Professional Military Education

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Secretary of Defense James Mattis

Podcast

Lying to Ourselves: An Interview with Dr. Leonard Wong

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My guest is Dr. Leonard Wong, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. In February 2015, he co-authored a paper with Stephen Gerras called “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession.” The interview explores how a culture of “ethical laziness” has spread throughout military branches like the U.S. Army. The essential question is whether the Army “system” has eroded virtues like integrity. Dr. Wong argues that through “overtasking” i.e. too many training requirements, military leaders will consciously report false or misleading information.

But, is this malicious? Is it a new phenomenon? What can military leaders do now to recover the core values that make the profession of arms so widely respected? This conversation will stir a lot of passionate debates and emotions, but that is a good thing. Dr. Wong takes on a difficult topic, and it will only challenge military leaders to think and improve their profession.

What has been created?

In his research of the U.S. Army, Dr. Wong tallied up 297 days of mandatory training. However, there were only 256 days of available training. He reported this in a study called, “Stifling Innovation.”

If one has served in the military, then they probably understand the extent to which an overwhelming number of training requirements persists. Many are specific to a certain job. For example, marksmanship training is an obligation for infantrymen. However, other less mission critical requirements like tobacco cessation training are also training requirements. Furthermore, in this case, both training requirements stand on equal footing. As a result, each year infantrymen are expected to have completed both their rifle qualification training and tobacco cessation training (note: there are many requirements similar to tobacco cessation i.e. required but not mission critical).

While tobacco cessation training is typically done on a web based program, most people quickly click through the training modules to get it done. The goal is to report compliance. This strips away the seriousness of the actual objective i.e. reducing tobacco use and promoting a healthier lifestyle. Thus, the training becomes comical and is treated as a “check in the box.”

Dr. Wong’s central argument is that these types of requirements are having a damaging effect on the ethical integrity of the military. While the training may be a positive initiative (tobacco use is not a healthy habit), it is not perceived that way at lower levels. Instead it is perceived as an obstacle to be overcome.

How did it get to this point?

Trust is crucial. It is vital to the effectiveness of any organization. Leaders must trust each other and trust the people they lead. But, if there is a lack of trust in leadership than a mandatory training requirement might be created to replace it. The message is, “We don’t trust you to look after the welfare of your troops so now we are going to make you do it by imposing XYZ training.”

What is the effect?

Typically, lower level unit leaders roll their eyes and figure out the quickest way to expedite the training. As Dr. Wong suggests this is where the ethical erosion begins to take place. So when a lower level leader “checks the box” to report compliance, it is rarely seen as morally suspect. When the answer is we are “good to go”, this is what higher up leaders want to hear. This is the essence of “lying to ourselves.” Dr. Wong argues that higher ups often understand that “good to go” may be satisfying the mandates of the system. In many cases, those same leaders have been brought up in the system and understand that the reporting may be exaggerated if not blatantly false.

A system of distrust can also be self-perpetuating. It becomes a vicious cycle. If a leader can’t accomplish all of the priority training requirements, then their higher ups may lose trust in them. Instead of relaxing the training requirements, it is likely they could impose more. Too often when there are leadership failures the response is often to apply new mechanisms and requirements to ensure that the failures don’t happen again. This is where leadership gets replaced with checklists. The system continues to become more robust. As it becomes more robust, it diminishes the importance of real leadership.

Leadership vs. Checklists?

Why have checklists replaced leadership? Dr. Wong claims leaders are imperfect. Leadership is a messy business. Its a people business, and people are imperfect. Not all leaders are created equal. But, systems and checklists “appear perfect.” Its this appearance of perfection that gives a sense of relief that lower level unit leaders are doing what they are supposed to be doing. It’s part of the “green light” mentality. Checklists can also be a way of “covering one’s ass.” For example, if some personnel are caught hazing, a leader can say, “Look, they received the hazing brief.” This leader can then point to a roster with signatures. Is that really leadership? Dr. Wong’s argument is no. It’s a system that has diminished leadership.

On the appearance of perfection, I raise the idea of appearing to look good instead of being good. This makes sense. The military has drills and elaborate ceremonies. Its members sport sharp short haircuts, and wear nicely pressed uniforms. Appearance does matter. At the same time, there is a culture of competition and not wanting to look bad. As a result, leaders may not be truthful if they are trying to present an image of readiness and compliance rather than being honest about their readiness status. This can have negative effects. In certain cases, people have lost their jobs trying to keep up appearances.

Are we simply feeding “the system” what it wants?

What does it look like to “feed the beast”? How does lying to the system work? One example is Marines having to fill out Holiday Accident Reduction Program (HARP) forms before they go on leave and extended liberty. These forms are extremely detailed and take a lot of time to complete in their entirety. So the typical form gets filled out without a lot of thought or effort. However, the rationalization is that this is fine because the goal is to get the Marines on liberty. It is essentially “lying” under the guise of troop welfare.

Therefore, the irony is that a tool designed for troop welfare (e.g. HARP forms) is seen as an impediment to troop welfare. The HARP form does’t serve its intended purpose. Also, troops at the lowest levels know that their leadership does not fill out HARP forms. Therefore, they recognize it as a simple check in the box. Get it done i.e. “feed the system” then get the troops on liberty i.e. look out for troop morale.

Solutions

We don’t want to discuss problems without solutions. Dr. Wong offers a few of his own. Despite some resistance to his paper, he has noted changes since it was published. A lot of ethical leadership seminars now include his paper as a reference. Many officers and senior enlisted leaders have discussed the issues raised in it too. Also, Dr. Wong has delivered talks based on his research. Whatever people may think of the paper, it is making an impact. Here are some of the solutions he has proposed.

Admit there is a problem

The first step is to admit there is a problem. Dr. Wong argues there is a disconnect between higher and lower levels of leadership. Higher leaders are often unaware of the myriad of requirements that are placed on lower levels. He says that senior leaders need to recognize that there is a problem not deny it or be willfully blind to it. Also, it is rarely the case that senior leaders will remove any requirements. Typically, a senior leader is more likely to add another requirement rather than fight to take one away. This needs to change.

Exercising restraint

Too often leaders struggle to prioritize training. If everything is a priority than nothing is a priority. Additionally, at each level, leaders believe that what they are mandating is mission critical. It is important to be conscious of how a leaders actions might be perceived at lower levels. Leaders must prioritize and plan to mitigate these issues.

We did talk about the changeover in leadership that happens frequently in the military. For example, when units return from deployments, there are extensive leadership changes. As new leaders come in, they are ready to step on the gas and train full speed. At the same time, when returning from deployment, there are a lot of post-deployment training requirements and administrative actions that must take place. Thus, there is often a confluence of priorities as the new leadership steps in eager to train, but is often less concerned with the post-deployment training.

Lead truthfully

Dr. Wong provides an example from his time at the Army War College. There was a requirement to report certain things as “mission critical.” For example, sending employees to conferences. While the conferences were not mission critical, they were good for employee education and career enhancement. But, the requirement stood firm i.e. going to a conference has to be mission critical. In this case, Dr. Wong’s leadership expressed that it was not mission critical, but they still wanted their people to go, and they would report is as such simply to satisfy the requirement. The response was still that it must be “mission critical.” So they relented and said, “It’s mission critical.”

Dr. Wong says this example works because his superiors were transparent about the reporting. They were honest in explaining that they were saying “mission critical” only to get their people to the conference. They were straightforward about their use of words to satisfy the mandate. Eventually, the “mission critical” requirement was dropped. Perhaps the transparency and truthfulness affected this type of change. Dr. Wong suggests that this is part of the model for leading truthfully and fighting back against ethical erosion.

Conclusion

This paper has struck some nerves. But, it contains detailed research and thoughtful analysis. With full earnestness, Dr. Wong is trying to address some challenges within the military. Since the military prides itself as a learning organization, it is not unreasonable to expect Dr. Wong’s paper to continue to enhance positive leadership and promote values of honor and integrity. The military remains one of the most trusted if not the most trusted institution in America. The goal is to keep it that way by being honest with ourselves.

Feel free to reach out to Dr. Wong via e-mail: leonard.wong.civ@mail.mil

Also, check out his page at the U.S. Army War College.

Be sure to read his paper, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession

 

 

Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging with Sebastian Junger

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Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging

What is a tribe? What is tribalism? When you think of great moments in your life, did they involve other people? Perhaps being part of a winning sports team. Or being a member of a club dedicated to a mission. Or maybe getting in trouble with friends in high school. All of these experiences involved groups of people coming together.

My guest, Sebastian Junger, has a lot of insights about the human need for connection. His theory is that human beings crave strong social bonds. While this observation may not seem unique, in Mr. Junger’s book, Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging, he argues that many veterans suffer when they get out of the service because they miss the strong, intimate relationships that they had when they were in. Furthermore, what is called post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD has become a catch-all term for veterans that are simply alone, depressed, and struggling to make sense of their service in a society that values the individual over the community. This is where Mr. Junger’s book hits home and stirs up some much needed dialogue. Check out the interview we had. Also, I provide a lot of links and resources for veterans at the end of this commentary.

“I sleep better in the field.”

Mr. Junger’s book was published in 2016, and was well-received. Whether one agrees with his thesis or not, there is no doubt that the book will stimulate important conversations. I was drawn to several points in our interview such as the difference between how people live in modern society versus how military units live together. On deployments, military personnel will typically live next to each other in close quarters. During field training, military units will also sleep very close together. There is a common joke about how close Marines will sleep to each other when it gets cold outside. Essentially, if it is cold, Marines will find themselves practically snuggling with another member of their fire team or squad. No one judges because they are probably doing the same thing. Additionally, units will always have a rotating sentry on watch to look after the group.

I can speak from personal experience that sleeping in the field is often better than the sleep I get at home. This seems crazy because my home is comfortably climate controlled and I don’t worry about rain or snow. I also spent a good chunk of change to get the perfect mattress with all of the right settings. But, Marines will frequently say the same thing, “I sleep better in the field.”

Mr. Junger’s point is that it is an experience that is truer to our evolutionary hard wiring. This experience feels good because it is how we were meant to live together. As we follow this point to Mr. Junger’s conclusion, veterans miss these experiences. Thus, often veterans are not nostalgic for war and violence rather they feel an intimate loss of the brotherhood and connection that can be completely “intoxicating.” They may also be missing a good night’s sleep.

Does misery breed company?

In our interview, Mr. Junger touched on the ability of catastrophic events to bind a community. At the present moment, he talks about not feeling close to his neighbors in New York City. However, after the attacks on September 11, Mr. Junger recalls the city becoming a tighter community- i.e. a closer tribe. People came together in the face of adversity and hardship. Moreover, crime rates went down. Also, rates of suicide and depression also decreased.

His book explores some additional examples of this phenomenon such as the London Blitz. London officials expected panic and hysteria. But, the opposite occurred. People were surprisingly resilient.

Additionally, Mr. Junger’s career was spent following a civil war in Bosnia during the 1990’s. The siege of Sarajevo brought an enormous amount of suffering and pain to the residents of that city. However, Mr. Junger mentions that after the siege, several survivors yearned for the close bonds they felt toward one another when community survival was at stake. Everyone had to pull their weight and as such everyone had a job to do. Everyone was a valued member of the community.

How tribalism can be toxic

We try not to get too political in the interview. But, it is worth noting the extent to which American politics has become a toxic form of tribalism. Each political party has a tribal identity and spews hateful rhetoric at the other side. The question I pose to Mr. Junger is whether a nation so deeply divided into warring political tribes can survive. In his book, he writes that if an adversary wanted to destroy the United States, the best tactic would be simply to sit back and let the U.S. destroy itself from within. There was obviously an element of this that occurred through Russia’s social media meddling in the 2016 presidential election.

But, it is worth pointing out that veterans go abroad and serve their country only to return to a country that seems to be at war with itself.  And it isn’t just political rhetoric.

I will never forget the moment that I returned from the field in 2012 only to hear about the Sandy Hook shooting in Connecticut. It was a moment of deep sorrow. We had been training in the desert of 29 Palms, CA. As we drove back to Camp Pendleton, I remember sitting on the bus with my rifle in my lap and being struck by a bitter irony. We had trained for a month to defeat a foreign adversary and to keep the American people safe. But, in one morning, one disturbed individual senselessly murdered innocent American children.

And it got worse. Around the time I was getting ready to deploy, stories emerged about how the victims parents were being harassed and threatened by conspiracy theorists, who were fellow American citizens. As an active duty Marine committed to defending my country, every tragic case like Sandy Hook is extremely depressing.

What can be done for our veterans?

There are a lot of fantastic resources and organizations dedicated to helping veterans. “Thank you for your service” is a hollow phrase. On the other hand, saying “thank you for your service, let’s help you find the right job” is a better phrase. There are a lot of organizations dedicated to helping employ veterans (see below). At the end of the day, veterans want to serve and give back. The best way to do that is with meaningful employment.

Mr. Junger talked about the rise in disability claims. There is an interesting irony that today’s wars have less casualties (thank God) than wars in the past. However, more disability claims are filed than in past wars. Today, the Veterans Administration (VA) wants all veterans to have their medical records screened and to file a claim if needed. Additionally, they will establish service connected disability based on four criteria: Direct, aggravated, presumptive, and secondary.

Disability Breakdown

“Direct” is an injury or condition tied to something that happened while someone was in the service. For example, an individual breaks their back fast roping from a helicopter.

Second, “aggravated” is a prior injury that may have went away. But, service in the military brought it back or made it worse.

Third, “presumptive” is an assumption of a cause and effect condition. For example, there was an incident of contaminated water supply at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in the 1980’s. The VA presumes a service connected disability if a veteran who was exposed to that water supply develops a disease that might be linked to the contaminated water.

Finally, “secondary” conditions are caused by a previously identified service-connected disability. For example, if someone had a broken arm, and later on they began experiencing shoulder pain. The VA might identify this as a secondary injury related to the broken arm.

It is worth understanding that the VA wants to take care of veterans. Mr. Junger acknowledges that this is a good thing. However, the fear is that veterans will come to view themselves as victims. Taking care of veterans is more than just cutting them a check. Again, there is no substitute for meaningful employment. It is the best way for society to say, “thank you.”

The VA’s mission is “To fulfill President Lincoln’s promise ‘To care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by serving and honoring the men and women who are America’s Veterans. Check out the VA’s website at www.va.gov.

Additional Resources

Check out Sebastian Junger’s website. He also wrote several other excellent books such as The Perfect Storm. George Clooney, Mark Wahlberg, William Fichtner and John C. Reilly starred in the movie of the same name. Mr. Junger is also an accomplished filmmaker with award winning documentaries such as Restrepo and Korengal. Hell on Earth: The Fall of Syria and the Rise of ISIS is his most recent documentary. Finally, Tribe emerged from an article that Mr. Junger wrote for Vanity Fair called “How PTSD Became a Problem Far Beyond the Battlefield.”

Career Help

There are many excellent resources to help Service members find new career paths after the military.

Check out the following websites to find and achieve transition goals:

My Next Move for Veterans- https://www.mynextmove.org/vets/

O*Net Online: https://www.onetonline.org/

National Labor Exchange: https://usnlx.com/index.asp

The Department of Labor offers a lot of advice and help for veterans. Check out veterans.gov

Go to https://www.careeronestop.org/ and locate an American Jobs Center in your region.

Training for the Future

DoD SkillBridge promotes civilian job training for transitioning Service members. www.dodskillbridge.com

There are also apprenticeship programs that exist for veterans as well as on-the-job training opportunities. Find out more at https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/onthejob_apprenticeship.asp

Veterans Communities and Networks

Linkedin is a powerful tool for networking. LinkedIn offers Service members and Veterans a free one-year premium subscription plan. Go to www.linkedinforgood.linkedin.com/programs/veterans/premiumform

Finally, there are many veterans associations and organizations dedicated to helping veterans. Check out these organizations:

The American Legion

Veterans of Foreign Wars

Disabled American Veterans DAV.org

American Veterans amvets.org

 

 

Episode 12: John Boyd, Maneuver Warfare, and MCDP1

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Warfighting

MCDP1: Warfighting is only four chapters, and the total length is around 100 pages. The book is affectionately termed a “two crapper”, which means that a person can finish it in two bathroom trips. Warfighting describes a way of thinking about war. It is not a checklist or a technical manual. It gives a mental framework that provides the basis for the Marine Corps conception of war. More importantly it is a launching point for future studies. Warfighting is the gateway for further scholarship. It is simple to read, and also enjoyable. The themes and points of discussion in Warfighting could be discussed for many hours.

Chapter 1: The Nature of War

“War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force.”

The text goes on to say that these groups may include “nonstate groups.” Nonstate groups could include terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The nature of war is also an “interactive social process.” It is a conflict between independent human wills. One term that is used is Zweikampf, which is a German word that means “two-struggle.” Carl von Clausewitz used the analogy of two wrestlers locked together, each one pushing and pulling against the other.

In describing the nature of war in MCDP1, Maj Brown claims that Carl von Clausewitz inspired the principles of “friction” and “uncertainty.” Next, Maj Brown traces “fluidity” to Sun Tzu. Another attribute of war is disorder, which Maj Brown believes came from John Boyd. Disorder is an understanding that plans breakdown on the battlefield.

War is a dynamic process. There is an art and science to it. The science refers to understanding the physical components of things like weapons and logistics. The art relies on creativity and intuition. This is why Professional Military Education is important. It seeks to develop a Marine or soldiers understanding of the art and science of war.

“Violence and danger” characterize war too. For more information, Guy Sajer’s book The Forgotten Soldier is a good first hand account of man’s experience in war. “Human factors” is the term that describes the physical and mental anguish of an individual’s experience in war. Sajer’s book is about the sheer brutality of a soldier’s life on the Russian front during World War II.

Chapter 2: The Theory of War

War is an extension of policy. It is part of the political process. When peaceful diplomatic means are not achieved, competing groups may resort to armed conflict. Furthermore, war occurs on a spectrum from low intensity conflicts to full-scale conventional conflicts. Conventional conflicts are what we consider when we think of major powers at war with each other.

Maj Brown describes the levels of war: Strategic, operational, and tactical. The On Tactics interview with B.A. Friedman covered these levels of war. Strategy involves national security decisions. On the other hand, the tactical level of war characterizes the individual and small unit level. In between the strategic and the tactical is the operational. Operational levels reflect a campaign or deployment. When an infantry battalion goes on a six month deployment, this is considered the operational level. It accomplishes a strategic objective, and the units within the battalion engage in tactical actions.

Maj Brown discusses the topic of center of gravity and critical vulnerability. He describes a relationship between these two areas. As Maj Brown explains, maneuver warfare relies on “disrupting the relationships between the critical vulnerability and centers of gravity.” The goal is to isolate the enemies centers of gravity and turn them into critical vulnerabilities.

Boyd and the OODA Loop

Maj Brown describes the enemy as a “system of human wills.” He sees Col Boyd’s influence in the concept of isolating components of the enemies system to include individuals and groups of individuals. Much of Boyd’s thinking resulted in the concept of the OODA Loop.

Observe: Taking external inputs.

Orient: Processing these inputs.

Decide: Coming up with a plan based on the inputs.

Act: Taking action.

This is a feedback loop, and also a tool to out maneuver the enemy. As soon as the loop goes through one cycle, the next cycle begins with inputs from the cycle before it.

Chapter 3: Preparing for War

Maj Brown says that this chapter is about making the “orientation bubble” as big as possible. In the interview, he mentions the process of training and building a strong team. Through repetition in training, a unit gets to the point where it can effectively execute maneuver warfare. Thus, the goal of preparing for war is to get to “harmonized action” that can operate off of commander’s intent.

Additionally, within the Marine Corps, there is a Marine Air Ground Task Force (aka MAGTF). MAGTFs can execute a range of missions . They are comprised of a ground combat element, air combat element, logistics combat element, and a command element, which provides versatility.

But, all components being of the MAGTF must be able to effectively orient on the mission. As a result, a MAGTF will train extensively, develop a common doctrine, and conduct integrated and standardized planning. Essentially, all components of the MAGTF are on the same page. The goal is to reduce silos within the organization and harmonize the effort.

Chapter 4: The Conduct of War

“Preparation for war” establishes a strong foundation for the conduct of war. The conduct of war contains concepts of mission tactics, small unit leadership, commander’s intent, combined arms, and decisionmaking.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. 

This concept is NOT talking about “destroying” the enemy. In fact, it is a mindset that looks at breaking down the enemy’s coherence to get the enemy to give up. When we understand the enemy, we can backwards plan a method to shatter the enemy’s cohesion. Maneuver warfare can achieve this by going after the enemy’s mental and moral strengths. Prisoner counts rather than body counts determine success in warfare. POWs are indicative of the enemy’s having lost the will to fight and resist.

Additional Links and Resources

For copies of Maj Brown’s book, A New Conception of War, send advanced requests to mcu_press@usmcu.edu

Check out the Quarterly PME from the Marine Corps University Research Library.

Additionally, the Marine Corps University Research Library provides a helpful overview of many of the themes discussed in the interview as well as further reading.

Episode 11: John Boyd, Maneuver Warfare, and MCDP-1

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Warfighting: MCDP-1

Major Ian Brown discusses the evolution of the Marine Corps’ doctrinal publication, MCDP-1: Warfighting. After the Vietnam War, Marine Corps thinkers re-evaluated how to think about fighting wars. The term “attrition” meant defining success in body counts, and was the prevailing focus of the Vietnam War. “Throwing more men and material at a problem” is another way to describe attrition. Since this style of warfare failed in Vietnam, the Marine Corps sought a new concept of war. Maj Brown writes extensively about this history in his forthcoming book, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, The U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare.

Warfighting incorporates the Marine Corps’ idea of “Maneuver Warfare.” The author, Captain John Schmitt, wrote the original publication Fleet Marine Force Manual-1 (FMFM-1), which was published in 1989. General Al Gray Jr., the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, tasked Captain Schmitt with writing the book. Maj Brown describes this task as “the ultimate in mission type orders.”

Maneuver Warfare

Sometimes referred to as the “maneuver warfare movement”, this term represents the emergence of a new mindset. Maneuver warfare was a way of thinking about how to win any conflict from guerrilla-style insurgencies to conventional conflicts against major powers like the Soviet Union. Terms like tempo, surprise, deception, and shock to the enemies’ system described warfare by “maneuver”. As a theory, maneuver warfare focuses on getting inside the enemies mind and shattering his cohesion.

While the American military has always had a “physical, material” focus, Vietnam instructed military thinkers that material advantages were only a partial component of victory. There had to be a change in mindset. The answer could not always be to throw more men and bombs at a problem on the battlefield. There had to be a change in the way the military and the Marine Corps thought about defeating the enemy. The new, sophisticated approach looked at developing systems in which a unit could adapt faster than the enemy and respond quicker to changes on the battlefield. The ability to transition and apply pressure on the enemy at a decisive place and time speaks to this new conception of maneuver warfare.

Colonel John Boyd

Colonel Boyd was a pilot in the United States Air Force. His work focused on transitioning states of energy in aircraft that Boyd described as the Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) theory. Maj Brown explains that Col Boyd’s ideas on E-M continue to be relevant today. Furthermore, Col Boyd also helped with the development of the F-16.

When Col Boyd retired from the Air Force, he explored ideas on warfare that would be critical to the Marine Corps. In his essay, “Destruction and Creation”, Col Boyd looks at mismatches that create one’s ability to survive and adapt. As a result of this essay, Boyd embarked on a deep study into military history. From his studies, he developed a brief called, “Patterns of Conflict.” Boyd gave his brief to Marine leaders, and quickly found that he had a captive audience.

Reading MCDP-1

When reading Warfighting, context is important. FMFM-1, the first draft, was published in 1989, and it emerged from post-Vietnam analysis. Meanwhile, when it was updated to MCDP-1: Warfighting in 1997, the Cold War had ended. Thus, the history of both points in time- post-Cold War and post-Vietnam- should be considered when reading Warfighting.

Maj Brown explains that Warfighting is not a “how-to” manual. Maj Brown describes it as “deliberately generic and overarching.” The goal is to give a mental framework for how to view conflict. It seeks to provide a way of thinking about how to make the enemy quit. MCDP-1 is about understanding the enemy as a “human creature.”

For copies of Maj Brown’s book, A New Conception of War, send advanced requests to mcu_press@usmcu.edu

On Tactics: An Interview with B.A. Friedman

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On Tactics

In Episode 10 of the Professional Military Education podcast, I talk to B.A. Friedman, author of On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle. The conversation focuses on tactics and its relationship to strategy. Mr. Friedman discusses what he calls the three tactical tenets- physical, mental, and moral. He discusses how he developed his theory of tactics, and how that theory can be applied by military thinkers.

 

Giving Training Context

Mr. Friedman claims that this is the book that he wished he had as a junior Marine. He says, “It was a way to simplify what I had learned over the course of my career… to create some context that I could have used when I was younger and just starting out.”

Additionally, he saw that there needed to be a better “structure” to tactical thinking that mimicked the scholarship around strategic thinking.

Strategy is the use of victory on the battlefield to achieve victory in war. On the other hand, accomplishing a specific mission and winning battles is the key to tactics.

Physical Tenet

Mr. Friedman describes “maneuver” as a physical tenet. This means gaining a positional advantage over an enemy. Maneuver has not only a physical component, but also a mental and cognitive component too. The Marine Corps developed the principles of maneuver as one of the smaller services. The Marine Corps prioritized maneuver over mass and firepower as one of the keys to tactical success.

One of the physical tenets is also firepower. This part of the interview is about “combined arms”, which is putting the enemy in a “no-win” situation. For example, an enemy in a fighting hole tries to lift his head. If he does so then he will be shot with direct fire weapons. However, if he stays in his hole, the enemy will be suppressed with artillery and mortars. Consequently, the combined arms principle is based on trying to synchronize all aspects of weaponry to bring total force to bear on the enemy.

Mental Tenet

With the mental tenet, Mr. Friedman tries to explain how to “attack the enemy’s mind.” As a result, he explores the dynamics of surprise, deception, shock, and confusion. Furthermore, he studied theorists such as JFC Fuller and John Boyd. From his studies, Mr. Friedman recognized that no matter what happens physically on the battlefield, “there is a mental effect” on both the enemy and friendly sides. Physical actions create changes in mental states.

Mr. Friedman asserts that recognizing the battlefield is mental as well as physical gives us “more weapons.” It opens up a range of advantages. Ambushes are a good example of using surprise to gain both a physical and mental advantage over the enemy. At one point, Mr. Friedman claims that surprise can create the equivalent of a 2000 to 1 numerical advantage. Surprise is a way of corrupting the enemy’s decision making cycle.

Mr. Friedman does an excellent job breaking down the nuances between shock and confusion. He uses his broad knowledge of history and warfare to make impressive observations about shock and confusion as well as surprise and deception.

Moral

Mr. Friedman describes a cohesive unit as a “moral” unit. Furthermore, he says issues like morale, trust, leadership, and patriotism can provide the underpinnings of moral cohesion. Additionally, Marines and Soldiers want to feel like they are fighting for the right cause. Thus, morals must be tailored to a just cause. Mr. Friedman talks about laws of war and rules of engagement as part of the process to create the framework for moral cohesion. Ethics, morality, and rules of engagement are practical fields of martial study in order to protect our own moral cohesion. Finally, leaders are responsible for all aspects of their troops welfare to include their moral well being.

 

Be sure to follow Mr. Friedman on Twitter @BA_Friedman

Like On Tactics on Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ontactics/

HELP SPREAD THE WORD!

If you like this interview, and want to hear others, subscribe in iTunes. Support the show with written reviews, share on social media, and through word of mouth. For any requests for additional shows or guests, e-mail me: tim@professionalmilitaryeducation.com

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle

The North Korea Threat: An Interview with Dr. Bruce Bechtol

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In the following interview, Dr. Bechtol discusses the threat of North Korea. North Korea has made headlines for their ICBM tests and nuclear tests. We discuss the threat that they pose as well as get into the details of their regime, their current leader, past provocations, weapons systems, and options that the U.S. and its allies have to deal with them.

Dr. Bechtol is Associate Professor of political science at Angelo State University in Texas. He is a retired U.S. Marine, and wrote the lead article in the December 2016 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette. The article was called “A Marine’s Guide to North Korea.”

 

North Korea Threat Synopsis

We begin the interview discussing the current situation between the U.S. and North Korea. North Korea recently threatened to fire ICBMs at Guam. But, Kim Jong-un backed down… for now. Dr. Bechtol talks about the different types of missiles that the North Koreans have to include Musadan, KN-08, and KN-14 missiles.

The Washington Post reported North Korea’s advancement of miniaturized nuclear warheads. But, Dr. Bechtol says that this is nothing defense officials haven’t been aware of for several years. However, what has changed is that they have successfully tested the range of their ICBMs, and have displayed that they are capable of hitting the U.S. or Guam.

Dr. Bechtol discusses the current defense capabilities that the U.S. has to bring down a North Korean ICBM.

 

The North Korean State

What type of state is North Korea? North Korea (aka Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) a dynastic system, run by elites with a love for Joseph Stalin.

Who is Kim Jong-un? He was educated in Switzerland and grew up loving NBA basketball. Some thought he might be a moderate leader when he came to power. But, as a leader, he has ruled North Korea with an iron fist and carried out many purges. Dr. Bechtol talks about the political institutions in North Korea- the Party, the Military, and the Security Services. In the political system of the DPRK, everyone is watching everyone else. It’s a bizarre system of “checks and balances” in which “big brother” is always watching.

Dr. Bechtol talks about how Kim Jong-un may not have the support of the North Korean military. Thus, he has used military tests, provocations, and brinkmanship to solidify his support. What type of cyber technology does North Korea have? They have sacked Sony, hacked NGO’s, and sought to raid South Korean financial institutions.

 

The North Korean “Play Book”

Dr. Bechtol breaks down the tactics of North Korea’s violent provocations. They conduct “short” attacks to inflict massive casualties to strike fear in the hearts and minds of South Koreans. But, South Korea has stepped up their defenses to deter and respond to the North’s provocations.

We discuss the current command and control structure between the U.S. and our allies, South Korea (aka Republic of Korea or ROK). The Combined Forces Command establishes unity of command between U.S. and ROK forces. The CFC commander, a four-star general, takes his strategic and operational guidance from the U.S. national command authority and the ROK Minister of National Defense.

 

Contingency Planning?

Dr. Bechtol assesses how and why the U.S. and China is working to plan for “contingencies.” What would happen if the North Korean regime collapsed? The U.S. and China would need to work together. Dr. Bechtol says that the North Korea will implode stating it’s a matter of “if not when.” At that point, the U.S. will need to work directly with China.

On August 16, General Dunford, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Chinese military leaders in China.

Dr. Bechtol reiterates the need for the U.S. to develop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology.

How could the North Korean regime collapse? Dr. Bechtol explains, “Planning is a nightmare.” There are hundreds of possible scenarios for a collapse.

If North Korea collapses, Dr. Bechtol mentions that forces have been training to recover nuclear and chemical weapons. He says that they could fetch a high price on black markets.

 

Conclusion

What does Dr. Bechtol think should be done right now? Two things:

  1. Update BMD technology.
  2. Use economic pressure. For example, the Patriot Act Section 311 goes after banks that do business with rogue regimes. Dr. Bechtol says we need to use this. Bottom Line: Sanctions need to be enforced. The U.S. needs to stand up an inter-agency task force to make it happen.

Be sure to keep an eye out for Dr. Bechtol’s next book, Enabling Instability and Violence, which will be published in 2018.