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America’s Rise and Fall among Nations: Book Review

By PMEComplete on October 28, 2022

America's rise and fall among nations

What would John Quincy Adams do?

In September 2021, America lost a great mind. In a world of conformity on both the left and right, Angelo Codevilla’s life and work stands out. Codevilla’s mastery of history, politics, religion, and foreign policy appears in every paragraph on every page of his posthumously published book, America’s Rise and Fall among Nations: Lessons in Statecraft from John Quincy Adams.

Codevilla’s book asks “what would John Quincy Adams do” to create an America first foreign policy. John Quincy Adams was the sixth U.S. president and son of the second president, John Adams. He was president after America had been involved in a war for independence as well as the War of 1812.

In the early nineteenth century, there was an abundance of challenges to America’s national security. European colonial powers remained throughout the western hemisphere. These powers persistently threatened the safety of America as well as its neighbors. Thus, the foreign policy doctrine that developed under Adams was the Monroe Doctrine, which was named after America’s fifth president James Monroe. This doctrine established principles of non-interference in the western hemisphere principally Latin America. It applied to extra-hemispheric powers but was also self-applied by America to its affairs with Latin American countries too.

As a result, the foundations of the Monroe Doctrine established a foreign policy in which America minded its own business and would encourage other nations to do the same. This was the bedrock of “America first.” Codevilla asserts that Adams and the founding fathers would not even understand such a label. Of course, they would put America first. What serious country wouldn’t put their own nation’s interests first? Standby…

Woodrow Wilson and the Progressives Take Charge

After exploring the history of American foreign policy from Washington through Theodore Roosevelt, Codevilla offers an answer. He sharpens his pen to take aim at Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive movement, which radically changed America’s entire geopolitical framework. Codevilla makes clear that America’s entry into World War I began a sharp departure from Adams and his successors through Theodore Roosevelt. Furthermore, the Progressives began to formulate policy in terms of global interest. This amounted to spreading democracy to other nation’s whether they wanted it or not. Democracy became the catch-all for whatever Progressives thought was good. If people refused or voted against it, this was a threat to democracy. Sound familiar? Now we see where the incoherence of American foreign policy began to take shape.

While Codevilla’s criticism of Progressives was fun reading, it was also light on details. He touches the surface on Wilson’s push to establish the League of Nations, which became the precursor to the U.N. Nevertheless, perhaps others can pick up where Codevilla left off. The Wilsonian break with Adams could become a book on its own.

Describing the Progressive movement, Codevilla’s writing style is scathing. He has no remorse for the subsequent generations that have adopted the Wilsonian model. The Progressive establishment morphed into what he describes as America’s “ruling class.” Except for World War II, this ruling class has not won a war. At the same time, while World War II defeated the Nazis and Imperial Japan, it did not account for the rise of the U.S.S.R. that quickly followed. As a result, Codevilla tears into this group. Clearly, he never worried about missing invitations to cocktail parties in Georgetown.

The “Ruling Class”

The quick definition of the ruling class is basically the college educated population clustered mostly on the two coasts. The ruling class is typically white-collar professionals i.e. lawyers, bankers, consultants, journalists, and what is commonly called “the laptop class.” We can also add people in academia. The ruling class considers itself elite due to its credentials from colleges and universities.

Additionally, the ruling class has also grown up around the nation’s capital and staffs the ranks of bureaucrats, lobbyists, think tankers, foundation workers, military servicemembers, intelligence personnel, contractors, and many other government functionaries. These members of the ruling class comprise what Codevilla calls the “administrative state.” The two overlap and the one thing that defines them is the uniformity of their education, which is typically Ivy League or Ivy League adjacent. Again, the credentials matter because it gets into the elites conception of themselves as being experts.

Codevilla’s contempt is rooted in the fact that the members of the ruling class believe that they have the expertise to run the country, yet they consistently fail in doing so. Instead, he sees them as self-serving. They are interested in perpetuating their own power and not acting in the best interest of the American people.

While Codevilla is broad in his denunciation of the ruling class, his depth of knowledge and sweeping analysis makes the reader think that he must know what he is talking about. To the frustration of his critics, he has the added benefit of being right. He has been the first to point out and even predict the myriad of foreign policy failures over several decades. Ironically, he also has a lot of credentials himself and an impressive resume in the military, foreign service, government and academia. Perhaps he can be critical of the ruling class because he is, after all, coming from it.

Consistent Failure

Look no further than the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, America’s inability to stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rise of China, and North Korea’s capability to threaten America with nuclear weapons. Add in the failed wars from Korea, Vietnam, the first Gulf War (tactical success, strategic failure), Iraq, and Afghanistan, and one starts to see the pattern. There is also the rise of Iran, al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

America has lost thousands of lives and spent trillions of dollars over the last two decades in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein was once on the CIA payroll. America supported him in his war against Iran then proceeded to wage two separate wars against him. If U.S. policy seems to be sporadic and lacking in direction, that’s because it stopped being grounded in reason, practicability, and a relentless focus on America’s national interests. With all of these issues, Codevilla continually points the finger at American elites for their poor statecraft. Adams would not be pleased.

In a League of His own

Reading Codevilla is exhilarating. It also leaves the reader with a sense of melancholy. This feeling comes from the fact that it is hard to see things getting better. The ruling class is very much empowered and arrogant. One senses that Codevilla is probably a supporter of President Trump. If he did vote for Trump, he doesn’t fawn over him or withhold points of criticism. Codevilla is not wedded to any one party or politician. At least not any living politician. In this book, he calls balls and strikes. Furthermore, he always returns to the question of how Adams would handle current issues.

Adams on Ukraine and Russia

So how would Adams handle the war on terror, Russia-Ukraine, the People’s Republic of China, and other issues of the day. Codevilla offers his thoughts on all of these and more.

Looking specifically at Russia and Ukraine, Codevilla believes that Adams would say that America has no business being involved in the manner that the U.S. is currently involved. He writes, “Russia is no more willing to conquer Europe than it is able.” Seems true after their inability to conquer just Ukraine.

On Ukraine, he says, “Its independence is very much a U.S. interest, but it is beyond our capacity to secure.” Also proven to be true. However, critics would say that our financial support and imposition of sanctions on Russia has shown (at least for now) that the U.S. can help preserve Ukraine’s independence.

On Russia, he writes that John Quincy Adams “would know and sincerely convey to Russia that [Ukraine’s] independence depends on themselves, and that he regard it as counterproductive to try making them into American pawns or even to give the impression that they may be.” American statesmen clearly missed the boat on that latter part.

Finally, Codevilla concludes, “Nothing would be geopolitically clearer to Adams than that natural policy for both America and Russia is not to go looking for opportunities to get in each other’s way.” Reading this analysis is much more satisfying than the mainstream hysterics of “Putin is Hitler!” It all seems too reasonable and almost scary in its simplicity.

Moreover, Codevilla wrote this prior to Russia’s invasion. If U.S. politicians had been familiar with Adams, perhaps they could have used practical diplomacy to prevent war. They certainly are not using any diplomacy in an effort to end it.

America First statecraft

What are the principles of America first statecraft?

Codevilla believes that these principles were used by presidents from Washington to Teddy Roosevelt. He writes, “There is nothing new or sophisticated about them. They are on the homey level of ‘early to bed, early to rise,’ ‘don’t get into debt,’ ‘eat your veggies,’ and so forth. They boil down to minding our own business and minding it well.”

Can it be that simple? Don’t we need a degree from the Harvard Kennedy School or Georgetown School of Foreign Service? Hardly. In fact, Codevilla would probably say the opposite is true.

Codevilla also thinks that reliance on intelligence from the CIA has been a consistent mistake. He is extremely critical of the CIA overall. His blunt assessment is the unquestioned belief that the CIA possesses some unique insight that overrides common sense and prudential judgment. After all, the CIA has taken a lot of actions independent of the will of the American people and against good statecraft. These actions have frequently come back to hurt America.

Experts without expertise

His disdain for the the CIA is also part of his ruling class critique. It boils down to having a plethora of experts with no expertise. It’s not just in foreign policy, intelligence or the military either. We can see this everywhere in our society.

How is it that we have more mental health experts and therapists, yet the rates of anxiety, depression, and suicide continue to rise? Could it be that mental health like foreign policy has been complicated by over credentialed elites? Once upon a time the diagnosis for a kid’s “mental health issues” would also be “on the homey level”: Go outside, play with your friends, do physical activity, go to church, and listen to your parents. Now a mental health expert with a PhD will fill out a prescription drug and listen to the kid mope while the parents pony up a couple hundred bucks an hour. After all, the parents aren’t mental health experts!

Whether it is a mental health “professional” or a CIA analyst, they are probably smart and went to a lot of fancy schools. Just because they are smart doesn’t mean they are wise. Furthermore, their cures are usually worse than the disease. However, you can’t question them because you are not an expert like they are. So you and your kids can take happy pills and let the CIA figure out new ways to funnel money to third world dictators. You didn’t vote on that policy, but experts say its in our best interest.

Conclusion

We have lost Angelo Codevilla too soon. Thankfully, we have his writing to continue injecting sanity into the madness. America’s Rise and Fall among Nations will be relevant for many years.

To the enduring question of can foreign policy be as simple as John Quincy Adams makes it appear? Yes and no. Issues are very complicated with multiple second and third order considerations. Foreign policy will always be messy and difficult to figure out. It will take a lot of work. No, foreign policy is not simple.

But, yes, in that John Quincy Adams and the founders followed a remarkably simple set of principles. The model doesn’t require AI-powered software. So here is the algorithm. Start with minding one’s own business and minding it well as the general operating system. Within the code, determine the nation’s interests and what issues do and don’t affect those interests. Then consider how practically these interests can be enforced and defended. Run the code with an enduring sense of honor and also prudence. This is how John Quincy Adams would approach statecraft in the 21st Century. American leaders should wisely follow Adams’ lead. Codevilla’s book will help them start.

 

Find the Book at Encounter Books here.

 

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Stalin’s War Book Review

By PMEComplete on August 20, 2022

Stalin's War

Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II

By Sean McMeekin

Great history books are revelatory. This characteristic makes them hard to put down. Often the revelation comes from new facts and historical data that the author discovers through lengthy research. It is becoming harder to find such works. This is not because there is a lack of history to discover. The job takes hard work and years of dedication. Too much of the current historical literature is not revealing anything new. It is rather a reinterpretation of what is already known in narrative form. This tells the reader less about the history and more about how the historian wants us to understand the history. None of this is the case in Stalin’s War.

Dr. Sean McMeekin’s book, Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II, is an ambitious and provocative historical account. The author’s attention to detail and in-depth research provides a trove of new information about Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. As a result, it is the rediscovery of forgotten historical events that drives the core of Dr. McMeekin’s thesis. In the case of the Soviet Union, the fact that historians like Dr. McMeekin are unearthing new facts nearly 70 years after the death of Stalin reinforces the central premise of the book. That is the Soviet Union under Stalin was a duplicitous and immoral regime that played geopolitical chess in pursuit of worldwide communist revolution. Furthermore, they were as depraved as the Nazis and equally culpable in the start and perpetuation of World War II.

The tragedy of this history is that Churchill and Roosevelt never grasped that the Soviets were as morally corrupt as the Nazis. This fact appears most notably in the personal meetings between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. Stalin’s War sheds light on the ineptitude of Roosevelt in dealing with his Soviet counterpart. Dr. McMeekin illustrates that Roosevelt had a deep desire to be liked if not loved by the communist dictator. If we take a schoolyard analogy, think of a bully on the playground. Stalin would be that bully. Then consider another weaker kid that wants the bully to like him. Unfortunately, this kid would be Roosevelt. Typically, the schoolyard bully would want to beat up the weaker kid. But the weaker kid has an ace to play. His parents are rich and every day he brings shiny new toys to school. To get the bully to like him, the weaker rich kid lets the bully “borrow” his shiny new toys. But the bully doesn’t like him. In fact, the bully has contempt for the rich kid with the shiny new toys. The only reason the bully doesn’t beat him up is because he might lose access to the shiny new toys.

What were the shiny new toys that Roosevelt had to offer? They came in the form of Lend-Lease aid, and they were much more destructive and expensive than the typical Hot Wheels. Dr. McMeekin runs through the numbers in terms of tanks, planes, weapons, oil, steel, aluminum, and even butter. All of these were offered to the Stalin to “borrow.” The purpose behind the aid was to help the Soviet Union on the eastern front after Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa. Thus, Roosevelt’s intentions were noble. But the size and scope of the aid was incredible costing the United States over $1 trillion in today’s dollars. Even more telling is that the aid was delivered with no strings attached. There was never any guarantee that the USSR would pay it back. And, of course, they never did. Meanwhile, Britain paid off its debt over the course of 61 years with a final payment in December 2006.

Dr. McMeekin goes into great detail about the conferences at Tehran, Potsdam, and Yalta when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met. One would think that Roosevelt and Churchill would have presented a united front against Stalin. But it wasn’t so. In fact, there were many times in which Churchill was on his own. In one case, Stalin felt brazen enough to make fun of Churchill to his face. Churchill was like the cool, athletic kid in the schoolyard. The bully would like to beat him up, but knows that its going to be a tough, bloody fight. Besides there are plenty of weaker kids to pick on and a rival bully to worry about. Of course, the rival bully was Nazi Germany.

Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 would not have happened without Stalin. The two bullies in the European schoolyard, the Nazis and the Soviets, colluded together. They signed a non-aggression pact called the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. That pact was signed on August 23, 1939. It is named after each country’s foreign affairs minister, Ribbentrop for the Nazis, and Molotov for the Soviets. Dr. McMeekin explains that this pact should give Stalin as much culpability for starting World War II as Hitler. While the Nazis fired the first shot, the Soviets were not far behind them. Indeed, Soviet forces invaded Poland on September 17, 1939. Poland was the dividing line in the European sandbox. One bully struck from the west (Nazi Germany) and the other bully struck from the east (the USSR). They both decided to respect each other’s half of the sandbox initially.

The Soviet invasion of Poland was the opening salvo in Stalin’s war. It was quickly followed by the invasion and subjugation of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The USSR also invaded Finland and part of Romania. The invasion of Finland was less successful than the others. Dr. McMeekin points out that the USSR invaded six countries after collaborating with the Nazis. But the western powers did not see Stalin’s belligerence in the same way that they saw Hitler’s. Dr. McMeekin explores the many reasons why this was the case. One of the primary reasons is that the USSR was less public about their intentions than the Nazis.

The Soviets and the Nazis were equally immoral, but ideologically opposed. Long-term they were foes and likely to go to war. So, what was Stalin’s purpose in collaborating with Hitler? First, he was gambling that the western Allied powers would enter the war and fight against Nazi Germany. That gamble paid off. From Stalin’s point of view the Anglo-American allies and the Nazis were no different. They were all part of a global capitalist system and were, therefore, enemies of communism. The USSR was committed to destroying them for the sake of communist revolution. However, Stalin wagered that it was better if they destroyed each other first and then the USSR could mop up the pieces. What Stalin miscalculated was how quickly Nazi Germany would be able to conquer western Europe through their infamous blitzkrieg. Unlike World War I, there was no western front. Hitler’s war machine was much more formidable and had learned from the tactical and operational failures of the first world war. As a result, Stalin faced the prospect of a stronger and more aggressive Germany that could soon turn its sights on the USSR, which, eventually, it did.

What Britain and the United States never seemed to understand was that Stalin was not simply a nationalist committed to defending the borders of Mother Russia from Nazi aggression. On the contrary, Stalin was a true ideologue and as committed to communist revolution as Hitler was to German lebensraum. The Allies never took seriously Stalin’s global ambitions. Soviet conquest and Nazi conquest were equally brutal. Millions of people of different races and nationalities suffered the same harsh fate under the Soviets that Jews suffered under the Nazis. The Soviets executed political prisoners and sent many to gulags. In Poland, the Soviets were the perpetrators of the infamous Katyn massacre. Despite the USSR’s consistent denial (until 1990), Stalin personally approved the massacre of over 20,000 Polish officers and POWs in the spring of 1940. When the Soviets invaded Germany in 1945, they raped, pillaged, and engaged in random acts of violence. Stalin sanctioned rape. Additionally, Soviet soldiers killed refugee women and children and, in some cases, ran over by tanks. They looted and burned homes. In fact, Soviet brutality extended to their own people. Dr. McMeekin explains that Soviet POWs in American custody often attempted suicide to avoid involuntary repatriation to the USSR. The monstrosity that was Stalin’s Soviet Union was more than apparent by the time V-E Day arrived on May 9, 1945.

The treatment of conquered people illustrates the stark moral contrast between the western powers and the Soviet Union. There is a reason that refugees fled west and continued to do so until the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. In 1983, when President Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire”, he was not wrong. The Soviet Union was rotten to the core just like the Nazis. It is a shame that the western powers either did not realize this fact, ignored it, or perhaps were duped by the many Soviet infiltrators that populated high ranking positions in the U.S. government. If the western powers had realized this fact, then perhaps the only aid they would have offered Stalin would have been indirect by pouring American money and resources into the liberation of western Europe. If American military power had been solely dedicated to freeing France and defeating Germany than the western Allies could have done the latter without the Red Army storming into Berlin. Furthermore, Stalin would not have received the military equipment, supplies, and technology that would enable the Soviet regime to subjugate the eastern European nations that fell behind the Iron Curtain. History is full of unknowns. Stalin’s War uncovers a lot of previous unknowns. In doing so, it raises a lot more “what ifs.”

 

Additional Reading and Resources:

Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II

Britain pays off World War II debt in 2006: Link

The Katyn Massacre 1940: A History of Crime

Ronald Reagan’s great speeches:

“Evil Empire” speech 3/8/1983 and the famous speech at the Brandenburg gate in West Berlin 6/12/1987

How Wars End Podcast interview

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The Chinese Invasion Threat Book Review

By PMEComplete on January 23, 2021

Name the only European country that has formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan? That is a good nugget of trivia. Perhaps when bars re-open and people socialize again, it will be a good one to keep in reserves. Answer: The Vatican.

How do I know this? I picked up a fascinating, yet sometimes scary book by Ian Easton on the topic of Taiwan. More specifically, the capability of Taiwan to defend itself against a Chinese invasion. The book is appropriately named The Chinese Invasion Threat.

The level of detail is remarkable. Mr. Easton has done his homework. He has a strong grasp of history and current events. He draws on countless hours of research and thousands of pages of sources. He has studied the People’s Liberation Army doctrine to the extent of its availability to gain insight into what he declares is the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) long-term objective to invade, control, dominate, and rule Taiwan.

The history begins with the Chinese Civil War between the Communists under Mao Zedong and and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. The Nationalists lost and were forced from the mainland to a string of islands off the coast with the largest one being the island of current day Taiwan (then Formosa). Over the years, the Chinese Communists sought to conquer Taiwan. However, they were consistently deterred by the difficulty of the mission, and America’s willingness to intervene. 

It should be noted that Taiwan and the Taiwanese consider themselves the Republic of China aka “ROC.” They believe that they are the rightful Chinese government. Although they have abandoned their claim to the Chinese mainland.

Over the years, Taiwan has built up defenses and lived with the constant threat of an invasion. What we learn from Mr. Easton’s book is how difficult an invasion would be for the PRC. Indeed, the conditions would have to be just right. Furthermore, the mobilization and logistics would be hard for the Chinese to conceal. Mr. Easton spells out these complexities in careful detail.

Additionally, the weather would have to cooperate as the Taiwan Straight is perilous for ships to cross. It is often impassable for amphibious operations. The Taiwanese terrain and beaches present many other difficulties. Taiwan is mostly mountainous, and the mountain ranges are extremely tall and treacherous for any military movement. Finally, the manmade features built on Taiwan are all heavily reinforced with steel and concrete. Taiwan often gets hit with typhoons and the structures have been built to withstand the onslaught of nature. Thus, the island is well defended with natural and manmade obstacles.

In the big picture, it is ironic and sad that Taiwan does not have diplomatic recognition by the rest of the world. It is a democracy with a free society. It is also the United States’ 10th largest trading partner. Its economy is highly technical as it makes many electronic components including chips for Apple iPhones. Nevertheless, U.S. relations with Taiwan evolved and were solidified in the 1978 Taiwan Relations Act under President Jimmy Carter. In this relationship, America supports Taiwan with military equipment and expertise. It also supports Taiwan with an implicit guarantee of military protection. However, there are no formal diplomatic relations.

Mr. Easton’s book is a must read especially for U.S. Marines. As the Marines look to the Indo-Pacific region for current and future operations, this book is worth studying. Mr. Easton describes the flashpoint between China and Taiwan as one of the most consequential national security issues that America faces. The strategic importance of Taiwan cannot be understated. It is true that while China is militarily aggressive, they are waging war on many fronts. These fronts include cyber, political disinformation, economic pressure, and espionage.

Finally, while Mr. Easton published his book in 2017, it is even more relevant in 2021. The year 2020 saw an increased amount of PLA aggression against Taiwan. The PLA continues to push the boundaries and test the Taiwanese. Thus, it is crucial to study and know what is coming. Mr. Easton’s book is a strong warning. The question is will America’s national security decision makers heed this warning in time to stop the Chinese invasion?

Check out the book-

The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia

Also check out the podcast interview. 

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The Fifth Domain book review

By PMEComplete on January 20, 2020

The following is a book review of The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats by Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake

After reading this book, I understand that cyber-attacks can shut down hospitals, electric grids, and create a trillion dollars in damage to the world economy. These things are happening all of the time. The equivalent of World War III is raging on the internet while people sit on the couch with a bowl of Fruit Loops streaming Netflix. So naturally, during internet World War III, I read this book to answer some important questions. The most important question isn’t where to dig a fighting position with my entrenching tool and hold the line with an M16. That is because the fifth domain is an ethereal, unseen place in the clouds. In fact, unlike the other four domains- land, air, sea, and space- this is World War III in the cloud! So the most important question of internet World War III…

Is a Russian agent watching me watch Netflix? 

Serious question. I know that right now thousands of cyberattacks are taking place on my bank, and that it could mean all my life savings could be stolen. That would be bad for sure. But, if I really am being watched right now during Season 3 of Stranger Things, then we have a big problem. Oh, and I want to know if Mark Zuckerberg is listening to my conversations and then selling me ads on Facebook. If so, then I am totally deactivating my Facebook account in protest… for a day.

The Fifth Domain was a fun read. I like books that I can read and remember the material. Because when I remember the material, I sound smarter than I actually am. After all, that is the goal of reading. Some people read and then they say, “Check out such and such book, it was so great.” My response, “What is it about?” Cue the awkward pause. “Well, its about this thing… that um… ugh…” Yikes!

It’s embarrassing to read a “great” book and then not remember anything.

The Fifth Domain won’t be like that. The only thing that would be hard to remember is the weird names of the cyber attacks. But, guess what! I am going to put some of the major ones here, and some information about what happened. If you memorize a few of these, you’ll be set. I mean you will be the darling of cocktail party conversation. Also, if you talk about Petya and WannaCry on that first Tinder date, forget it! He or she will call you back immediately. You’re welcome!

Here are some prominent cyberattacks:

2010: Stuxnet- U.S. attacks Iran

Full disclosure: This one is my favorite because it came from the good ole U.S.A. We let freedom ring in the form of a piece of malware that infected and disrupted Iranian nuclear centrifuges at their Natanz facilities. Go America!

2012: Iran Strikes Back

This one isn’t as cool. In fact, if you were in the Navy and Marine Corps at that time using an NMCI computer, then some Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) agent probably knows your “Pros and Cons.” They also know if you were on a meal plan or not. If you’re a 2nd Lieutenant, then the IRGC probably read all the crazy training plans, that your CO never approved. The IRGC probably stole ORMs to copy and paste for their own training plans… bastards!  

2015: Chinese hackers and U.S. cheaters

This was the year that the Chinese stole 21.5 million records from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). If you worked for the government around this time, someone in China probably has your social security number. Also, if you worked for the government and also had an Ashley Madison profile then 2015 was a double whammy. Not only did the Chinese take your social security number, but your spouse found out you were cheating. Ouch!

2016: The DNC gets hacked

The Russians are at it. This is the year the DNC e-mails were hacked and released by Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks for all the world to see. Sorry Bernie supporters, but the mainstream Democrats really weren’t feeling the Bern. The authors do spend a good portion of the book talking about hacking to meddle in U.S. elections. It is worth paying attention to as we come on another election year in 2020.

2017: WannaCry (no, but I will laugh at this funny hacker name)

This was a busy year for the cyber armies. Things kicked off with WannaCry, and people started hearing about Bitcoin. Why? The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft software that allowed them to break in to people’s computers and encrypt them. They would then demand payment in Bitcoin to unlock them. This is also called a ransomware attack. This attack is important because the U.S. blamed North Korea. Therefore, this was a high-profile case of state sponsored cyber war.

June 2017: Petya attack

This was another attack in the same realm as WannaCry. However, this one involved the target being Ukraine. Also, the suspected perpetrators are Russian. In this case, Microsoft vulnerabilities were also exploited, and Bitcoin was demanded. This attack caused global ramifications as it affected many businesses and industries around the world. The attack cost the world economy many billions of dollars.

Right Now

The Chinese. Every day. All the time. The Chinese are just typing away as we speak trying to hack anything and everything.

2020: New Decade, new strategy?

Finally, in 2020, we had some recent news that the NSA alerted Microsoft to a vulnerability in some of their software. The vulnerability made it possible for hackers to exploit. This was a newsworthy event. Instead of keeping the information secret to develop their own cyber capabilities, the NSA decided to work with Microsoft.

If there is one major thematic takeaway from the book, it is that the authors believe in a “strong defense” in the cyber realm. Also, it is important for corporations and the government to work together on cyber defense. Companies cannot look to the government for solutions. It is a problem that is beyond the reach of one entity. Perhaps that is why the recent news of the NSA working with Microsoft is so important. There is a shifting strategy in which the government and companies are recognizing the need to collaborate to solve problems in the fifth domain.

After reading the book, I looked at a cyber security company called CrowdStrike. The book mentions CrowdStrike many times. It is a company that went public on the NASDAQ in 2019. It sounds like an important company with a smart founder and CEO. Maybe I will buy some shares. If the companies stock price goes up, then my purchase of The Fifth Domain will have been worth it many times over. Not only will I have more money for the cyber criminals to steal, but I’ll also have two factor-authentication to protect it. Who said internet World War III couldn’t be profitable? And now I have extra money to comfortably renew that Netflix subscription. Just don’t ask me for my password!   

Check out the book and make your own killing in cyber stocks… The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats

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Call Sign Chaos: How General Mattis turned the ‘good idea fairy’ into CHAOS

By PMEComplete on September 16, 2019

Call Sign Chaos

There is an unofficial term in the U.S. military (at least in the Marine Corps) for the officer (generally an officer), who says, “I have a great idea I want to try.” This term is not altogether endearing. It is typically attached to an exuberant Second Lieutenant Platoon Commander. Close second and third could be Company and Battalion Commanders. The name percolates down to the lower ranks. All Marines are on notice waiting for the inevitable hours-long PME or twenty-mile ruck run. In short, what the unit will hear is that the officer in question is a “good idea fairy.”

Now, the so-called “good idea fairy” officer usually means well. Often, they need the advice and wise counsel of a good Platoon Sergeant or senior SNCO to help mold and shape their proposed good idea. Ironically, if the officer is to lose the title “good idea fairy”, there are two things that have to happen. First, their idea needs to be good in reality. Second, their idea needs to work in practice. Furthermore, even if these two things happen, the “good idea fairy” label can still stick as a negative stigma. After all, new ideas often require changes and breaks from the status quo. These initiatives are often the hammer that smash the phrase, “This is how we’ve always done things.” Thus, for an officer to lose the label “good idea fairy” and turn it into call sign “CHAOS” is a monumental accomplishment. This officer’s good ideas must have been really, really, consistently good for many years.

Colonel Has Another Outstanding Solution (CHAOS)

In General Mattis’ new book, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, I learned that “CHAOS” stands for “Colonel Has Another Outstanding Solution.” This call sign is slightly more bad-ass than “good idea fairy.” General John Toolan (USMC-Ret.) was the originator of the call sign. Since he was subordinate to General Mattis, its probably better that this was the name he came up with instead of using the aforementioned moniker.

In his book, General Mattis talks about many times in which he did, in fact, have solutions. Lots of them too. What would you expect from someone who has also been called the “Warrior Monk.” Of course, this is a nod to his studiousness. General Mattis is known as a voracious reader with an extensive library. He makes it clear that he considers reading a moral imperative and a hallmark of good leadership. Additionally, his solutions would not be possible without dedicated scholarship of history and past wars.

Quick note to clear the air on politics…

As much as political pundits want to kick poor Jim Mattis around like a political football, the fact is that General Mattis’ solutions have clashed with all political parties. From Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, a key theme of the book is the battle between Mattis, the practical warfighter, with the political machine. He does respect and value civilian leadership over the military. But, that doesn’t mean he respects their decisions. As he mentions in the book, he was fired by a Democratic administration and resigned under a Republican one. A true independent indeed.

Send in the Marines… please!

Over a forty-year career, the book covers a lot of modern history. General Mattis served in the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan (OEF) and the Iraq War (OIF). His highest level of Command was as Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander from August 11, 2010 to March 22, 2013.

In Afghanistan, General Mattis led Task Force 58, and became the first Marine to do so. He was responsible for planning and conducting operations in southern Afghanistan. After American troops and Afghans secured Kandahar, General Mattis turned his attention to the mountains of Tora Bora. He claims that he used the 19th Century U.S. Armies “Geronimo Campaign” in the American Southwest as the framework for his plan to capture and kill Osama bin Laden (OBL). He writes that his Marines were ready to close with and destroy OBL and al-Qaeda. “Just send us in!” General Mattis practically shouted.

However, General Tommy Franks overruled him and instead employed Afghan fighters to hunt OBL. Mattis recognized the critical error. But, he also looks back reflectively thinking if he could have done more to sell his plan better. He wonders if he could have done a better job communicating with the decision makers above him on why they should send in the Marines to finish the job.

Nevertheless, he concludes his chapter on Afghanistan by citing a New York Times correspondent, writing “The refusal of CENTCOM to dispatch the Marines was the gravest error of the war.”

Iraq War – 1st MARDIV Commander

General Mattis was also commander of First Marine Division (1st MARDIV). He commanded 1st MARDIV from the invasion of Iraq and the March to Baghdad through Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah. He does not mince words in this chapter. His frustration with the politics surrounding what happened in Fallujah in March and April 2004 is palpable.

Mattis saw the halted Fallujah assault in the Spring of 2004 as yet another missed opportunity. It was a major tactical and strategic blunder. His finger wags again at the politicians and higher ups.

Marines were ready to pounce. “Send in the Marines,” he shouted again. But, political pressure halted the assault. Instead of taking the fight to the enemy, General Mattis believes miscalculated political decisions gave the insurgents (namely Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) a major win.

He concluded that the U.S.and the Marines would have to fight again. They did. In Novemer 2004, the second battle of Fallujah took place. Known as Operation Phantom Fury, it became a major urban battle akin to Hue City in 1968. The Marines fought house to house to destroy the insurgents that had taken the city in the Spring. This battle was much more decisive in the Marines favor. The politicians finally got out of the troops way, and the job got done.

I MEF Commander

After serving several years stateside, General Mattis took command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Thus, he commanded 40,000 Marines to include 15,000 serving in Iraq in 2006.

Commanding U.S. Marines in Iraq two years later, the situation on the ground had changed. Military victories in places like Fallujah laid the groundwork for the improvement. Furthermore, the Anbar awakening was also taking place. Sunni Sheiks in Anbar province turned toward American forces and away from al-Qaeda.

General Mattis explains that U.S. forces built trust with Sunni sheiks and tribes. This goodwill helped turn the security situation around and allowed U.S. troops to “conclusively seize the offensive.” Unlike 2004, Mattis’ return in 2006-2007 was more optimistic. Finally, victory was close at hand.

Legacy Beyond the Battlefield

Reading Call Sign Chaos , I am reminded by how impressive some of General Mattis’ training and doctrine solutions were too. For example, after returning from Iraq in 2004, General Mattis took command of Marine Corps Combat Development Command. During this time, he helped spearhead the Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) in Camp Pendleton, CA. This is a fully simulated immersive experience where small units train in an environment that replicates the confusion and uncertainty of combat overseas. General Mattis drove this “outstanding solution” in the mid-2000s. It was a solution that has saved many lives because of the high quality, realistic training. It fosters decision making in a chaotic environment. Mattis believes this is crucial for small unit leaders to be able to do.

Also, General Mattis partnered with General David Petraeus to write a joint doctrine manual on counterinsurgency (COIN). By writing a doctrinal guide to COIN, General Mattis again helped prepare American units for battle by capturing lessons learned and highlighting best practices for success.

When it comes to doctrine, General Mattis also talks about his time at U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk, VA. He took it upon himself to oppose a popular doctrine called Effects Based Operations (EBO). He opposed this after observing the failure of Israel to employ this type of fighting against Hezbollah in 2006. In this case, General Mattis’ solution was to get back to the fundamentals of warfighting in its most basic form. He re-introduced MCDP-1, Warfighting, which talks about the immutability of the nature of war.

Finally, at the conclusion of his career at JFCOM, General Mattis also recommended that the command be abolished. He did so without any other consideration other than whether it was worth the American taxpayers’ investment. After time in command and talking to his own troops at JFCOM, he concluded that it was not making a meaningful contribution. Thus, as he explains in the book, he fired himself.

CENTCOM Commander

Not long after “firing himself”, he was sitting in President Obama’s office (i.e. the Oval Office) for a job interview. The job was CENTCOM Commander. He got it.

His time as CENTCOM Commander was marked by many of the frustrations with political bureaucracy that are consistent throughout the book. He gripes about the lack of awareness of Obama administration officials to fully comprehend and historically contextualize the situation taking place during the Arab Spring.

Similar to the section where he disagreed with the Bush Administration on Fallujah, he also thinks that President Obama’s decision to pull out of Iraq too soon was a serious strategic mistake. There was clearly wishful thinking that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was going to be a viable Prime Minister that could govern effectively. He wasn’t. General Mattis makes the case that his polarizing, sectarian style of governance led to the Sunni tribes turning against the Iraqi government. This ultimately set conditions for ISIS to seize large territorial gains starting in 2014. (General Mattis is a fan of David Kilcullen, and Mr. Kilcullen’s book Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism is one of the best accounts I have read that describes what happened after American forces left Iraq)

Leadership Legacy

Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead also includes many of what can be called General Mattis’ “greatest hits” i.e. the quotes for which he has gained notoriety and cult status. Like this one:

I come in peace. I didn’t bring artillery. But I’m pleading with you, with tears in my eyes: If you fuck with me, I’ll kill you all.

or this one:

Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.

General Mattis provides the right level of context and perspective that lets most of his critics (are there critics?) know where he was coming from when he said what he said. The most important takeaway is that the quotes are not bluster. They are rather candor, and a leader speaking with authority that comes from wisdom.

Building trust requires clear and effective communication. As a western boy raised in the country, Mattis has the edge of a man who says what is on his mind. If he is known for being blunt and plainspoken, it is clear that he wanted his subordinates to reciprocate this in their feedback. His quotes are brilliant because they are no B.S. And General Mattis’ tolerance for B.S. is extremely low. As a result, Marines knew they could trust him to listen. This is part of what makes General Mattis so revered. Those whom he led had enormous trust in him.

Leadership principles reiterated throughout the book include building trust. “A unit moves at the speed of trust” is a frequent refrain. He also mentions the adage, “Praise in public and criticize in private.”

For his part, General Mattis’ greatest leadership lesson can be simply his personal example of caring and commitment to his Marines. He was the type of leader who “walked the lines.” He wanted to be with his Marines. He wanted them to see him, and for his Marines to know that he was personally on the ground with them sharing in whatever they were going through whether stateside or in combat.

General Mattis’ Influence

General Mattis legacy will endure for years. As previously mentioned, many of his initiatives continue to make the military better. Also, as Secretary of Defense, he published the 2018 National Defense Strategy guidance, which is still being used to drive military strategy and future doctrine. (More to follow on the NDS in this blog/ podcast soon)

On a personal note, he has been a major inspiration behind this blog and the podcast. This was my own “outstanding solution” to help improve PME throughout the Marine Corps and DOD in the form of high-quality interviews and great writing. If you’ve made it this far in the book review, then I trust you’re on board with my own mission.

Remember the goal is to go from “good idea fairy” to CHAOS. It often takes decades of reading and experience to achieve. Nevertheless, with persistence and passion, General Mattis shows that it is possible.       

Additional Reading and Information 

As mentioned, General Mattis is an avid reader. There is an e-mail that went viral in which he explains the value of reading. Essentially, his argument is that it is foolish not to take the lessons and experiences of others and learn from them. One could take a year to get through the entirety of General Mattis’ book list. I am including a few of the top names that I like best from the list and a few that I am hoping to pick up soon.

Three of my favorites:

With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa by E.B. Sledge

Gates of Fire: An Epic Novel of the Battle of Thermopylae by Steven Pressfield

One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer by Nathaniel Fick

Next to read:

The Forgotten Soldier by Guy Sajer

Once an Eagle by Anton Myer

Meditations: A New Translation by Marcus Aurelius

  

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Book Review of American Patriot: The Life and Wars of Colonel Bud Day

By PMEComplete on August 18, 2019

Honor. Courage. Commitment. These are the core values of the United States Marine Corps. Every Marine learns about them either in bootcamp at Parris Island or San Diego or Quantico for officers. The Marine Corps and the U.S. military put a premium on these values. They are the hallmarks of service that sets military men and women apart from civilians.

I believe that these values need to be reinforced. Core values are like muscles that atrophy unless we commit to them and actively think about them. With that in mind, I picked up an amazing biography, American Patriot: The Life and Wars of Colonel Bud Day, which is a 24-hour fitness of core value training.

Colonel Bud Day (USAF) is not a household name. Perhaps Air Force personnel are more familiar with him. However, he did serve as a Marine during World War II. Although this Devil Dog had a less than stellar career. In fact, he was the subject of a court-martial. Nevertheless, he joined the Air Force, and became a pilot. He found a renewed commitment to service in the Air Force, and it was as a pilot that he would build his stellar legacy. Indeed he became one of the most decorated American veterans in history.

American Patriot is the story of a man from the heartland of America (Iowa), who volunteered to serve not just in one, but three wars. He served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Robert Coram, the biographer, paints a picture of a man, Bud Day, who saw service and loyalty to his country as a way of life. No questions asked. There was no conscientious objecting. It was simply a matter of pride and patriotism.

Furthermore, Colonel Day had a great family and a successful law career when he decided to serve specifically in Vietnam. Consider the following quote:

“To a civilian, it seems bewildering at best, callous at worst, that a forty-one-year-old man with four children- three of them in diapers- would ask to go to war. But such is the nature of the warrior; a warrior rushes toward- not away from- the sound of the guns.”

Additionally, Colonel Day’s wife had started a profitable business too, and the couple had many lucrative real estate investments. Bud Day had a lot to lose, yet he still volunteered to serve.

But, that is where the story begins. It wasn’t enough for him to simply serve as a field grade officer where he could have found an easy assignment somewhere far from the front lines of armed combat. Instead, Bud Day commanded an elite, top-secret fighter squadron- the Mistys. Their missions were some of the most dangerous of the Vietnam War. The Mistys bombed high value targets in the North. Bud Day’s role as commander wasn’t a cushy staff officer job. He was on the front lines flying every day. He was leading by example, and his unit loved him.

Coram explains it as follows, “When a Vietnam-era fighter pilot says he flew up north, that means he ripped off the front gate of hell and flew into the deadliest air-defense system ever devised.” As a result of the danger and constant challenge of the mission, Colonel Day and his fellow pilots returned from each mission knowing a “marrow-deep fatigue that came from being shot at hundreds of times in the past five hours.” (And I thought I was tired after staring at a computer all day!)

If the story sounds like that of the late Senator John McCain, then here is where things get interesting. Colonel Day was McCain’s cellmate. The two warriors “bunked” together at the Hanoi Hilton.

Like McCain, Colonel Day was shot down and captured in Vietnam. He nearly escaped at first. The author paints an amazing story of his daring escape. As much as I rooted for Day to make it, I was halfway through the book and knew the inevitable was coming. Colonel Day was captured again and sent north. Furthermore, knowing he nearly escaped, the North Vietnamese wanted revenge.

Let me say this up front. The scenes in the book are gruesome. To say that Colonel Day had the shit pummeled out of him is an enormous understatement. I thought the Saw movie series was intense. Those torture scenes don’t hold a candle to what Coram describes. The treatment of American POWs in North Vietnam remains disgraceful. Colonel Day’s story retells much of that harrowing experience.

But, the amazing part of the book is the resolve of the American fighting men in it. The reader will feel an enormous amount of pride and patriotism knowing that our country has such great men. Colonel Day’s honor and resolve is unbelievable. The oft-repeated refrain of the book is “Return with Honor.” It sustains Day and others. It becomes the rallying cry in the face of so much hardship.

It is unfortunate the extent to which honor has become equated with something antiquated and primitive. Distortions of honor exist to be sure. But, the book paints the nobler side of honor. This is the type of honor that is about commitment to a cause greater than oneself and a resolve to never give up on one’s country and mission. The Code of Conduct is the backbone behind it.

For Colonel Day and his fellow prisoners, they saw adherence to the Code of Conduct and doing their duty as their primary mission while in captivity. Consider the following quote, “They pressed on with their duty as they saw that duty. While the world might think of them as prisoners of war, they thought of themselves as prisoners at war.” The fighting didn’t stop for them. There was no quit in these men simply because they were POWs. 

However, not all of the POWs valued honor and duty the same way. The book shows a divide between two groups of POWs. Twelve POWs returned early before Day and the others. Colonel Day and his fellow POWs that endured the entire imprisonment until the Spring of 1973 scorn these twelve early released POWs. It becomes a source of enormous tension after the War. It may seem difficult to fathom such a bitter divide. But Coram does a good job providing the context and history behind it. In the end, it comes down to honor and doing one’s duty. Colonel Day firmly believed that the twelve early released POWs forsook that duty and compromised their honor.  

Colonel Day’s release from captivity isn’t the end of the story. He led an amazing life beyond his time of uniformed service. As previously mentioned, he was a lawyer. He was successful before the Vietnam War, and he would prove to be equally if not more successful after it. He achieved amazing financial success. Think more real estate properties and new Cadillac type of success!

However, his training as a lawyer led him into a role in which he went toe to toe with the government in court. The issue at hand related to medical benefits for retirees. The story is one in which military retirees were denied their benefits in the 1990s under President Clinton. Colonel Day decided to challenge the government in court over this issue despite being in the latter part of his life with poor physical health and recurring nightmares from Vietnam. It’s an amazing bookend to an already distinguished career. Robert Coram paints Day as a man committed to service until the end.

A good biography can not only illuminate different periods of history, but also inspire us. Colonel Day’s story motivated the hell out of me. It is like reading about other instances of American bravery and hardship because it challenges the reader to wonder, “Could I do the same under those circumstances?” While I was reading the book on a couch with a beer in air-conditioning, I thought about this question several times. At the very least, it is a biography that compels us to pause, reflect, and be grateful to live in a country where such brave men and women are willing to take up arms, do their duty, and uphold their honor. Colonel Day was one of those amazing individuals. America is grateful for them.  

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Destined For War Book Review

By PMEComplete on July 10, 2019

Destined For War

“It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”

– Thucydides

Is America destined for war with China?

Dr. Graham Allison poses the question in the subtitle of a book called Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?. If you’re like me and you’re asking what the heck is a “Thucydides’s Trap”, then I am sure you’re not alone.

Thucydides is the godfather of history. He’s kind of a big deal. He wrote about the Peloponnesian War that took place between Athens and Sparta in the Fifth century BCE i.e. a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away. Most people probably know more details about the last season of Game of Thrones than Athens and Sparta. Even though the Spartans were super badass, I don’t think Thucydides mentioned anything about dragons. But while George R.R. Martin is a good writer, he is not the father of history. Thucydides will take that title because he wrote about the conflict and helped provide the framework for some theories of power and politics such as realpolitik. So for all political science students, you’re freakin’ welcome!

In his “Melian Dialogue” Thucydides wrote the classic line, “In the real world, the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.” Boom! I’d like to see the HBO writers pull that one off. In one sentence, Thucydides gave military historians intellectual red meat to devour for years.

Thucydides’s Trap Thesis

At the core of Dr. Allison’s book is the theory that the U.S. and China are destined for the same fate as the Athenians and the Spartans. The Spartans were threatened by the rise of Athens. As a result of distrust and diplomatic breakdowns, the two nations eventually went to war.

In the modern sense, the U.S. is the entrenched power (i.e. the badass Spartans) and China is the rising power (i.e. the upstart Athenians). It is important to understand that he is not suggesting that the nations are similar in terms of politics or culture. After all, Athens was a democracy. On the other hand, China surveils its citizens, blocks their Internet access, and slaps them with Uber-style social ratings. Meanwhile, Sparta was a warrior culture where mothers told their sons, “Come back with your shield or on it.” I guess the Spartans never heard of safe spaces. American kids are given cell phones and anxiety pills, and mothers tell them not to sit too close to the screen playing video games. Kind of different there…

What makes war inevitable?

Economic Rise

“Since the Great Recession, 40 percent of all the growth around the world has occurred in just one country: China.”

– Dr. Graham Allison

China’s economic rise over the last thirty years has been incredible. In fact, it has averaged at least 10 percent a year since 1981. For whatever criticism exists about their style of government and economy, they have succeeded in “lifting more than half a billion people out of extreme poverty.” Additionally, China’s middle class and consumer economy is beginning to show strength. They are spending boatloads (a quantifiable # btw) of money on research and education in areas of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math).   

Additionally, they have more room to grow. Dr. Allison cites the productivity gap between American and Chinese workers. American workers are currently four times as productive as Chinese workers. However, if China can close the gap over the next ten years then China’s economy will become four times the size of America’s. Sounds like America needs to send Chinese laborers X-Boxes, potato chips, soda, and La-Z-Boy sofas ASAP.

Xi Jinping: Is he China’s Theodore Roosevelt?

The book contains an interesting look at President Theodore Roosevelt. President Roosevelt had a clear vision for American expansion, power, and dominance. He had grandiose ideas for America’s economic and military might not only in the Western Hemisphere but abroad. More importantly, he helped America become a world power.

Thus, Dr. Allison wants the reader to ask, “What if China had a Theodore Roosevelt of its own?” What would that leader be like?

Xi Jinping doesn’t look like a Rough Rider charging across the badlands on a horse shooting pistols with a cowboy hat, but let’s not underestimate people. The book points out that the current Chinese leader has a vision of Chinese greatness and supremacy. He may not be charging San Juan Hill, but the dude thinks that China has something akin to their own manifest destiny. He’s smart patient, and powerful. He’s developed a strong inner circle and consolidated Chinese politics under the Communist Party.

What is his foreign policy idea?

The Chinese World Order

The chapter about China valuing hierarchy in international affairs is important. Instead of a rules-based international order, they want all other nations to bow and stand in awe of the great Chinese civilization. It seems like it might be hard to play nice with others when you want them to kiss your feet. Just saying… This leads us to the next issue:

Clash of Civilizations

Samuel Huntington wrote a book called The Clash of Civilizations. The thesis is that in the post-Cold War era, conflicts are going to become less ideological and more cultural. This idea was controversial in the 1990s so I can’t imagine people are any less offended by it today. But Dr. Allison seems to think it is highly relevant.

The book suggests that around 1900 when America became a world power, the English basically said, “We know you guys are cool.” Same language. Same general political system. Same religion. Etc… There were enough similarities for the British to let it go without too much of a fight.

This decision worked in Britain’s favor. During World War I, the Brits needed America’s back, and we helped. When World War II kicked off, they wanted America in the fight, and we were all in. From there, a “special relationship” developed that has sustained the post-war and modern-day alliance between the U.S. and Britain.

Could something similar happen between the U.S. and China? 

Again, the author returns to some of the political and cultural differences. It’s not that it can’t happen. However, it seems less likely. Furthermore, the U.S. has made overtures to the Chinese and tried to include them in the U.S. version of world order with varying degrees of success.

To show just how unlikely it is for the two nations to become strong allies, Dr. Allison suggests that it would take an Alien invasion from outer space. Sound insane? Well, there is a historical precedent for this. Apparently, President Ronald Reagan suggested to Mikhail Gorbachev that if little martian men from Mars attacked Earth, the two nations would become fast friends.

Pending the arrival of any non-Russian little green men, Dr. Allison’s point is that there are major issues facing humankind that could cause the U.S. and China to set aside their differences and work together. Among them are climate change and threats of terrorism. The point is that if the two world powers can find a common enemy like space invaders or global warming then in theory tensions should ease.

Let’s try Strategy 101

The authors call to action is a tough one. He is suggesting that American politics become less polarized and that politicians start thinking long-term. Cue the laugh track…

Have you caught your breath yet? His point is a bit somber here. He thinks that American political leaders need to take strategy seriously, but probably won’t. Nevertheless, that is the solution.

The reality is that China does think in terms of generations and not election cycles. If the U.S. could start projecting poll numbers from our great-great-yet to be born grandkids then maybe that’s our best shot. We’ll see. My guess is that Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos will be living on Mars by then. Of course, then they can raise armies to invade earth. In turn, the earth will have its alien invaders to bring the U.S. and China together and avert war just in the nick of time. And now you know why SpaceX really exists…

Conclusion

As the U.S. and Chinese trade negotiations remain ongoing, as protests break out in Hong Kong, and while China continues to build artificial islands in the South China Sea, this book becomes more relevant each day. It combines my favorite qualities of history books- relevant information, interesting facts for cocktail parties, cool statistics, and most importantly, not too long!      

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“Retreat! Hell!” On Desperate Ground Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 9, 2019

It is hard to read On Desperate Ground, and not gain an immediate appreciation for whatever is happening in your life. The old adage things can always be worse comes to mind. If your buddy says , “I’m having a bad day. I was fired from work, and my girlfriend dumped me.” Hand him a copy of this book. There is not much that compares to the harrowing experience of the First Marine Division and the men who fought in North Korea from November through December of 1950. On Desperate Ground: The Marines at The Reservoir, the Korean War’s Greatest Battle is a page turning, damned good book that will end up on many reading lists very soon.

In my case, I listened via Audible. Not once, but twice! The narrative was exceptional. I liked listening in the morning while at the gym. The book was a shot of motivation like no triple espresso could compare. I was revved up to run harder and lift more listening to the courageous actions of America’s military members who fought in the brutal cold and crushing terrain.

Background

The author, Hampton Sides, has written a concise, well-paced narrative that puts the reader firmly in the heart of the action. Furthermore, he blends a boots on the ground perspective with the strategic, geopolitical backdrop. From a historical point of view, the forces that led to Americans fighting in North Korea were a combination of poor intelligence, hubris on the part of General Douglas MacArthur, and an underestimation of Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong’s willingness to deploy troops. The Chinese leader preemptively and covertly moved his troops south of the Yalu River as American and Allied forces moved past the 38th Parallel separating North and South Korea.

There are countless examples of good and bad leadership in this book. The First Marine Division Commanding Officer, General Oliver P. Smith is chief among the good ones. On the other hand, Mr. Sides does not paint a flattering picture of either General MacArthur or General Ned Almond. General Almond commanded the U.S. X Corps. Additionally, Mr. Sides tells stories of other Marine heroes such such as Captain William Barber of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, and Lieutenant Chew-Een Lee from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

Human Factors

On Desperate Ground brings out the brutality of warfare. If you read this as a bedtime story to your kiddies, one of two things will happen. You’ll either scar them for life or they will grow up to be meat-eating, Marine Corps machine gunners looking to get some everyday! One of the scenes that captures the gruesomeness occurs on a beach with landmines. North Korean soldiers planted them there. The Allied forces took the beach back. When they did, Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers lined up the captive North Korean soldiers shoulder to shoulder and walked them forward to clear the beach. As the mines went off, they had the prisoners fill in the gaps as the others went up in a plume of red mist and scattered limbs.

Its hard to imagine the carnage of using stacks of bodies for cover. But, the Marines did it when they had to. During the breakout, Chinese bodies were used to build a bridge. I had to listen to this part again because it seemed so unreal.

Also, Mr. Sides book overlaps with other classics such as The Last Stand of Fox Company: A True Story of U.S. Marines in Combat by Bob Drury and Tom Clavin. On Desperate Ground retells the battle of Fox Hill. Mr. Sides does an equally fine job bringing out the heroism of the Marines in Fox Company. Hordes of Chinese soldiers attacked them at night as they fought in sub-zero temperatures. However, being led by Medal of Honor recipient Captain Bill Barber, the Marines of Fox Company never gave up. They were tough, resilient, and endured.

These Marines deserve to have their story told over and over again. They are the legends that make the Marine Corps what it is. Today’s Devil Dogs should read it before hitting the rack and wishing Chesty goodnight with a K-bar under their pillow!

In writing this swift reading epic, Mr. Sides did his homework. He used many resources, books, and letters. Unfortunately, the Korean War has been dubbed “the Forgotten War.” This is unfortunate considering how many Americans fought and died there. Ultimately, the Korean War veterans made sure that the South didn’t fall into the hands of the North. At the end, Mr. Sides notes that millions of South Koreans today can trace their lineage to family members that escaped the North. These are the fortunate ones. They live in a country that is starkly different and much better than their neighbors to the North. The First Marines and other American veterans helped make this possible.

“Retreat! Hell!”

“Marines” and “retreat” don’t pair well together in a sentence. But, the Battle of Chosin is one of the greatest tactical “withdrawals” in history. In typical Marine fashion, Marine leaders put a spin on things to add levity. When asked about the tactical retreat, General Smith replied, “Retreat! Hell! We’re just advancing in another direction.”

The Korean War produced several notable quotes. On Desperate Ground also notes when the Chinese surrounded the First Marine Regiment, the Commander, the famous “Chesty” Puller remarked, “We’ve finally found them. We’re surrounded. That simplifies things.”

When the Marines withdrew, they accomplished one of the greatest “breakouts” in history. Through the piercing cold, ice, and overwhelming enemy odds, the Marines were able to escape destruction. Chinese bodies piled up, and the Marines took many casualties. The F4U Corsairs from First Marine Air Wing rained a hail of ordnance to include napalm on the enemy to aid the Marine withdrawal.

Conclusion

In the end, Allied forces suffered nearly 18,000 casualties. By some estimates, the Chinese lost nearly double that figure if not more. The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir was a chaotic mess of violence and disorder. Mr. Sides book wades through the madness of these events. The reader feels the disorientation because Mr. Sides writing about it is so precise. In the end, Americans can be proud of what the Korean War veterans were able to endure and accomplish. The Marines can be rightly proud of this desperate and legendary moment in their Corps’ history. Mr. Sides has added another noble chapter to Marine Corps lore. Furthermore, he has helped give the veterans of this war proper recognition and the respect they deserve. Their sacrifice will never be forgotten.

Further Books and Reading

Hampton Sides website: www.hamptonsides.com 

This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History, Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (1963) by T.R. Fehrenbach

The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (2007) by David Halberstam

Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War’s Greatest Untold Story–The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company (2010) by Patrick K. O’Donnell 

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Wake Up Early, Eat, Exercise: It’s The Power of Habit

By PMEComplete on May 1, 2018

Power of Habit

It’s 5 am and an alarm is buzzing in your ear. What do you do? Slap the snooze button? Or wake up ready to workout. Most people opt for the snooze button although they may want to run the track or hit the weight room. So why can’t the second choice be as easy as the first one? The answer might lie in something called a habit loop. It turns out there is a lot of science behind this early morning decision. The answer may not simply be because of tiredness. Power of Habit implies a much stronger force is at work.

Charles Duhigg’s book The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business digs into the tricky science behind these habits. As a Marine, I find habits and the development of good, powerful habits to be interesting. The Marine Corps tries to instill habits of thought and habits of action into the young men and women who join its ranks. According to Duhigg, the Marine Corps is on to something significant. It turns out that habits do begin in the mind in the form of mental feedback loops. These loops are incredibly powerful.

Individual Habits

There is a cue. The cue triggers a routine. The routine is followed by a reward. With this feedback loop comes the formation of both good and bad habits. For example, a good habit might be an alarm goes off (the cue), the gym  clothes go on (the routine), then a person gets a good workout in (the reward). As Duhigg notes, the power of habit isn’t always the reward. Instead the power of habit can be the anticipation of the reward.

On the negative side, take a bad habit like smoking. Smokers have a difficult time quitting not because of the nicotine but often because of routines that have been built around the anticipation of nicotine. For example, consider a smoker who has a cigarette every morning at 9 a.m. after driving to work and finishing their morning coffee. It becomes extremely difficult for that smoker to quit unless they stop driving to work every morning at 9 a.m. and drinking their morning coffee. The reason is because the cues trigger the anticipation of the reward i.e. the morning cigarette.

As a Marine, I found this portion of the book valuable. It helped me to understand why certain habits that the Marine Corps standardizes are so powerful. Moreover, they have long lasting impacts on the individuals who join the organization often breeding life long skills of discipline and hard work.

The Power of Keystone Habits

Before reading the book, I expected to find more value in the section on individual habits. I was wrong. Part Two on organizations and the keystone habits chapter made the book worth the purchase. I learned a lot as a leader from this part. Duhigg did an excellent job explaining some fascinating business case studies.

In particular, the story of Paul O’Neill was outstanding. Paul O’Neill became CEO of Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America) in the late 1980’s. When he got to the company, he decided to focus solely on workplace safety. At the time that he announced this initiative, Wall Street investors panicked. Duhigg says that they thought, “Who put this crazy hippie in charge?” But, what the shortsighted investors didn’t get was that Paul O’Neill was creating what Duhigg calls a “keystone habit.” As it turns out, focusing on the keystone habit of workplace safety was immensely profitable. In fact, by the time O’Neill left Alcoa, the companies stock value had gotten five times bigger and the company had achieved a valuation of $27 billion.

The keystone habit of workplace safety was the cue that caused multiple second and third order effects throughout Alcoa. Communication channels improved through timely and accurate reporting. Old equipment and manufacturing parts were replaced. Waste was cut in daily operations. As a result, profitability soared through improvements across the organization.

As leaders, we can look at our own organizations and find certain “keystone habits” to focus on. Perhaps in the military it is focusing on specific unit SOPs. Although what seems to be overlooked by Duhigg is the fact that O’Neill as a leader prioritized safety as a keystone habit. Alcoa had a safety program prior to O’Neill, but it wasn’t a priority. For leaders, we don’t always have to look at adding something new or reinventing the wheel in a dramatic way. Sometimes prioritizing the basics is what matters. In fact, the Marine Corps likes to call this “brilliance in the basics.” Being good at doing the little things right can itself be a keystone habit.

Power Habits from Starbucks

I found this chapter extremely valuable. According to Duhigg, Starbucks has created many powerful habits. In fact, Starbucks has created a system for its employees to deal with disgruntled and rude customers. One of the techniques is called: LATTE. Listen to what the person is saying. Acknowledge their concerns. Take action. Thank them. Explain what happened. Duhigg’s point is that Starbucks has sought to give their employees a habitual tactic to maintain a kind and positive customer service.

Before reading this book, I didn’t expect to learn self-discipline techniques from Starbucks baristas. But, Duhigg brought me there. In the military, we focus on things called immediate action drills. There is a natural crossover between business practices and the military procedures in this case. Starbucks employees have their own immediate action drills. They train to use these drills when dealing with the challenge of unruly patrons. This becomes habit with time and ensures that the employee can fulfill the Starbucks mission of quality customer service. In the same way, Marine units train to use immediate action drills so that certain actions become a matter of habit. For example, taking contact from the enemy or reacting to sniper fire. Each action from the enemy triggers a trained response from the unit. This powerful habit allows the unit to regain initiative and accomplish its mission.

Power of Habits in Societies and Groups

The final section of Duhigg’s book focuses on societal habits. In one chapter, he tells the story of Rosa Parks and the Civil Rights Movement. He also intertwines the experience of Rick Warren, who built a megachurch known as Saddleback Church in Orange County, California. Duhigg focuses specifically on the social habits that allowed Civil Rights marchers to successfully boycott the Montgomery buses and eventually set the conditions for civil rights legislation. In the case of Saddleback, a socialization process developed around small groups in church members homes. This helped Saddleback grow from one man and his family into a congregation of over 20,000 people.

The key takeaway from this section was the importance of peer pressure in creating powerful habits. Network effects can bring about sweeping social change. In thinking about the Marine Corps, I reflected on the recruiting process. Often we see Marines that are second or third generation Marines. They are not the first in their families to join. Also, a lot of Marines have siblings that joined too. Families create a natural social pressure for an individual to join. However, for a recruiter to get individuals to join with no prior connection to the Marine Corps, focusing on trying to get a group of friends committed seems to be the best method. The peer pressure from one or more members of a social group creates a powerful incentive for commitment.

Duhigg’s writing style is entertaining and informative. There is a lot of good cocktail party conversation in it. Specifically, the chapter on retail giant Target predicting when a woman is pregnant was very interesting. If someone is looking for a book to better understand personal habits, then the Power of Habit is a solid read. I also highly recommend it to military and business leaders because of the organizational habits part. In particular, the keystone habits chapter stands out as a must-read in what is, overall, a very enjoyable book.

 

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Extreme Ownership: The Perfect Mindset for Successful Leadership

By PMEComplete on April 28, 2018

Extreme Ownership by Jocko Willink and Leif Babin

How do Navy Seals lead and win? Jocko Willink and Leif Babin explain in their book, Extreme Ownership. The authors are former Navy SEALS and combat veterans. After multiple deployments to dangerous places like Ramadi, Iraq, they have valuable leadership principles to share. In Extreme Ownership they bridge lessons from the battlefield with challenges in the business world. The result is a leadership book accessible to both military and civilian leaders.

Broken into three parts and twelve chapters, each chapter focuses on a core leadership principle. For example, Jocko’s first lesson about a friendly fire incident in Ramadi leads to a principle of accepting personal responsibility. In fact, this is the central lesson of the book. Leadership is about assuming personal responsibility for everything that takes place in an organization. Jocko hammers this point repeatedly. Taking ownership for problems is a leadership imperative. Furthermore, leaders should be quick to credit their subordinates for success.

Extreme Ownership Part I: Winning the War Within

Reading this part of the book, I was reminded of the line from the New Testament, “First remove the beam from your own eye and then you can see clearly to remove the speck out of your brother’s eye” (Matthew 7:5). Too often in a bureaucratic organization like the military, it becomes easy to shift blame. With a chain of command, one can get mad at a subordinate for failure. Is this good leadership? Extreme Ownership argues no. Extreme Ownership says that the leader sets the subordinate up for success or failure. This is a radical lesson on servant leadership. It underpins and reflects the mantra of “no bad teams only bad leaders.”

In order to “win the war within”, a leader needs to look inward and figure out what he or she should do to make the organization successful. For example, this may take the form of belief. When tasked with a seemingly insane mission- taking poorly trained Iraqi troops on missions- Jocko writes about taking ownership of it and trying to believe in the mission. He does this by putting himself in the shoes of his higher commanders. He looks several levels above his narrow field of view.

In this case, the Navy Seals of Task Unit Bruiser did not want to conduct operations with Iraqi soldiers. Who could blame them? The Iraqis were poorly trained, ill-equipped, and lacked motivation. But, Jocko communicated to his team that if they took Iraqi soldiers with them, they would be authorized more missions. Furthermore, if they were able to train the Iraqis to defend their own country, the Navy SEALS would be able to set successful conditions for U.S. troops to leave the country for good. This simple logic was enough to get his team to believe, which they did.

Extreme Ownership Part II: The Laws of Combat

Laws of combat include decentralized command, prioritization and execution, and simplicity. With the example of simplicity, this lesson was magnified through the lens of a unit’s first patrol in Ramadi. In this case, the patrol unit leader, a young Lieutenant, had trained Iraqi soldiers for a patrol into enemy territory. After reviewing the Lieutenant’s plan, Jocko convinced the officer that the plan was too complex and underestimated the dangers on the battlefield. Reluctantly, the patrol leader took Jocko’s advice. The patrol took contact after 12 minutes outside friendly lines and sustained multiple casualties. Consequently, the patrol leader learned a hard lesson about simplicity. Jocko points out that the situation could have been much worse if not catastrophic had the Lieutenant gone with the original plan. Thus, the old adage- a plan breaks down on first contact- means that plans need to be simple to mitigate the inevitable chaos and confusion. The other saying, “the enemy gets a vote” means that leaders can’t anticipate everything that will happen when they step outside the wire.

In the business world, complexity can create chaos too. For example, Jocko uses the example of a company with a confusing employee bonus plan. The intricacies of the system made sense to management. But, to the employees? Head scratching all around. But, how are problems like these mitigated? Understanding that “people take the path of least resistance” is important. People need to have simplicity embedded into the way they work. With simple plans, employees can be flexible when faced with challenges in dynamic workplace environments. Flexibility in operations will ultimately drive productivity. Employees will have clear expectations and a baseline upon which to effectively operate.

Extreme Ownership Part III: Sustaining Victory

In the final part, Jocko and Leif include some harrowing examples of close calls in Ramadi, Iraq. Specifically in the chapter on “uncertainty”, Leif relates a story of working with Chris Kyle, the famed Navy SEAL sniper and author of American Sniper. Leif tells of how Chris decided not to take a sniper shot until he got positive identification (P.I.D.) on a possible target. Leif was put in a position in which another unit of Army soldiers was pressuring him to take out the possible enemy sniper. Ultimately, Leif decided not to let Chris take the shot. The decision proved prescient when the potential target turned out to be an American soldier.

Leif explains how this incident “scared the hell out of him.” If Leif had ordered the shot, it would have meant the end of his career. The lesson is clear. Leaders need to be decisive even in the midst of uncertainty. Logic must trump emotion. In this case, the emotion was tied to soldiers, who had been taking fire from enemy snipers. Leif had to resist the emotion of a unit that desperately wanted to kill the enemy. The military tries to empower its leaders to employ logic through training, doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs) as well as simple, executable plans.

In business, chaos abounds too. Perhaps no better example of this exists than in the stock market. No one can predict the direction of stocks on a given day. One must have a disciplined and well-thought out investment strategy. This strategy can be simple too. For example, an investor can buy index funds and hold them long-term. With this type of strategy, investors can maintain confidence in the face of market uncertainty.

Learning from Others

Extreme Ownership is an extremely valuable book for leaders at all levels. I wish I had read this book a long time ago. It quickly became a call to action for me in my current leadership role. I found myself taking the leadership lessons and immediately figuring out ways to apply them.

Finally, Extreme Ownership is a great book to read with a team or organization. The book provides a strong platform for productive conversations. Team members and leaders will benefit from each principle as they are simple, timeless, and supported through tough experience. As leaders, we are called to learn from what others have gone through. With Extreme Ownership, Jocko and Leif are exceptional teachers.

 

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“All the Shah’s Men” Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 25, 2017

On November 4, 1979, shouts of “death to America” and “death to the Shah” roared from the streets of Tehran. Outside the American embassy throngs of radical Iranian students pushed against the embassies’ walls shouting in visceral disgust at the American diplomats inside. It wasn’t long before these students brazenly scaled the walls and stormed the embassy. In the harrowing hours after the American embassy was overrun, fifty-two Americans were taken hostage. They were paraded before cameras and broadcasted around the world by international news outlets. Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution which overthrew the Shah’s rule, refused to release the American hostages. They remained captive until January 20, 1981 when President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. For 444 days, Americans were kept in captivity, and the United States fumed with justifiable anger, resentment, and confusion. How could an event like this happen? What were the roots of the crisis in Tehran?

Iranian students scale the walls of the US embassy in Tehran. (Image source: Wikipedia)

In his 2003 book, “All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror”, Stephen Kinzer attempts to lay the groundwork for an explanation. The story of how America became heavily involved in a plot to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh represents a fascinating chapter in American history, and one that is frequently overlooked and sadly misunderstood. “All the Shah’s Men” provides a broad overview of Iranian history to set the stage for Iran’s present-day resentment and mistrust of foreign powers. Mr. Kinzer harkens back to the era of the Persian empire “built by Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes” and remarks that Iranians possess an abiding sense of inspiration in “their heritage” (Kinzer 17-18). He also talks about the collective social consciousness and sense of justice that can be traced to the influence of Zoroastrianism in Persian history. At the same time, Kinzer underscores the fact that Iranian pride in their history and culture is also deeply rooted in their opposition to hostile invaders to include Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan’s Mongol hordes, and Arab conquerors, who spread Islam to Iran. Furthermore, the form of Islam adopted by Iranians would be Shiite, which is a tradition rooted in the belief that Mohammad’s cousin Ali was the successor as caliph i.e. leader of the Islamic world. During the first quarter of the 20th century, Iran was ruled by a Turkic tribe known as the Qajars. When the Qajars were gone after 1925, Iran stood between “two great imperial powers, Britain and Russia” (Kinzer 28). Due to this position, Iran found itself within the crosshairs of world powers competing for ideological partners and foreign allies in the aftermath of World War II.

Who could forget Xerxes? You know, the dude from 300! (Image Source: GQ )

A significant portion of Mr. Kinzer’s book involves the rise of Iranian nationalism embodied in the figure of Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh rallied his political support under the banner of opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This was a British oil company located in Abadan on the Persian Gulf, and the British made no apologies about the conditions in which Iranian laborers worked and the paltry royalties which the Iranian government received from the company. “All the Shah’s Men” dives deep into the divisions and lack of compromise between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iranian nationalists like Mossadegh. Mr. Kinzer suggests that the British maintained a colonial attitude that ruled out the idea of profit sharing or concessions to the Iranian government such as the ability to audit the company. The conflict between the British and Iranians brought the US deeper into the region and Middle Eastern affairs. Under President Harry Truman, the US had been an impartial arbiter in the conflict, and often urged Anglo-Iranian Oil to make concessions. However, events changed when President Eisenhower took office in 1953.

Partial image of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. (Image Source: Frontline)

President Truman tried to walk a fine line in the conflict. His diplomatic envoys were clearly frustrated with both sides unwillingness to compromise. The US watched their British allies overplay their hands in Iran until Mossadegh’s government nationalized the oil industry. Eventually, the British were expelled from Iran altogether. This did not stop them from maintaining their strategic patience, and applying the full weight of their economic power to squeeze the nascent Iranian oil industry out of world markets, which proved to be much easier than it would be for the US to attempt in the late 2000s. As Winston Churchill was re-elected British prime minister, there were even whispers of military action. However, military intervention never transpired. Instead, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower opened a new window of opportunity for British interests in Iran.

To the extent that Eisenhower’s election fostered renewed British hope to overthrow Mossadegh, it was not due to anything that President Eisenhower said or believed about Iran prior to him assuming office. On the other hand, the Dulles brothers entered Washington as part of the new administration with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles serving as Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Kinzer asserts that the Dulles brothers’ worldview was shaped by the ideological conflict of the Cold War. They were the practitioners of a Soviet containment strategy that relied on intervention in countries which they saw as vulnerable to falling into the orbit of the Soviet Empire. Their first project was Iran.

Image of brothers Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles (Image Source: NYT)

Mr. Kinzer absolves President Eisenhower of much of the decision-making and responsibility for the 1953 coup. Instead, he sees the Dulles brothers as the principle architects. In terms of execution of the coup, the book digs into a CIA operative by the name of Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. In a CIA mission called Operation Ajax, Roosevelt, a savvy, Middle East operative, charged forward with the plan to oust Mossadegh. Mr. Kinzer provides some details into how Roosevelt cut deals, paid mobs, and pulled at the delicate fringes of Iran’s political fault lines to make the coup a success. After paid civilians lay dead outside Mossadegh’s residence, Mr. Kinzer notes that they were “found with 500-rial notes still in their pockets,” which had been given to them through Roosevelt’s dozens of subagents (Kinzer 187).

Images from the 1953 coup. (Source: CNN)

While the events of the coup are well documented, Mr. Kinzer’s narrative lacks some pertinent details. He merely suggests that after nationalizing the oil industry Iran was left in an isolated economic situation, which created political unrest. But, this is an area that I felt needed more focus. There is a sharp transition from when the British leave, Iranian nationalism soars, and Mossadegh’s popularity seems well-established to Roosevelt and the CIA overthrowing the government literally in a single night. Although Roosevelt’s initial attempt at the coup failed, he gambled again and succeeded the second time. I wanted to read more about the shifting political situation in Iran. I also found myself wondering how Roosevelt had built a sophisticated network of agents that could allow him to mobilize a coup in one night. Somehow Roosevelt made it all happen as planned. As a result, Mohammad Reza Shah ruled the country for twenty-five years, and former prime minister Mossadegh spent his remaining years under house arrest.

The preface to Mr. Kinzer’s 2008 edition of “All the Shah’s Men” addresses what he calls the “folly of attacking Iran.” He wrote the preface in response to talk that existed in the Bush Administration and Defense Department about using military force against Iran. This was when Iran was under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was notoriously anti-Western and had even harsher opinions toward Israel. Mr. Kinzer’s conclusions are relevant in today’s political environment as Iran has been put “on notice” by the current administration. President Trump and has called Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. Ironically, President Trump has also reinstated a bust of Winston Churchill in the oval office. But, considering the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal and Iran’s re-election of moderate President Hassan Rouhani, Mr. Kinzer’s assertion that “there are a remarkable number of areas in which the United States and Iran might find common ground” should be taken seriously (Kinzer xix). His contention that the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh was a long-term strategic disaster comes through poignantly in his book, and it informs Mr. Kinzer’s policy stance towards Iran as being much less hawkish than the prevailing wisdom in Washington.

“All the Shah’s Men” is a fast-paced read. The history is interesting, and Mr. Kinzer’s writing style is captivating. This book could have been a lot longer, and readers who want more details on the Shah’s rule and the events leading to the revolution of 1979 will not find much here. But, Mr. Kinzer covers a lot of ground and illuminates a moment in history that continues to affect US foreign policy. It is unclear whether lessons have been learned from this period in history. There are members of the National Security Council (NSC) such as Ezra Cohen-Watnick, the council’s senior director for intelligence, who have urged the use of CIA spies to try to do the same thing Roosevelt accomplished in 1953. But, these NSC members would be wise to recall the fact that twenty-five years after Roosevelt’s operation, Tehran’s streets teemed with chants of “death to America” prior to the American embassy being overrun. Will a second coup work? The historical record must be considered. For Mr. Kinzer’s part, his contribution to this record is powerful, and he concludes unequivocally that the 1953 coup “brought immeasurable tragedy to Iran, contributed to the rise of anti-American terror, and, in the end, greatly weakened the security of the United States” (Kinzer xxiii).

Source:

1. Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2008.       


                   

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“How Terrorism Ends” Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 24, 2017

I am a sucker for a good “how-to” book. It seems like the market is saturated with these types of books from weight loss and relationships to cooking and personal finance. There is a “how-to” book for nearly everything that people care about on a personal level. But, in the world of counterterrorism, I could only find one pseudo “how-to” book. That is the question of “how terrorism ends?” The book that I found on this subject has some thoughts and excellent considerations. As a generic “how-to”, it is less prescriptive than a cooking recipe or an investment strategy. But, as a work of historical analysis, it provides insightful answers into how specific terrorist groups have ended. Overall, “How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns” by Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin is a phenomenal achievement, and a must read for anyone interested in counterterrorism and national security strategy. The subtitle of the book, “Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns” is the main thrust of Professor Cronin’s work. She uses a specific framework for understanding how the “decline and demise” has or has not happened for 457 terrorist groups classified as such by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Her model follows a six-part framework related to the end of terrorism: the capture or killing of the leader (decapitation), integration within a formal political process (negotiation), achievement of strategic objectives (success), implosion (failure), elimination through force (repression), and reorientation, which means the terrorist group transitions to a different activity such as crime, insurgency, or political activism. In her final chapter, she discusses how this framework specifically applies to al-Qaeda, which Kronin authoritatively states “will end” (Note: The book was published in 2009 prior to the rise of ISIS in its current state).

The brilliance of Professor Kronin’s book is that she draws on different historical examples of terrorist groups as diverse as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), radical student groups like the Weathermen, and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) to name a few. Professor Kronin does not advocate a specific strategy. In each section of her six-part framework, she focuses on different social, political, economic, and religious forces that either set the conditions for a terrorist group’s success or failure. If there is an enduring theme of her work, it is the extent to which terrorist groups seek to leverage the state’s response to their advantage. She claims that terrorism itself is a “weak tactic”, but its strength is driven by the bungled policy and strategic missteps that a state makes in attempting to fight “fire with fire.” Her theory is reminiscent of counterinsurgency expert, David Kilcullen, who argues in his book “The Accidental Guerilla” that western solutions to terrorism typically rely on a single-minded conventional military response instead of seeing the terrorist problem as one requiring better intelligence, improved law enforcement, selective use of force, and information operations to counter the narrative of terrorist groups.

3/6/1970 – Explosion and fire at 18 West 11th Street in Greenwich Village. NYTCREDIT: Neal Boenzi/The New York Times. (Source: Columbia Journalism School)

Professor Kronin defines terrorist groups as being political in nature, non-state actors, who disregard international laws and indiscriminately kill civilians and noncombatants. By its nature as a non-state actor, terrorism is tough to eliminate. Nevertheless, it does not present the same strategic and existential threats as a conventionally capable state actor such as North Korea, Russia, or China. That is what makes terrorism a complex issue to tackle. Solutions often defy state versus state logic. For example, killing the leader of a terrorist group seems to be an easy way to end it. But, Kronin explains that in many cases, the killing of a key leader will not have a decisive effect. She predicted this with al-Qaeda (the book was written prior to Bin Laden’s death). Although the death of Bin Laden was a major setback for al-Qaeda, Professor Kronin was correct that it did not end the group. This does not mean that a state shouldn’t kill the leader. But, by itself, decapitation is rarely the definitive solution, and terrorist groups can adapt beyond the cult of personality of a single leader. Professor Kronin does argue that in select cases capturing a terrorist leader has a more profound impact. This was true for Abimael Guzman, leader of Sendero Luminoso aka “The Shining Path”, a Marxist terrorist group in Peru that was responsible for the death of 69,000 people. Guzman was captured on September 12, 1992. When the terrorist leader was displayed wearing a prison jump suit in a cage and urging his followers to surrender their arms, Kronin explains that The Shining Path suffered a significant blow. In the years that followed “violence fell by 50 percent and continued to decline thereafter.” On the other hand, in cases such as Israel’s campaign of targeted killings of Palestinian terrorist leaders, Russia’s killing of Chechen leaders, and in the Philippines where Abu Sayyaf’s leadership has been killed, terrorism did not end rather persists as new leaders enthusiastically replace the old.

Leader Abimael Guzman of The Shining Path in prison. (Source: BBC)

With negotiations, Professor Kronin points out that terrorism and violence tend to increase during periods of negotiation. Negotiation is not a strategy that is used often, and with 457 terrorist groups studied, there were only 18% that negotiated. The IRA in Northern Ireland provides an example of negotiations working in the long run although there were many terrorist acts that took place in conjunction with negotiations throughout the 1990s. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is another example of negotiations causing spikes in violence. Professor Kronin explains that “the Palestinians began to see terrorist attacks as complementary to the peace process instead of at odds with it, because they believed that negotiations alone would never lead to Israel’s withdrawal” (Kronin 57). She also discusses the FARC terrorist group in Colombia. Negotiations with the FARC have been ongoing, and Kronin shows at another point in the book that the FARC also fell under the category of reorientation as they transitioned from a terrorist group to a criminal cartel. Furthermore, American funding for the “war on terror” significantly increased the Colombian government’s ability to pressure the FARC militarily and use better intelligence against the group. Between reorientation, repression and on-going negotiations events culminated in November 2016 when the FARC negotiated a formal peace agreement with the Colombian government. As of this writing, the peace agreement may prove to be one of the most successful examples of negotiations working between a state and a terrorist group turned criminal enterprise. The FARC is willingly disarming, former fighters are being granted full rights as citizens, and the group is being integrated into Colombia’s political establishment. In spite of criminal activity and political unrest that persists in Latin America, the western hemisphere has no formal wars being fought at this moment in world history.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos (left) and FARC representative Timoleon Jimenez negotiate. (Source: CNN)

With terrorist groups that have achieved success, Professor Kronin explains that success largely depends upon the action of the state which the group opposes. She summarizes this by explaining, “When a campaign is well under way, two further conditions improve the odds for success: first, the state has to overreact in its response; second, the terrorist group has to capture the imagination of a broader audience, mobilize popular support, and gain strength” (Kronin 93). This happened to a limited extent in the case of the Israeli terrorist goup, Irgun (IZL), who carried out attacks on the British in Palestine during and after World War II. Irgun’s methods of attack were incredibly brutal and violent including two British soldiers being strangled and hung on July 30, 1947. In some cases, British soldiers mutilated bodies were booby-trapped causing injuries to responding British soldiers. The British government came under heavy domestic political pressure to withdraw its troops from Palestine, which was easy to justify considering a myriad of internal post-war political challenges. When the state of Israel was created in May 1948, Irgun was formally absorbed into the Israeli army. In so far as they achieved their strategic objectives, Irgun is an example of a successful terrorist group. Indeed, one of its leaders, Menachem Begin would eventually become the sixth Prime Minister of Israel.

Within the category of failure, which includes implosion, loss of operational control, and marginalization, Professor Kronin suggests that this is one of the better strategies for defeating al-Qaeda. However, this category was lighter on historical case studies, which presents a problem for the model as it suggests the inherent difficulty of the strategy. There is no immediate political payoff as there is with something like a strategy of repression or decapitation. Nevertheless, Kronin seems to think that in the case of al-Qaeda, the organization is vulnerable to imploding from internal fractionalization as well as loss of popular support due to their indiscriminate killing of innocent people to include many Muslims. On this note, I found myself wishing that Professor Kronin had spent several more years working on the book to examine the so-called Islamic State and offer perspective on how ISIS might end. I imagine that most of her conclusions for al-Qaeda would apply to ISIS. Recently, repression and the use of force has worked to take back territory from ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This presents an inverse challenge of reorientation. ISIS was a terrorist group that formed a state. A state actor is easier to target with conventional means. However, as they reorient from a terrorist state back to a dispersed terrorist network conventional force becomes challenging. Although destruction of the physical state of ISIS is undoubtedly important, I don’t anticipate from reading Professor Kronin’s book that loss of territory will bring about the end of ISIS. Like al-Qaeda, the group will scatter and reconstitute in other destabilized parts of the world’s Muslim communities (referred to as the “Umma” in al-Qaeda’s strategic blueprint, published in 2004 called “The Management of Savagery”). In fact, ISIS has already dispersed to parts of the world where they can take advantage of unstable governments and exploit a lack of rule of law.

ISIS Fighter carrying the groups black flag. (Source: PBS)

Concerning repression or using overwhelming force against a terrorist group, Professor Kronin offers the most skepticism. She explains the strategic objectives of a terrorist group as being provocation of the state, polarization, mobilization, or a combination of all three. She states that repression appears to be the logical and intuitive countermeasure to terrorism. But, what emerges from her analysis is that conventional response only benefits the state politically by fulfilling a sense of justice and that the state is “doing something” about the terrorist problem. However, that doesn’t mean repression is effective. Russia has spent years using overwhelming force against Chechen terrorists and have fought a full-scale insurgency in Chechnya, yet they have routinely been targeted by Chechen terrorists with an attack occurring in a subway station in Saint Petersburg as recently as April 2017. Professor Kronin does not suggest that use of force can’t work. She explains clearly that “repression succeeds when mobilizing the rightful forces of the state effectively against the violent perpetrators (and their supporters) within a community, without either catalyzing a larger countermobilization by that community or demobilization of the government’s own support” (Kronin 143). Thus, force has its rightful place in counterterrorist strategy. But, it will not be sufficient to deal with the problem as a whole. Like decapitation, it must be integrated into a broader strategy.

A terrorist attack on a Russian subway station on April 3, 2017 killed and wounded many civilians. (Source: New York Times)

Finally, with her analysis of al-Qaeda, Professor Kronin provides sobering insights. Unfortunately, religious based terrorist organizations are the most enduring with a group called the Hindu Thugs holding the record for survival at 600 years. Professor Kronin claims that al-Qaeda is unique due to its ability to use the internet and media for networking and propaganda. Structurally, al-Qaeda operates in a three-tiered system with the core members at the top followed by a diffuse network (al-Qaeda’s dispersed cells) and then those on the periphery (i.e. al-Qaeda inspired individuals). This presents a unique challenge because 21st century communication methods enable al-Qaeda to operate in a decentralized manner that can present significant problems to America and other nations. However, Professor Kronin also explains that this decentralization may also be the group’s critical vulnerability as it can cause fractionalization and loss of operational control. Therefore, we see the genesis of a strategy that the US has attempted to varying degrees of success namely the selective targeting of terrorist networks. Unfortunately, this strategy has evolved with experience, and many hard lessons. Warfighting (MCDP-1) describes war as the “extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force” (MCDP-1 23). Thus, from the beginning, the “war on terror” was a paradoxically mismanaged strategy as America automatically bestowed political legitimacy on a terrorist group by declaring war on them. This is the mentality that Professor Kronin is determined to break. A terrorist group is not a state with conventional capabilities, and to respond to it as such can have disastrous consequences for the state and enormous benefits for terrorist groups. Defeating terrorism takes patience and a clear understanding of the nature of the threat. It involves careful study and strategic analysis. Professor Kronin has made a significant contribution toward that goal. The question remains whether the decision-makers in Washington will translate historical lessons into effective policy. Additionally, it is foolish to wish away the inevitability of another terrorist attack either by a lone gunman or a determined cell. The strategic response should also be calculated based on lessons learned. While answers may not be clear and tough solutions may not win votes, at the very least, merely asking the question, “how does terrorism end?” could be the first step on the road to better strategy.

 

Sources:

  1. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009. Print.               
  2. Warfighting. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1997. Print.                                                             

 

 

 

   

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War in the Shadows: “Confront and Conceal” Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 18, 2017

I can still remember the exact moment when I heard the news that American Special Forces killed the world’s most notorious terrorist leader in a raid that took place deep inside Pakistan. It was a Sunday night, and I was sitting in a barracks room in Quantico, Virginia. I remember word spreading rapidly around base as President Obama prepared to make the announcement that Osama bin Laden had been killed by an elite team of Navy SEALs. I received a phone call from my family at the exact moment that I was turning on my computer to read the breaking news. After President Obama’s address to the nation calling the killing of Bin Laden “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda,” I felt an overwhelming sense of elation and relief. The events of 9/11 had been a turning point in my life in which I vowed to serve my country in the armed services. Finally, the man that US intelligence had pursued for years had met swift and deadly justice. In the weeks that followed, I read and learned more about the details of the raid on the Abbottabad compound, which is located a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy. However, it wasn’t until I read David Sanger’s book, “Confront and Conceal”, that I truly grasped the strategic scope and vast complexities of President Obama’s decision to send US Special Forces to conduct an early morning raid on May 2, 2011.

The Situation Room (Image from CNN)

In his book “Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power”, David Sanger, the chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times, has written a detailed and fast-moving account of President Obama’s first term foreign policy. As I read this book nearly five years after its original publication date (2012), it is interesting to see how many of the challenges, successes, and failures of Obama’s first term have developed over the subsequent years. We now know that the killing of Osama bin Laden and the treasure trove of data taken from the raid has not brought an end to al-Qaeda nor did it prevent the spread of another equally nihilistic, radical terror group in the form of the so-called Islamic State. But, it is interesting to read Sanger’s account of the Obama administration’s handling of events in Iran, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, along with the desire to get out of the Middle East and focus on “pivoting” US strategy toward the Pacific.

Sanger is an exceptional journalist, and there is nothing about his book that seeks to either overly praise the Obama administration or sharply criticize it. President Obama comes across as a competent commander-in-chief, who is carefully analytic and at times aggressive. However, as the events of the Arab Spring show, he was also selective in his use of American force and his appetite for risk in different crises. We can only speculate what an intervention against Syria and the use of force against Bashar al-Assad might have done to stop the catastrophic bloodshed and the refugee crisis that ensued. While these historic counterfactuals are merely speculative, Sanger points out that the decision to avoid Syrian intervention as opposed to what happened in Libya was simply a matter of cost and strategic calculation. An intervention in Syria would have been too expensive and would have most likely sucked the US into another Middle Eastern quagmire. Meanwhile, any action against Syria would have been vetoed by Russia and China in a UN security council resolution. Indeed, Syria houses a Russian naval base, and Vladimir Putin’s contribution of Russian military assistance has turned the direction of the Syrian civil war in favor of the Assad government. Nonetheless, it is refreshing to read a book that analyzes the spectrum of issues to include second and third order effects of decisions and indecisions that the Obama administration made without the typical polemics that one finds on either the Obama-hating right or the Obama can do-no wrong left. For people who appreciate straightforward foreign policy analysis, this book is as good as it gets.

There are some parts of the book that pack a strong punch. The chapter entitled “Olympic Games” by itself makes the book worth purchasing. I have read WSJ reporter Jay Solomon’s book, “The Iran Wars”, because I am fascinated by the sanctions, cyber weapons, and assassinations that were used by the US and Israel to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “The Iran Wars” delves deep into the specifics of the financial war against Iran. However, David Sanger’s book examines the use of cyber weapons, and explores the covert program called “Olympic Games” with fascinating details. Sanger provides the Obama administration’s rationale to use cyber weapons based on fears that a war between Israel and Iran was imminent if Iran’s nuclear development continued. Several years after the deployment of the Stuxnet malware, the US and Iran struck a nuclear deal. Thus, one can appreciate the extent to which the diplomatic landscape changed in a few years after the assassination of Iranian scientists, the breakdown of centrifuges, and the use of economic sanctions. After all the Middle East seemed on the brink of an impending conflict between Iran and its neighbors. However, while the 2015 nuclear agreement led to a reprieve in tensions, it has not stopped the present-day escalation of conflict between Iran and the Gulf States notably Saudi Arabia in the form of a proxy war in Yemen. Furthermore, the Iranian incursion into Iraq could set the stage for a land route from Iran directly to Syria and Lebanon both of which are on Israel’s border.

Ahmadinejad tours a nuclear facility. (Image from LA Times)

As one reads “Confront and Conceal”, the narrative flows in a sequential manner based on the myriad of strategic choices that were made in Obama’s formative first four years. It begins with the desire of the administration to shift from war in Iraq to what President Obama believed should have been the focus of effort in Afghanistan. Thus, Sanger gets into the details of a troop escalation that ultimately brought the total number of American troops in Afghanistan to roughly 100,000. Additionally, under Obama, the “war on terror” was replaced by the explicit objective of defeating al-Qaeda. Sanger has a very balanced analysis of how the Obama administration danced around the legality of drone strikes and the escalation of drone attacks within Pakistan, a sovereign, nuclear power, who consistently argued that American drones killed its civilian population. From Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, it seemed like the Middle East could not have become any more complex. But, when a young Tunisian man committed an act of self-immolation as an act protest against the Tunisian government, events seemed to rapidly spiral into what is now called the “Arab Spring.” The Arab Spring saw the US depose another dictator in Muammar Gaddafi, the long-time Libyan strongman, who met his end trying to evade air strikes and rebel forces in a drainage pipe on October 20, 2011. Meanwhile in Egypt, Sanger describes the tensions that developed as internal pressures mounted against Hosni Mubarak. The US eventually broke with Mubarak, and Sanger recounts the decision that culminated in a phone conversation that President Obama had in which he told the former Egyptian President in unequivocal terms that it was time to step down.

Egyptian Revolution (Image from The Atlantic)

The last part of “Confront and Conceal” deals with a rising China and the enduring threat posed by North Korea. Several years later, US and North Korean tensions have not abated. The same problems that the Obama administration faced are now on the plate of President Trump and his National Security Council. However, the situation with China seems neutral if not improved. One must give President Obama credit for the “pivot” to the Pacific to focus on the threat of a rising Chinese military power. Perhaps I am personally biased as I was directly involved in executing this strategy as I deployed to Darwin, Australia in 2015. While the pivot to the Pacific did not halt China’s economic and military development, it did reinforce the strong relationship that the US had with traditional allies in the region, and assured them that the US was committed to protecting international norms and maritime security. To this end, China may have balked in the face of America’s bold return to the region. At least for now. Sanger describes that at a minimum, US strategic commitment to the region galvanized a segment of Chinese internal politics, which sought to check the militant nationalism of its military establishment. Sanger articulates this point with an enlightening anecdote in which during a January 2011 visit to Beijing, Defense Secretary Bob Gates discovers that a Chinese military show of force with J-20 Stealth Fighter jets was meant as message to Chinese President Hu Jintao rather than himself.

North Korean missile tests. (Image from Al-Jazeera)

“Confront and Conceal” remains an important book as we survey the landscape of foreign policy in 2017. At the time of publication, it would have been difficult to predict that parts of Syria and Iraq would be overrun by a terrorist group or that Russia would annex Crimea or that a reality television star, whose political career was born in the tasteless lie of the birther movement, would become President of the United States, but that is how things have played out. “Confront and Conceal” does foster a nostalgia for President Obama’s finer qualities as commander-in-chief namely his attention to detail, thorough analysis, and boldness for risk. At the same time, one can see in his desire to steer the US out of conflicts in the Middle East, the foundation for failures and inaction that would cause the region to simmer in the chaos we see today. Nevertheless, Sanger’s book is insightful and well-written. It will inevitably allow people to look at this short period in American foreign policy history and ask themselves “what if” for many years to come.

 

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Book Review: The Iran Wars

By PMEComplete on April 23, 2017

Since 1979 the United States and Iran have engaged in a war that has existed in the shadows. While there has not been direct military confrontation, each nation has engaged the other through the use of proxies, spies, cyberattacks, and economic sanctions. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has described Iran as the world’s biggest “state sponsor of terror.” If one explores the record of terrorist groups Iran has supported to include Hezbollah, then Secretary Mattis is correct. Indeed, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 represented the largest number of Marines killed in a single day since the battle of Iwo Jima. Thus, it is remarkable that nearly 35 years after the American embassy was taken hostage in Tehran, a milestone nuclear agreement would be negotiated with an Iranian regime that reserves the moniker “great Satan” for the United States. In the book Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals that Reshaped the Middle East, Wall Street Journal reporter Jay Solomon explores the evolution of the conflict, the rise of Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. attempts to sabotage it, the details of the nuclear agreement, and offers some perspective on the long-term implications. Although the book is short on covering hostilities throughout the 1980’s, Mr. Solomon digs into the conflicts that have defined the Middle East over the last 15 years with a wide range of knowledge and insight into how Iran has sought to shape events in the region.

One of the major themes of the book is the extent to which distrust pervades the fraught relationship between the U.S. and Iran. At times, there have been moments in which rapprochement seemed to be a possibility. But, these moments were fleeting in the face of historical animosity and skepticism of the other side’s intentions. For instance, Mr. Solomon mentions a period after 9/11 in which the U.S. and Iran seemed to have a common enemy in the Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it wasn’t too long after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan that Iran was placed in “the axis of evil.” The extent to which the U.S. miscalculated how Iran might benefit from an invasion of Iraq is explored in the book. Mr. Solomon explains that there were neoconservatives within the Bush administration, who hoped overthrowing Saddam Hussein would lead to the establishment of a Shia government that could counter Iran’s influence. However, the exact opposite happened, and Iran was able to capitalize on post-invasion Iraq by expanding their reach inside the country. Mr. Solomon describes how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force are used to spread the revolution and help Iran achieve its strategic objectives not only within Iraq but also Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian territories. The Iran Wars shows the extent to which U.S. planners continually underestimate the complexity of Middle Eastern events while overlooking the multitude of intentions and shapeshifting alliances that allow Iran to adapt to circumstances and consolidate power.

In spite of U.S. setbacks in the early 2000s and significant strategic missteps, there were successes that ultimately laid the groundwork for driving the Iranians to negotiate. The best chapter of Mr. Solomon’s book contains an in-depth look at the nature of America’s financial war against Iran. This chapter’s major lesson was the extent to which America was able to use an “irregular” form of warfare to achieve its policy aims. Mr. Solomon chronicles several notable individuals to include Stuart Levy, undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence from 2004-2011, along with Robert Morganthau, New York County district attorney from 1975-2009. These individuals sought to use their power to completely shut Iran out of the global banking systems. America’s ability to systematically isolate Iran economically led to the collapse of the rial by as much as 40% in a single trading day. Industries throughout Iran were shuttered. Oil exports dropped significantly as Iran was cut out of European and Asian markets and left in a state of financial desperation. The book emphasizes how complicated this process was, and is instructive on the difficulty of enforcing sanctions to achieve their full effect.

With Iran on the brink of financial ruin, Mr. Solomon turns his focus to the Obama administration and the extent to which they pursued the nuclear agreement. The Obama doctrine stood in stark contrast to that of Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush who took a harder line against Iran. But, even as President Obama was seeking to reach out to Tehran and work toward better relations, there were many events within Iran and the Middle East that presented hurdles to this delicate process. The first of these was Iran’s “Green Movement” in which hard line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected under widespread controversy and claims of corruption. As Iranian protestors took to the streets, President Obama faced the dilemma of supporting the protests and inflaming tensions with the current Iranian regime or backing down and allowing events to play out without U.S. influence. The latter course of action was taken. This would foreshadow decisions that occurred several years later during the Arab Spring and subsequent Syrian Civil War. Mr. Solomon suggests that in an effort to prevent any possible derailment of the nuclear agreement, the Obama administration decided not to enforce established “red lines” that might hinder progress toward a nuclear agreement. This was based on the calculation that Iran as a major backer of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad would withdraw from talks if any military action was taken against Assad’s regime.

With the deal itself, Mr. Solomon provides an impressive amount of insight. The book loosely argues that the Obama administration wanted desperately to achieve an agreement and was willing to offer concessions along the way to make it happen. This occurred often to the ire of French leaders, who believed the U.S. was giving too much ground and not exerting the leverage that they held due to sanctions. Mr. Solomon seems sympathetic to this viewpoint, yet he does not report the facts in a partisan or ideological manner. In the end, he is balanced in his reporting by suggesting that the Obama administration and Secretary of State John Kerry truly believed that the nuclear agreement helped prevent a war between Iran and Israel.

The Iran Wars not only does a fantastic job covering the development of the 2015 nuclear agreement and the terms of it, but the book is also remarkable for its ability to present the complexity of Middle Eastern events and relationships. In this regard, President Obama’s personal letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to work with Iran to battle ISIS signifies how nuanced the fault lines of Middle Eastern affairs truly are. However, if there is one major point to be taken away from the book, it is the extent to which Iran had the patience and knowledge of the U.S. political system to use it against itself. Mr. Obama has left office, yet Ayatollah Khamenei remains and the spirit of the Iranian revolution still pervades Iran’s most formidable state institutions to include the IRGC. President Obama’s signature foreign policy agreement had a timeline associated with it, but even as a new U.S. administration ponders re-negotiating the terms, one can see how precarious the agreement truly is. U.S. diplomats negotiated with Iranians who spoke English and were educated in the U.S. Their knowledge of America’s political system should have been obvious. For the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran that have faced Democrat and Republican administrations for the past 35 years, changing presidential administrations is nothing new. They can wait, outlast, and quietly continue to spread their power and influence.

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Book Review: The New Tsar

By PMEComplete on March 24, 2017

At the beginning of Steven Lee Myers’ book The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin, there is a quote about Putin’s love for the martial arts that seems to foreshadow the future Russian president’s foreign policy attitudes. Myers writes, “The martial arts transformed his life, giving him the means of asserting himself against larger, tougher boys.” I immediately wrote “NATO” and “the West” on the margin of the page. In many ways, this theme dominates Myers’ assessment of Vladimir Putin. In this well-written biography, the Russian president appears to have a perpetual chip on his shoulder. What emerges is the portrait of a distrustful, brooding autocrat, whose political career has been built on standing up to Russia’s external enemies both real and imagined. Although Putin initially appeared to represent a glimmer of hope that the post-Soviet Union reforms of the 1990’s would continue, these hopes quickly eroded in his first term as president. Putin’s decisions to consolidate the authoritarian power of the state, crackdown on political dissent, and ultimately violate the sovereignty of an independent nation would be influenced by many significant domestic and international events to include Russia’s war on terrorism, perpetual disagreements with western leaders, the struggles of an economy closely tied to the fluctuations of oil and gas prices, and a new ethno-nationalist Eurasian ideology.

Mr. Myers’ biography begins with Putin’s time as a KGB agent. During his KGB career, he was stationed in Dresden where he was tasked with gathering “intelligence and recruiting agents who had access to the West.” Several key points from Putin’s KGB experience relate to how the collapse of the Soviet Union made him deeply skeptical of what he saw as “mob rule” in the political turmoil that unfolded. With this experience branded into his consciousness, the author wants to show how Putin’s overall contempt for democracy is tied to his fear of mob rule.  As a bureaucrat, prime minister, and president, Putin believes fundamentally in the power of the state and prioritizes it over the will of the people. Furthermore, under Putin, Russia has become an anti-democracy that poses as a democracy. There is a “contract” between the people and the state in which the state offers security and stability, but the people must not criticize its actions in pursuit of that goal. Putin’s rule is not totalitarian. It is autocratic, and most Russians have learned to accept it.

Considering Putin’s deep distrust of western style democracy, it is easy to understand why events like Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution were upsetting to him on a personal level. Furthermore, this incident fueled Putin’s theories that America was to blame for the political movement as part of the Bush doctrine to promote democracy throughout the world. Blaming America for political instability continued even into Putin’s 2012 return to the presidency when he thought Hillary Clinton and the State Department instigated protests in Russia. Furthermore, one can clearly see that Putin’s anti-democratic attitude accounts for the stark foreign policy differences between Russia and the United States. Myers writes “there existed a dark association in [Putin’s] mind between aspirations for democracy and the rise of radicalism.” This illustrates why Putin opposed America’s overthrow of Saddam in Iraq, the overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya, and why he has fought against attempts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad in Syria. When it comes to governance, Myers asserts that the Russian president believes that “people cannot be entrusted with the power to choose their own leaders except in the most carefully controlled process.”

The New Tsar also contains details on Russia’s war on terrorism and the war against Chechen insurgents. When Putin became prime minister, there was a brutal war taking place in Chechnya. Putin’s popularity among Russian citizens soared due to his handling of the war, which was characterized by “banging the hell out of the bandits.” This also hardened Putin’s stance towards America and Europe as international pressure was placed on Russia for human rights abuses and suspected war crimes. As the war in Chechnya raged, Russia faced its own war on terror with a string of apartment bombings in multiple cities, which claimed hundreds of lives and wounded over a thousand citizens. These bombings were followed by the Moscow Theater siege in October 2002. Then nearly two years later, Russia suffered the horrific hostage crisis at School No. 1 in Beslan, a small town in North Ossetia. These dark events strengthened Putin’s determination to consolidate the power of the state for security reasons. Myers concludes that Putin was not nostalgic for the Soviet Union as it was dominated by the Communist Party, but he writes that “Putin seemed to blame the siege in Beslan on Russia’s inability to preserve the strength that made the Soviet Union he remembered as a boy so strong and respected.”

Myers book digs into high-profile events such as the “Yukos affair” in which Putin ultimately imprisoned Russia’s wealthiest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for what Myers concludes was the crime of being “the wrong kind of oligarch.” The book details several of the most notorious suspected assassinations to include that of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and Aleksandr Litvinenko. Myers provides useful facts and anecdotes related to Putin’s handling of political dissenters particularly with the case of the Pussy Riot group. Other notable moments of the biography include the issues surrounding the planning and development of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Also, Myers includes the most recent international dust-ups with the U.S. over Edward Snowden and the Obama administration’s “red line” in Syria.

Finally, the book closes with the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Myers explains the skillful way in which Russia blended hard and soft power to influence the events in their favor. The use of irregular warfare tactics to include the infamous “little green men,” information operations and cyberattacks was done in a manner that gave Russia deniability. Ultimately, Putin’s objective was to reassert Russian influence and to halt NATO expansion, which Putin continually fears is creeping closer to Russia’s border. Myers explains that Ukraine holds significant historical meaning for Russians. The attempt to reconsolidate Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence is part of what Myers calls Putin’s Eurasian ideology. Thus, what we have witnessed with the rise and reign of Vladimir Putin is the emergence of an ideological hardliner who sees himself as the leader of a broad pan-Eurasian Union that is committed to countering the ideas and influence of the West. While this may serve Putin’s political interests at home, it has left the world with renewed tensions eerily reminiscent of the Cold War. That is where the book ends, but follow-on editions would likely include the conclusion by seventeen U.S. intelligence agencies that Russia deliberately meddled in the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. After reading The New Tsar, the reader can see that the hacking and leaks intended to create uncertainty and division in the U.S. electoral process have the specter of Vladimir Putin all over it.

                                       

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My Share of the Task by General Stanley McChrystal

By PMEComplete on February 16, 2017

I approached reading General Stanley McChrystal’s memoir, My Share of the Task, with high expectations. I tend to read a lot of memoirs from high ranking military leaders with noted observations on some of the habits and techniques that made them successful. While a lot of people are awed by General McChrystal’s one meal a day and his rigorous daily exercise, I found that his success as a leader can be summarized in one word: Passion. General McChrystal’s passion for his soldiers and the men and women he served with nearly overwhelms (in a good way) the reader on each page. It becomes very clear to the reader that General McChrystal’s passion for service and passion for command was the bedrock upon which he was not only personally successful but also drove the success of the units that he led. Furthermore, it cannot be understated how his wife and his family supported him in his demanding profession. The gratitude that he feels toward his family is also clear throughout the book, and he has no illusions that without his families unwavering support, he would not have been able to accomplish his “share of the task.”

Throughout the book, I appreciated General McChrystal’s candor. He wasn’t too proud to admit occasional mistakes, and he explicitly states that there were times when he had to figure out his own style of leadership. He mentions that occasionally he would try to find his direction between being too kind and too harsh. Ultimately, he learned that there was a value in just being consistent. I made note of those small nuggets of wisdom that permeate the book. Additionally, General McChrystal continually mentions his love for history and reading. He applied sharp analysis to a multitude of situations by simply reading books and resources that could give him context to the complexity of certain situations. He fits a pattern of extraordinary military readers who are voracious readers.

Throughout the book, I took away lessons on building teams by knowing your soldiers and employing them in accordance with their capabilities. Additionally, General McChrystal built strong teams through trust. The book becomes exceptionally thrilling in the chapters in which his team hunted Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In some of the most critical moments during the hunt for the terrorist ringleader, General McChrystal displayed a high level of trust in the judgment of his subordinates. This includes moments in which he wanted to act on some intelligence, but had the patience to trust the advice of a subordinate in his task force named J.C. In a critical moment during the hunt for Zarqawi, J.C. advised tactical patience to which McChryatal agreed. The decision paid off not too long after he displayed trust in J.C.’s judgment. Furthermore, on the Zarqawi takedown, I was interested in the conduct of the interrogations and how the interrogators got some of the key detainees talk. In what I came to recognize as McChrystal’s style, the interrogations were successful due to the rapport and trust that the interrogators built with high level detainees. They learned about some of these detainees personally, and managed to leverage their egos and idiosyncratic behavior traits to their advantage. Overall, I loved reading about McChrystal’s time in Iraq as JSOC commander. It was impressive to hear how he constructed his own network to defeat the insurgent network. He clearly had a strong sense of the need to streamline the cycle of intelligence gathering and used it to drive operational tempo. The results speak for themselves in Iraq. General McChrystal personally drove the pace of operations through his relentless drive and unwavering work ethic.

The chapters on Afghanistan are informative as well. General McChrystal clearly had his work cut out for him from the beginning. He sought to replicate many of the principles that made him and his team successful in Iraq. The reader also sees him thrust into a new role in which for better or worse he was forced to handle the political dynamics that came with the role of ISAF commander. But, he managed to succeed despite some of these early setbacks, and ultimately secured a similar surge of troops in Afghanistan to accomplish the new counterinsurgency strategy. One senses the overwhelming nature of the task and the immense heartaches and pains of trying to turn the Afghan situation around. It feels abrupt, which it was due to the release of the career damning Rolling Stone article. General McChrystal doesn’t make any excuses or apologies for it though. In the end, he left his command and the Army, and after reading about the challenges and burdens placed upon him in over thirty years of hard service, the reader can sympathize with his wife, Annie, who at the book’s conclusion, felt a sense of relief once her husband’s journey in the Army came to an end.

General McChrystal’s legacy continues in the military today. His actions as JSOC commander deserve careful study, and will be canonized in American military history. Through his personal example of leadership and his unrelenting passion for his soldiers and his country, General McChrystal will endure on the roster of great American military leaders. This book is devoid of bravado. It is a testament to the straightforwardness and humility of a man who embodies service and sacrifice to his soldiers and a grateful nation.

 

 

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Book Review: Tribe by Sebastian Junger

By PMEComplete on January 9, 2017

Tribe

Sebastian Junger is known for writing The Perfect Storm and his documentaries Restrepo and Korengal. His most recent book, Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging, was the most important book published in 2016. The provocative ideas and uncomfortable questions raised in this book need to be taken seriously. Let’s begin with some context and consider the fact that modern American society despite its increasing affluence, safety, and technological connectivity has higher rates of depression, suicide, and chronic loneliness than at any other time in our history. Additionally, the amount of partisanship and vitriol in our deeply divided politics has created a shrill environment in which the dehumanization of political opponents makes our society appear fractured with hate. Let’s go further, imagine you were a soldier or Marine deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in 2008 during the financial crisis. Imagine returning to a country in which a small handful of bankers recklessly gambled away trillions of dollars in wealth causing the single greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression while you were risking your life for your country. To date none of these bankers has been held accountable for their actions, and most paid themselves enormous bonuses. Seems like capitalism for the rich, and socialism for everyone else, right? Imagine you are a veteran who has deployed with close friends and lived and trained together for years in austere, inhospitable places. So now you are returning to a society with social isolation, greed, reckless individualism, and economic uncertainty. But, more importantly, for veterans trying to reintegrate into American society, they have lost the intense camaraderie and sense of purpose that they felt while living, training, and deploying with their closest friends for some of the best years of their young adult lives. As Junger concludes, there is clearly something greater than “PTSD” affecting the lives of returning veterans.

Amid this backdrop of veteran reintegration into American society, Sebastian Junger asks why so many veterans without combat experience are claiming PTSD. There are obviously a few “bad apples” who take advantage of the system and claim benefits that they don’t rate for the sake of life long compensation. Unfortunately, these greedy individuals do immense harm to the veterans who are legitimately suffering from PTSD. There is no doubt that many veterans have experienced shock, emotional, and physical trauma from combat experiences during their service. Junger explains that this accounts for instances of “acute PTSD,” which makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. Human beings who have experienced the trauma of combat are more likely to react to loud noises, sleep on edge, feel uncomfortable in close spaces, and have flashbacks. These acute PTSD symptoms remain with people as mechanisms for survival. It is completely natural and not abnormal at all. Nor is there anything “weak” about an individual who feels these symptoms. It is simple evolutionary science. Thus, this type of acute PTSD can be treated, and its effects can go away over time. What is being seen in many veterans today is something different. Long term, chronic PTSD seems to be an entirely different phenomenon and its origins appear to be rooted in something different from combat stress. As I stated, Junger points to issues such as reintegration into American society as part of the problem. Furthermore, he claims that “the trauma of war seems to be giving it up.” This point is interesting. As an anthropologist and social scientist, Junger studies cultures and societies that have been affected by wars and natural disasters. He cites numerous studies that point to the “positive” mental affects that these conditions can have on the psyche of individuals. For example, Londoners during the German blitz did not panic in hysteria. To the contrary, they developed their own sets of law and rules to police themselves and maintained a tough resolve to continue living their lives in the face of danger. As a more modern example, Junger points to the fact that after 9/11, crime rates decreased dramatically in New York City along with rates of depression and suicide. In societies that have been afflicted by earthquakes and landslides, the aftermath brought egalitarianism and social solidarity that made the society i.e. “the tribe” bond together in a close-knit manner. This is the essence of the tribal benefits that Junger is talking about. Challenges and hardship can bind a society and bring people closer together in a common cause.

But, there can also be a dark side to the tribe. The fact that challenges and war can bring people closer together does not mean that nations should be seeking wars, enemies, or natural disasters to give society social solidarity and make their nation bond together. Although, this is done consistently in American politics as political parties create enemies and designate groups of people as the insidious “other” to galvanize voters by pandering to their fears. The 19th century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once said, “A good war makes any cause sacred.” It’s worth remembering that most conflicts are manufactured by people with an agenda namely money and power, and they use fear to rally the tribe. The benefits of tribalism are not worth creating conflicts and enemies. That would be the worst conclusion to take from this book. However, the important part of this book is to recognize that even though modern society possesses so many benefits to include wealth and relative safety, there is still a natural, tribal longing that is hardwired into human consciousness. On this point, Junger has an interesting chapter on European colonial settlers defecting to live with Indian tribes on the American frontier. He points out the fact that even though many of these settlers chose to live in Indian society, there were very few examples that this worked the other way. The number of people who “went native” was disproportionate to those who “went civilized.” Indeed, the latter hardly happened.

Why else are Junger’s conclusions important? Think of some of the terrible acts of violence that exist in the world today to include mass shootings and westerners being recruited to fight for ISIS. There is a similar pattern here. In most cases, there are upper class, affluent young men that feel a sense of social isolation and boredom. They are drawn to violent images and videos for stimulation, and more importantly, they are susceptible to the propaganda of joining a cause greater than themselves that promises in real-time the same stimulation that they get online. Again, another dark side to recognize about the allure of the tribe. The tribe can also forgive atrocities against people it feels are heretics, infidels, or social pariahs. People in the tribe can easily lose their humanity, and forgive the most heinous crimes. It is important to recognize these negative dynamics of tribalism, and I feel like Junger could have done more to explain this. Although he does mention some of the inherent problems with tribalism, he doesn’t elaborate with the same detail.

Returning to the issue of America’s veterans, a lot of them return to civilian life realizing that they miss the experience of combat and non-combat based deployments. There is a terrible stigma about people who “miss war.” It must feel weird and socially isolating for a person to have nostalgia for a war. But, Junger makes it clear that humans are not yearning for “war” because they like death and violence. On the other hand, it is the camaraderie, close bonds, and shared hardship that war engenders which makes people nostalgic for it. Veterans return to society to go back to school and find jobs, yet they can never get back that sense of brotherhood and the deep bonds that existed between them and their closest friends. This happens to veterans who deployed to combat and those that never saw combat. In my own experience, I have had two non-combat deployments with a lot of Marines that never went to combat. A lot of these Marines get out of the military, and what I hear is that after the initial rush of “freedom” wears away, most of them miss their military experience more than they thought they would and in some cases, look for ways to get back in. However, for most veterans, getting back in the service is simply not possible. But, this isn’t a case for despair. As Junger explains there is a concept called “the self-determination theory” and it has three components that give individuals- veterans and everyone else-  a sense of meaning and purpose in life. First, individuals want to feel competent at what they do. Second, they want to feel authentic in who they are. Third, they want to feel connected to others. These are all intrinsic values that determine happiness. American society through economic and marketing forces has “put consumption ahead of long-term happiness.” People can make millions of dollars, and yet if they lack these three things, they will not be happy. They will be prescribed anti-depressants and vent to a therapist (not that there is anything wrong with therapy). After reading this excellent book, it is clear the best way to help our veterans and improve our society is to promote a culture in which these three self-determining factors are priorities. How does this happen? Sebastian Junger doesn’t have all the answers (he has some suggestions). But he puts the question in the reader’s head, and that is the best way to start an important conversation.

Additional References and Resources:
Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice: PDF Link
Emile Durkheim is mentioned in the book. Here is a link to his Wikipedia page as a very general resource to learn more about him.
Karl Marlentes is mentioned. He is the author of Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War and What It Is Like To Go To War Both are good books.

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Scales on War Book Review

By PMEComplete on January 7, 2017

Scales on War
The infantry community is desperately trying to push the word that Scales on War is a must read. A lot of infantrymen are shouting, “Buy it now!” For good reason, Scales on War argues bluntly that for many years, the infantry has been severely deprived its rightful slice of Defense Appropriations funding. To some extent, General Robert H. Scales, who began his thirty-five-year career as an Army artillery officer in the jungles of Vietnam, is right. The actual writing for this book began in a piece that General Scales wrote in a January 2015 article for The Atlantic entitled “Gun Trouble.” In the article, he explains that the legacy of a Civil War-era Union ordnance officer, General James Wolfe Ripley, who stonewalled the mass fielding of repeating rifles, still “haunts” the U.S. Army today in the form of bureaucrats, generals, and policy makers, who for a variety of self-serving or apathetic reasons have not adequately outfitted infantry units with the best and most effective rifles. This fact affects General Scales personally as he recalls witnessing several of his soldiers die in Vietnam while trying to clear jams from their M-16s. He then asks why these same M-16s are still being issued to soldiers and Marines almost 50 years later. Thus, his question throughout the book endures: Why is the infantry not given the proper resources and equipment that they need to be successful in combat? He asserts that the infantryman makes up a small fraction of the military population that is tasked with the role of “intimate killing.” According to Scales the number of mostly men involved in this task would not even fill FedEx stadium (where the Washington Redskins play). Yet these men do most of the fighting and dying, while being neglected DOD funding that might limit the latter. Why is this?
Fair question. When you put it in those terms, it seems like a noble one too. However, there is something wrong in the construct of his thesis and in the entire premise of his book. General Scales has fallen into an erroneous trap in which he has failed to recognize distinctions between tactics and strategy. These two are linked to be sure, but he never fully appreciates the nature in which bad strategy can set up the infantry for failure tactically. Therefore, while I agree with him about the need for better training and equipment, and while I can gladly support the argument that infantry units should have updated rifles and dedicated drone assets, I cannot endorse the premise that winning battles automatically means winning the war itself. Nor can I forgive policymakers for making strategic errors that ultimately put the infantryman in unwinnable situations. This is where Scales and I differ. Not fielding updated rifles is not a strategic error, it is a logistical one. Strategic errors are much greater than the fielding of rifles. They involve decisions about when, where, why, and how a war will be fought. That question alone should begin the conversation about what weapons should then be sourced. But, that question is never brought up in this book.
Nevertheless, Scales begins the book by referencing the medal of honor ceremonies of Staff Sergeant Salvatore Giunta and Captain William Swenson, both of whom were awarded these honors for heroism in Afghanistan. Scales seems to believe that due to some Washington beltway scheme misappropriating funds to non-infantry segments of the military (i.e. planes and ships), these two brave men were neglectfully put into positions where they were fighting what he calls “fair fights” with the enemy. When he says that the fights were “too fair,” his argument is that these infantrymen were not given the tools and resources that might have given them an edge over the enemy, which in this case was the Taliban. Again, Scales might have somewhat of a valid point. I do not disagree that it would have been beneficial for their units to have a Reaper or Predator feed from a UAS flying high above them. However, even General Stanley McChrystal as JSOC commander in Iraq from 2003-2008 fought bitterly to get more UAS assets in Iraq while his Task Force was on the hunt for Zarqawi. Think about that for a second, the JSOC commander was having his own task force piece together old airplane parts to make more drones while going after the most notorious terrorist in Iraq. The need for more drones is evident, and Scales is hardly the first person to clamor for them. Welcome to the world of inter-service battles for more money and greater cooperation. It’s a tough, hard fight, and one that won’t go away anytime soon.
Back to the soldiers in Afghanistan, even if they had flown drones and had the ability to see their enemy first, this does not mean that winning any one of those battles specifically would have ensured success in the war overall. Scales doesn’t even ask the most obvious question: Why were they there in the first place? Second, were policy makers fully committed to the strategy in Afghanistan? Strategy matters. Wars can still be won despite tactical mistakes. Conversely, soldiers and Marines can still win battles and lose wars. A strategic blunder cripples the mission from the start. Indeed, there have been multiple occasions in which military operations have been conducted with overwhelming success and yet wars have been lost or nearly lost due to poor strategic planning. For example, the first Gulf War saw the removal of Saddam from Kuwait, but he remained in power in Baghdad where he reconstituted his Republican Guard and ultimately continued to terrorize his own people for the next decade. Additionally, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and toppling of Saddam was a huge tactical and operational success, but with no clear guidance and plan for the end of the war, many American troops and Iraqi civilians were killed in the destabilized society and sectarian violence that followed. More importantly, I would argue that the decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003 vastly hurt the strategy to go after Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from Afghanistan. By opening a second front in the war on terror and choosing to fight in Iraq, a disproportionate number of troops, money, and supplies were diverted from the conflict in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq. This was a strategic decision, and in hindsight it was not a good one. Thus, to say that SSgt Giunta and Capt. Swenson were the victims of funding that was diverted from the infantry to planes and ships is to miss the point of strategic missteps that diverted those funds to an entirely new conflict. If drones hadn’t been flying on the hunt for Zarqawi, perhaps they could have been flying in the hunt for Taliban fighters.
The fact of the matter is that the U.S. military has been flush with cash since the start of the war on terror. We are now approaching year sixteen of the war in Afghanistan, yet neither the Republican or Democratic presidential candidates talked about it in the most recent campaign cycle. This war was mentioned in none of the presidential debates. The American people could conceivably live their daily lives in sheer oblivion to what is going on in what is now the longest war in U.S. history. And yet Scales never seems to take any issues with that fact. He has a host of unnamed, nefarious Beltway enemies that he points to. But, these Beltway demons are red herrings. The real problem that gets infantrymen killed is simple: Top-level strategists have not done a good enough job. I don’t think that they have an insidious agenda (other than votes). Nor do I believe they are “bad” people. I just don’t think they have done a good enough job. On that note, I will repeat my point that decisions about what rifles to invest in are not strategic decisions. Decisions about putting GoPro cameras on soldiers are not strategic decisions. However, decisions about what wars to fight are strategic decisions. This difference needs to be understood clearly because this is where lives are seriously affected. We could give every soldier and Marine an iPad, GoPro, small drone, and top shelf hunting rifle, but it doesn’t matter if policy makers aren’t committed to their strategic success. One might argue that these resources reflect that commitment, but that is simply not the case at all. The best trained and best resourced militaries in the world can still be defeated due to poor strategy.
Finally, Scales argues that the goal of the enemy has always been to kill as many Americans as possible to sway public opinion. He cites a Japanese Colonel named Yahara, who at the Battle of Okinawa devised this strategy: Killing Americans. Scales calls the “killing Americans” strategy our critical vulnerability. No kidding. On this point though I think he and most people are mistaken in the belief that Americans don’t have the will to fight a long, protracted conflict. It is worth noting that Americans can endure war and the hardships of it when they know the cause is right. American leadership needs to be straightforward about the strategy and the reasoning behind it. There is an element of trust that must exist between the public and the policymakers. Too often people forget that the Pentagon Papers did as much damage as the media’s coverage of the Tet Offensive. Why? Because Americans lost trust in their leadership. With the Iraq war, Americans lost trust in the Bush administration when no weapons of mass destruction were discovered. Despite this revelation, Bush was still re-elected in 2004 and the surge strategy was still approved nearly four years into a war that appeared nearly lost. On the other hand, Afghanistan has always been viewed as the right war. The Taliban gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, which meant that the Taliban had to go. Now over fifteen years later, the war continues and there are very few protests or calls to withdraw the remainder of our troops from that country. In the meantime, the Americans who have fought there, have been left underfunded and without the necessary support to fight the Taliban while a second war was started in Iraq. None of this factors into Scales analysis of how SSgt Giunta and Capt Swenson were set up for failure.
Overall, Scales on War is worth reading because any book that seriously analyzes the past, present, and future of the U.S. military in a thoughtful way is worth reading. While I don’t support the authors premise and I shake my head at his failure to see the distinction between tactics, operations, and strategy, I commend him for his outside the box thinking about the infantry. I commend him for his passion to fight to improve the quality of our military and our infantry. I commend him for opening a dialogue about the future of the infantry. General Scales deserves a lot of credit for what he has done with this book. My only hope is that people will read it critically and apply Scales’ level of open minded thinking to the provocative points that he has brought up.

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Washington’s Immortals Book Review

By PMEComplete on January 2, 2017

Washington Immortals

Washington’s Immortals was written by Patrick K. O’Donnell, a military historian who focuses primarily on special forces units. Although there weren’t any “special forces” units during the Revolutionary War, the author picked a little-known Maryland Regiment to show an evolution in tactics and leadership that still resonates with military professionals to this day. This “elite” regiment also forms the backdrop for a fascinating and comprehensive history of the Revolutionary War. It is always exciting to read a book that is exhaustively researched and well-written. This book skillfully uses facts, quotes, and statistics to drive the story forward. The narrative does not become oversaturated with details that belabor one event or person. Washington’s Immortals is easy, fast reading. The reader will be surprised by how much of the Revolutionary period’s military history gets covered. Due to this fact, the elite Maryland regiment being chronicled sometimes takes a backseat to the larger story of the American Revolution. Nevertheless, this book is a very fun read, and the reader will easily learn or re-learn a lot of interesting American military history.

Everyone has their own reasons for reading history and military history. I find that more than anything I am interested in the aspects of war and military history that pertain to human nature, leadership and decision-making. For this reason, I am going to break this review into three important themes that I found very relevant- leadership, tactics, and human factors.

  1. Leadership

This book has several examples of good and bad leadership. I have always been interested in General Washington’s leadership since reading David McCullough’s classic 1776. I’ve always found it fascinating to study how Washington made a lot of mistakes early in the war and occasionally came up with plans that were overly complicated. Sometimes it seemed like Washington’s army survived on nothing but luck and British miscalculations. But, Washington’s ability to adapt, learn, and use his personal influence helped him ultimately lead his army to victory over the British.

Additionally, this book chronicles many leaders- American and British- that I found fascinating especially men like Nathaniel Greene and Daniel Morgan. These two leaders emerged in the second half of the war when most of the fighting had shifted to the southern colonies. It was interesting to learn that Greene and Morgan were both extremely well-read and well-respected individuals. They were students of their profession and warfighting. Furthermore, they applied their knowledge and experience to the battlefield in creative ways. For example, at the Cowpens battlefield, Daniel Morgan did an exhaustive terrain study during an initial reconnoiter. He determined that a field with a sloping hill and a ravine that cut across the Green River Road was suitable to stop his men from retreating while also preventing the British from flanking them. He determined immediately to fight the battle at that location. Furthermore, the book also explains that leaders like Morgan knew not only the terrain but also his own men and the character of his enemy. To this extent, he developed tactics that exploited his enemies’ weaknesses and took advantage of his troops key strengths. Morgan and other American leaders helped pioneer the “defense in depth,” which was “novel for the time.”

Finally, I appreciate the way the book also explores examples of British and French leadership. Contrary to the way movies and the media have portrayed the British General Cornwallis, he comes across as a good example of a leader to study. The author highlights many situations in which Cornwallis led from the front and inspired his own troops with his personal example.

 

  1. Tactics

As I mentioned with the Daniel Morgan example, the Washington’s Immortals shows how American and British forces adapted during the war and changed their tactics to exploit their enemies’ weaknesses while maximizing their advantages. It was interesting to read that the British began the war with refined tactics that they had learned from the French and Indian War several years earlier. In fact, the British were experienced in fighting with lighter forces that could strike quickly and relied on speed and maneuver. The book explains that a lot of these tactics had been adapted from fighting alongside American Indian tribes. Furthermore, the American tactics of guerilla style warfare weren’t developed until the latter half of the war when the fighting had shifted to the southern colonies. The book shows that the Americans recognized that many of the British positions were spread throughout the Carolinas and they sought to exploit the isolated British positions by conducting raids, harassing supply lines, and springing ambushes.

Regarding the Maryland Regiment, the book explains that they were at the “forefront of helping pioneer an American Style of combat” (O’Donnell 86). O’Donnell explains:

Tactically, the Americans tended to concentrate their firepower on a specific point in the battlefield where it had the greatest impact. They also developed defensive maneuvers that wore down the enemy, taking advantage of the terrain and making the best use possible of the militia and Continentals they had at their disposal. At the strategic level, the Americans used intelligence as a force multiplier, helping them position their troops to the best advantage. In addition, the Marylanders and the rest of the American troops relied on speed and flexibility, combined with judicious risk taking; they avoided needlessly wasting men’s lives for operations that didn’t produce results.

(O’Donnell 86)

 

  1. Human Factors

The author details the challenges that Washington’s army faced in terms of men and resources. After reading this book, I am interested in learning more about the economics of the conflict and how America paid for the war especially as hyperinflation became a significant challenge. With the economic hardships that existed, O’Donnell explains that in the winter months many of the American troops were hiking without shoes. With the lack of necessities like food and clothing, it is not hard to understand why desertion was a significant problem that Washington had to deal with. The book highlights a lot of instances in which Americans deserted and fought for the British, and then returned to the American side only to desert again and fight once again for the British. These types of anecdotes are scattered throughout the book, and provide some lively entertainment.

Additionally, the Maryland Regiment fought the countless battles from 1776-1783 and marched thousands of miles. Due to their experience and reliability in combat, the regiment was frequently put at critical points in many of the engagements. The author explains that Washington frequently used them as a rear guard to protect the Continental Army. The best example of this occurred during the Battle of Brooklyn where the Marylanders earned the distinction “Immortal 400” for a daring assault that saved much of Washington’s army from total defeat. They were also used as a rear guard during the bold escape from Long Island in which Washington’s army was successfully ferried to Manhattan in the middle of the night with the Marylanders being the last ones to leave and narrowly missing the British. Later in the war, the Marylanders were used as a “forlorn hope” which the author describes as essentially a “suicide squad.” Throughout these difficult situations, the Regiment endured significant changes to its task organization as men were killed, wounded, or captured. They lost several key leaders, but there were some that prevailed until the end and comprised the backbone of the Regiment. These men included John Eager Howard, Colonel William Smallwood, Otho Holland Williams, Mordecai Gist, and others, whose names and personal example contributed significantly to America’s war for independence.

Finally, the author ends the book with a call to action for the reader. Having learned about the history of the Maryland Regiment and their tenacity and determination, the author explains that the graves of 256 of the Immortal 400 have yet to be discovered. The challenge is for lovers of history to tell the story of these brave men and spread the word of their heroism in the hope that one day the hallowed ground on which they fought and died will be re-discovered, re-purchased, and dedicated to their memory and amazing legacy.

Click to get a copy of Washington’s Immortals

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How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything Review

By PMEComplete on December 24, 2016

At first glance this book seems to state what gets parroted frequently namely that war is being fought by a fraction of the population and an even smaller portion of the military itself. The oft-cited gulf between civilian and military personnel is alluded to in this book repeatedly. However, the book provides a unique perspective on this issue by pointing to the changing nature of war itself and focusing on technological changes and legal challenges that make war increasingly impersonal and far removed not only from civilians but also from many service members.

To provide some context on the author, Rosa Brooks, she is a contributor to Foreign Policy, a legal scholar and Georgetown law professor, who spent several years working at the Pentagon under Michele Flournoy, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Additionally, Ms. Brooks met her husband, an Army Colonel, while at the Pentagon, and became immersed in the culture of the military as a spouse. Due to this fact, the book provides an exposition of military culture and reads like an epiphany of the difference between civilian and military life. This should appeal to civilians reading the book, but not so much to active service members. Although I did enjoy the statistics on military recruiting and I hadn’t thought about the correlation between geography of military bases and the geography of recruiting trends.

This book’s strength occurs in its focus on war in the twenty-first century under the umbrella of the overarching and seemingly unending war on terror. The author suggests that military actions like drone strikes against suspected terrorists have far reaching implications which we have not fully begun to appreciate. The most obvious implication is what might happen when other nations adopt their own equally capable drone technology to carry out similar attacks all over the world under the banner of their own “war on terrorism.” This is where the author draws on her legal background to make the case that a clear legal framework, right or wrong, needs to be established for this kind of ever increasing activity. She also focuses on detainee detention at Guantanamo Bay, and makes a clear and strong human rights case for shuttering the base.

The second point of her book is that over the past fifteen years of counterinsurgency campaigns the military has been asked to take on a range of tasks that are traditionally reserved for the State Department, USAID, and NGO’s. But, as the American response to the war on terror has been overwhelmingly a military one, the DOD budget has ballooned and has vastly eclipsed that of any other government agency. Thus, the military is asked to do tasks that it is not trained to do nor is it truly prepared to do. She mentions everything from infrastructure building and public works projects included but not limited to countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Her description of the military as a “Wal-Mart” for policy makers is provocative, yet when one considers the number of missions the military conducts across the “range of military operations,” it seems to be a fair assessment.

The book touches on a lot of issues beyond the central thesis of “how everything became war and the military became everything.” Some parts of the book seem to be disjointed from the thesis and are included as one or more of her “tales from the Pentagon.” I am thinking of one of her earlier chapters on piracy. She alludes to a clear historical precedent for the Navy’s anti-piracy campaigns, but I don’t think that this means that fighting piracy has to fall under the “everything becoming war” taxonomy. I think this vignette simply becomes one of those juicy little “tales from the Pentagon” as she recalls the entire episode surrounding the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama. On the other hand, I found this history to be interesting, and there are a few other historical vignettes to wet the military historian palette. The tales from the Pentagon are well written too, and occasionally build her case for the military becoming everything. For example, a White House national security staffer called to order immediate drone surveillance in Kyrgyzstan. When she raised practical questions about the utility of the drone surveillance, the staffer blasted her for not getting some “CentCom [Central Command] Colonel” to order the drone immediately. This is one of the more eyebrow raising examples of the civilian and military disconnect not to mention civilians putting unreasonable expectations on military capabilities.

Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the current state of the American military and with an interest in thinking about the role the military should play in American geo-political strategy.

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Black Flags Review

By PMEComplete on December 23, 2016

Joby Warrick’s Pulitzer Prize winning book Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS is an incredibly quick and easy read. Even while checking some sources and constantly flipping to endnotes, I still managed to finish the book in one weekend. I will emphasize that my main critique of the book is that it needs more endnotes, and I would have preferred them to be referenced throughout the text. This would have made tracking the sources easier. But, the author’s style did not lend itself to this kind of structure. There was some creative license used in the book as it reads more like a novel than a summary of historical events. But, I do not think Warrick was trying to mislead the reader. On the other hand, it’s appropriate to say he was adding “color” (my quotes) to the story. For example, the discussion of Zarqawi in prison “commanding with his eyes” is an early example of this. The point is that Zarqawi held a lot of influence, but the author mentions that Zarqawi could simply look at his fellow prisoners and they obeyed him. Is that a stretch? I think it’s important to realize that there is some creative license at work here based on strands of truth.

Warrick’s book goes into detail about the rise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from a hard-drinking, tattooed, street thug from Jordan into an improbable leader of a vast terrorist network that would overtake Al-Qaeda, plunge Iraq into brutal sectarian violence, and whose legacy would continue to this day in the form of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The book focuses more on Zarqawi’s rise than it does on current day ISIS. It also concentrates on individuals within the American CIA and Jordanian Mukhabarat who were committed to stopping Zarqawi and preventing his influence from spreading. In many ways, the book is similar to Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower about the rise of Al-Qaeda and the events leading to 9/11. Black Flags points to several U.S. failures that unwittingly abetted the rise of Zarqawi. The most glaring example is the speech that Secretary of State Colin Powell made to the U.N. in February 2003 arguing a connection between Zarqawi and Sadam Hussein’s regime. This is one of those unfortunate historical episodes where the reader feels a sharp pang of disappointment. As one can imagine, there are a lot of moments like these scattered throughout the book. The episode in which the CIA was apparently ready to eradicate Zarqawi’s camp in northeastern Iraq is another one.

One hero that emerges prominently in the book is General Stanley McChrystal. Through his unrelenting leadership and drive to kill or capture Zarqawi, changes were made in the cycle of intelligence and the conduct of operations that would eventually bring the terrorist mastermind to justice. From Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, Mr. Warrick fast forwards nearly five years to the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War, which sowed the seeds for the rise of the Islamic State in the bloody Syrian conflict. Furthermore, between the instability of Iraq’s neighbor and the terribly sectarian policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, conditions were rapidly set for the rise of ISIS in the disaffected and fearful population of Iraq’s Sunni tribal lands namely Fallujah and Ramadi. Warrick focuses on some Sunni tribal leaders who had helped the U.S. during the surge of 2006-2007, but when faced with sectarian violence and marginalization by Shiite Prime Minister Maliki, these same Sunni tribal leaders welcomed ISIS with open arms to defend their tribes from Shiite oppression.

Compared with the books in depth look at Zarqawi, Warrick does short work on the rise of Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS and self-declared Caliph. The reader shouldn’t expect a lot of information on the organization’s unique means of recruiting via social media (although this is obviously mentioned). Also, there is not a lot of detail on military tactics, nor does he go into detail on the groups governing of conquered territories. This is a story about the rise of the group, and it doesn’t go into specifics that might interest someone looking for a more in depth look at the group as it exists today. If one wants these details, David Kilcullen’s most recent book, Blood Year should satisfy. However, Black Flags tells the story of ISIS rise with painful detail and precise focus on the most critical events.

 

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Blood Year Review

By PMEComplete on December 23, 2016

This book was an awesome account of what the title calls the unraveling of western counterterrorism as evidenced by the rise of ISIS. David Kilcullen does not have any bias except toward the truth. He leaves no party or politician unaccountable for what has happened that gave rise to the violence and terror caused by the so called Islamic State. Kilcullen has both brilliant insight and sharp analysis as he draws on a wide range of knowledge and experience to highlight his points. He also has a robust knowledge of history and can put history in the context of current events to discuss the merits of our current strategy while also suggesting other strategic approaches to solve this conflict. I can’t recommend this book more highly. One could explore the resources and notes referenced in this book and spend months trying to read all of the material that David Kilcullen consolidated into one thoughtful and at times provocative book.

 

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