2: Secretary Mattis describes a tactical shift from “an attrition” fight to surrounding the enemy in their strongholds in order to annihilate ISIS and “prevent the return home of escaped foreign fighters.”

Analysis: Marines believe in the principles of maneuver warfare rather than attrition. A basic definition of attrition is war based on trying to exert more force against the enemy and overwhelm them with a mass of troops and equipment. An example of this is often cited in World War I style trench warfare. Another example of attrition would be the use of body counts in Vietnam. This is a way of trying to kill more enemy than friendly forces. The attrition style of warfighting is anathema to the Marine Corps’ principle of maneuver warfare (perhaps this is why you may have noticed the inflection in Secretary Mattis voice during the address when he mentioned “attrition”). Maneuver warfare is based on putting the right people in the right place at the right time to attack the enemy from a position of advantage. From a position of advantage, one can shatter the enemies’ cohesion and destroy their will to fight. With maneuver warfare, one does not necessarily have to kill the enemy (although that is often a significant part of it). Maneuver warfare is often confused with movement (although movement can be a part of it). But, the best way to understand it in this context is the necessity to get coalition forces into a position where they can put the enemy in a no win solution and convince the enemy that their cause is hopeless. The enemy may realize this the hard way as conventional munitions explode on or around him. It can also occur through psychological and information operations too. What Secretary Mattis is suggesting is that coalition forces are putting the enemy in a no-win situation where the only options they have are to surrender or die.

 

Other highlights from Defense Secretary Mattis’s address:

    1. No Change to rules of engagement (ROE) and attempts to limit collateral damage. Analysis: American military theory recognizes the principles espoused by the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz that war has a moral component to it. America’s continued attempts to lead and assert moral authority are keys to victory.
    2. The coalition is comprised of 68 members to include 65 nations sharing intelligence and working closely together. This also includes 26 coalition nations making direct military contributions. Analysis: When Secretary Mattis co-authored a piece called “Restoring our National Security”, he discussed the importance of creating alliances and stressed the absolute necessity to work with coalition partners. We are seeing this vision being executed.
    3. Maintaining a view toward the aftermath when the violence stops. Analysis: A major theme of this blog and the podcast has been understanding warfare as Carl Von Clausewitz explained it as a conflict that has a political dimension to it. Thus, the aftermath of violence matters as much as the actual battles that take place. On the first podcast episode, I had a conversation with Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose about his book, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle.  He discussed his theory called “the Clausewitzian Challenge,” and how it relates to properly ending a war.  
    4. Status on the fighting: In Iraq, East Mosul is in friendly hands while West Mosul and Tal Afar are completely surrounded by friendly forces. In Syria, coalition forces continue to support Syrian Democratic Forces and are pushing to defeat ISIS in Raqqa.

Secretary Mattis explained three enduring goals in this fight:

  • Deny ISIS a geographic haven.
  • Eliminate ISIS ability to operate externally.
  • Reduce ISIS ability to finance operations and recruit.

 

Finally, Secretary Mattis highlighted several of the major victories that have occurred thus far:

  • 4 million people liberated by coalition forces.
  • Coalition forces have recaptured 50% of territory once held by ISIS.
  • ISIS has not been able to take back any of the recaptured territory.