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As I am currently reading Scales on War The Future of America’s Military at Risk, I wanted to share this video in which he outlines some of the ideas in his book.

General Scales’ book doesn’t hold back in a scathing criticism of what he sees as a failure of politicians and policy makers to adequately equip and invest in the infantrymen, meaning the soldiers and Marines involved in the unpleasant act of “intimate killing.” This means that the infantryman is the man who looks his enemy in the eyes before he squeezes the trigger. General Scales lays out a compelling case for the need to create a more professional and highly trained infantry force that is the “main effort” in terms of Defense Appropriations funding. His book often reads like Smedley Butler’s War is a Racket in terms of how he hints that large defense companies and the bureaucrats that write them checks have an incentive to manufacture conflicts that justify funding for air and sea technology. But, as he asserts, America’s enemies are not engaging us in the air and on the sea. In fact, he is adamant that in the nuclear age, large nuclear powers don’t fight each other conventionally. Furthermore, our fights have been against smaller, irregular forces who use cheap technology in creative ways. Since our infantrymen haven’t received adequate funding, the fights that they have been engaged in have been “too fair.” He asks why America’s infantrymen haven’t been given the resources that they need to have a significant edge over the enemies we have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is worth reading and the issues are worth discussing and debating. Check out the video and the book.

David Kilcullen is a counterinsurgency scholar that we follow very closely. He has written some awesome books to include: Counterinsurgency, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, and Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla

In this video, he talks about the ideas in his book Out of the Mountains and some of the trends of populations moving from rural to urban environments and how it will influence future conflicts. Additionally, he talks about how the urban centers are moving closer to the coastlines. What are the implications for military operations in light of these demographic shifts? Check out the video and look into Kilcullen’s books, you won’t be disappointed with his insights and knowledge.

As I read Washington’s Immortals by Patrick O’Donnell, I have noted how many mistakes George Washington made as a military commander. Obviously he was outmatched and outgunned by a far superior British army, which was highly experienced, well-trained, and disciplined. My assessment is that Washington wanted the Continental Army to be a European style army that could stand up to the British in a conventional fight. Early in the war, he intended to employ them in this manner. As Joe Ellis mentions in the video below, General Washington had to learn that his strength was wearing down the British Empire’s will to fight. Furthermore, he had to prolong the conflict until significant events like the French entering the war occurred. In this case, the Revolutionary War became more than a struggle in colonial America. For the British it became a global struggle. The extent to which the British had to worry about invasion at home from the French forced them to commit fewer troops to fighting in America. They were also fighting the Spanish in central America and the Caribbean.

George Washington was not a brilliant tactician, but he was an exceptionally determined leader, who insisted on high standards of excellence for his troops. When he came up with operational plans like the battle of Trenton, these plans were often overly complicated. In spite of his faults, Washington’s personal example routinely made the difference in a number of battles. He never hesitated to lead from the front and assert his influence at points of friction. He was bold sometimes to the point of recklessness. Also, as Joe Ellis mentions, he may have had a “death wish” (although that is simply historical speculation). Overall, George Washington is a fascinating military commander to study because of his blunders, and his ability to learn from them. His mental toughness and confidence in the American cause compounded by his willingness to lead the cause inspired his army during the Revolutionary War. They also inspire many people to this day!

I am currently reading the book, Washington’s Immortals: The Untold Story of an Elite Regiment Who Changed the Course of the Revolution. This book was written by Patrick K. O’Donnell, and was published in 2016. The story is about a regiment from Maryland known as the “Immortal 400.” Throughout the course of the Revolutionary War, the regiment distinguished themselves for their bravery and fighting spirit. They fought in a number of key battles throughout the war, and on more than one occasion, they managed to save Washington’s Continental Army from complete destruction.

As I have begun the book, I have already been sucked into the story and the remarkable history. Several key historical points that the author establishes early include:

1. The division in the colonies between those who wanted independence and those who wanted to remain loyal to the crown. The author does a good job establishing the divisive nature of the conflict particularly in Maryland as the state divided itself among geographical lines as the Patriots came largely from Baltimore and Annapolis while the Loyalists tended to come from the Eastern Shore.
2. The superiority of the British army. In the chapter on the British armada that floated into the Hudson Bay in the summer of 1776, the author explains how the twenty-three thousand of British regular soldiers were exceptionally professional. For example, the British generals averaged thirty years of military experience collectively while the privates in the British army averaged nine years of experience. By contrast, the American generals averaged two years of military experience. Also, as a result of the French-Indian War and the Seven Years War in Europe, the British army had a lot of combat veterans and were familiar with the American terrain. Due to this fact, the British had developed new tactics that had led to the development of light infantry and light cavalry units.

Overall, I am excited to continue reading this book. I have a feeling it will go by quickly as I have found that the material is very accessible and well-written.