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Iran

“All the Shah’s Men” Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 25, 2017

On November 4, 1979, shouts of “death to America” and “death to the Shah” roared from the streets of Tehran. Outside the American embassy throngs of radical Iranian students pushed against the embassies’ walls shouting in visceral disgust at the American diplomats inside. It wasn’t long before these students brazenly scaled the walls and stormed the embassy. In the harrowing hours after the American embassy was overrun, fifty-two Americans were taken hostage. They were paraded before cameras and broadcasted around the world by international news outlets. Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution which overthrew the Shah’s rule, refused to release the American hostages. They remained captive until January 20, 1981 when President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. For 444 days, Americans were kept in captivity, and the United States fumed with justifiable anger, resentment, and confusion. How could an event like this happen? What were the roots of the crisis in Tehran?

Iranian students scale the walls of the US embassy in Tehran. (Image source: Wikipedia)

In his 2003 book, “All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror”, Stephen Kinzer attempts to lay the groundwork for an explanation. The story of how America became heavily involved in a plot to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh represents a fascinating chapter in American history, and one that is frequently overlooked and sadly misunderstood. “All the Shah’s Men” provides a broad overview of Iranian history to set the stage for Iran’s present-day resentment and mistrust of foreign powers. Mr. Kinzer harkens back to the era of the Persian empire “built by Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes” and remarks that Iranians possess an abiding sense of inspiration in “their heritage” (Kinzer 17-18). He also talks about the collective social consciousness and sense of justice that can be traced to the influence of Zoroastrianism in Persian history. At the same time, Kinzer underscores the fact that Iranian pride in their history and culture is also deeply rooted in their opposition to hostile invaders to include Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan’s Mongol hordes, and Arab conquerors, who spread Islam to Iran. Furthermore, the form of Islam adopted by Iranians would be Shiite, which is a tradition rooted in the belief that Mohammad’s cousin Ali was the successor as caliph i.e. leader of the Islamic world. During the first quarter of the 20th century, Iran was ruled by a Turkic tribe known as the Qajars. When the Qajars were gone after 1925, Iran stood between “two great imperial powers, Britain and Russia” (Kinzer 28). Due to this position, Iran found itself within the crosshairs of world powers competing for ideological partners and foreign allies in the aftermath of World War II.

Who could forget Xerxes? You know, the dude from 300! (Image Source: GQ )

A significant portion of Mr. Kinzer’s book involves the rise of Iranian nationalism embodied in the figure of Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh rallied his political support under the banner of opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This was a British oil company located in Abadan on the Persian Gulf, and the British made no apologies about the conditions in which Iranian laborers worked and the paltry royalties which the Iranian government received from the company. “All the Shah’s Men” dives deep into the divisions and lack of compromise between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iranian nationalists like Mossadegh. Mr. Kinzer suggests that the British maintained a colonial attitude that ruled out the idea of profit sharing or concessions to the Iranian government such as the ability to audit the company. The conflict between the British and Iranians brought the US deeper into the region and Middle Eastern affairs. Under President Harry Truman, the US had been an impartial arbiter in the conflict, and often urged Anglo-Iranian Oil to make concessions. However, events changed when President Eisenhower took office in 1953.

Partial image of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. (Image Source: Frontline)

President Truman tried to walk a fine line in the conflict. His diplomatic envoys were clearly frustrated with both sides unwillingness to compromise. The US watched their British allies overplay their hands in Iran until Mossadegh’s government nationalized the oil industry. Eventually, the British were expelled from Iran altogether. This did not stop them from maintaining their strategic patience, and applying the full weight of their economic power to squeeze the nascent Iranian oil industry out of world markets, which proved to be much easier than it would be for the US to attempt in the late 2000s. As Winston Churchill was re-elected British prime minister, there were even whispers of military action. However, military intervention never transpired. Instead, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower opened a new window of opportunity for British interests in Iran.

To the extent that Eisenhower’s election fostered renewed British hope to overthrow Mossadegh, it was not due to anything that President Eisenhower said or believed about Iran prior to him assuming office. On the other hand, the Dulles brothers entered Washington as part of the new administration with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles serving as Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Kinzer asserts that the Dulles brothers’ worldview was shaped by the ideological conflict of the Cold War. They were the practitioners of a Soviet containment strategy that relied on intervention in countries which they saw as vulnerable to falling into the orbit of the Soviet Empire. Their first project was Iran.

Image of brothers Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles (Image Source: NYT)

Mr. Kinzer absolves President Eisenhower of much of the decision-making and responsibility for the 1953 coup. Instead, he sees the Dulles brothers as the principle architects. In terms of execution of the coup, the book digs into a CIA operative by the name of Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. In a CIA mission called Operation Ajax, Roosevelt, a savvy, Middle East operative, charged forward with the plan to oust Mossadegh. Mr. Kinzer provides some details into how Roosevelt cut deals, paid mobs, and pulled at the delicate fringes of Iran’s political fault lines to make the coup a success. After paid civilians lay dead outside Mossadegh’s residence, Mr. Kinzer notes that they were “found with 500-rial notes still in their pockets,” which had been given to them through Roosevelt’s dozens of subagents (Kinzer 187).

Images from the 1953 coup. (Source: CNN)

While the events of the coup are well documented, Mr. Kinzer’s narrative lacks some pertinent details. He merely suggests that after nationalizing the oil industry Iran was left in an isolated economic situation, which created political unrest. But, this is an area that I felt needed more focus. There is a sharp transition from when the British leave, Iranian nationalism soars, and Mossadegh’s popularity seems well-established to Roosevelt and the CIA overthrowing the government literally in a single night. Although Roosevelt’s initial attempt at the coup failed, he gambled again and succeeded the second time. I wanted to read more about the shifting political situation in Iran. I also found myself wondering how Roosevelt had built a sophisticated network of agents that could allow him to mobilize a coup in one night. Somehow Roosevelt made it all happen as planned. As a result, Mohammad Reza Shah ruled the country for twenty-five years, and former prime minister Mossadegh spent his remaining years under house arrest.

The preface to Mr. Kinzer’s 2008 edition of “All the Shah’s Men” addresses what he calls the “folly of attacking Iran.” He wrote the preface in response to talk that existed in the Bush Administration and Defense Department about using military force against Iran. This was when Iran was under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was notoriously anti-Western and had even harsher opinions toward Israel. Mr. Kinzer’s conclusions are relevant in today’s political environment as Iran has been put “on notice” by the current administration. President Trump and has called Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. Ironically, President Trump has also reinstated a bust of Winston Churchill in the oval office. But, considering the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal and Iran’s re-election of moderate President Hassan Rouhani, Mr. Kinzer’s assertion that “there are a remarkable number of areas in which the United States and Iran might find common ground” should be taken seriously (Kinzer xix). His contention that the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh was a long-term strategic disaster comes through poignantly in his book, and it informs Mr. Kinzer’s policy stance towards Iran as being much less hawkish than the prevailing wisdom in Washington.

“All the Shah’s Men” is a fast-paced read. The history is interesting, and Mr. Kinzer’s writing style is captivating. This book could have been a lot longer, and readers who want more details on the Shah’s rule and the events leading to the revolution of 1979 will not find much here. But, Mr. Kinzer covers a lot of ground and illuminates a moment in history that continues to affect US foreign policy. It is unclear whether lessons have been learned from this period in history. There are members of the National Security Council (NSC) such as Ezra Cohen-Watnick, the council’s senior director for intelligence, who have urged the use of CIA spies to try to do the same thing Roosevelt accomplished in 1953. But, these NSC members would be wise to recall the fact that twenty-five years after Roosevelt’s operation, Tehran’s streets teemed with chants of “death to America” prior to the American embassy being overrun. Will a second coup work? The historical record must be considered. For Mr. Kinzer’s part, his contribution to this record is powerful, and he concludes unequivocally that the 1953 coup “brought immeasurable tragedy to Iran, contributed to the rise of anti-American terror, and, in the end, greatly weakened the security of the United States” (Kinzer xxiii).

Source:

1. Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2008.       


                   

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Book Review: The Iran Wars

By PMEComplete on April 23, 2017

Since 1979 the United States and Iran have engaged in a war that has existed in the shadows. While there has not been direct military confrontation, each nation has engaged the other through the use of proxies, spies, cyberattacks, and economic sanctions. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has described Iran as the world’s biggest “state sponsor of terror.” If one explores the record of terrorist groups Iran has supported to include Hezbollah, then Secretary Mattis is correct. Indeed, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 represented the largest number of Marines killed in a single day since the battle of Iwo Jima. Thus, it is remarkable that nearly 35 years after the American embassy was taken hostage in Tehran, a milestone nuclear agreement would be negotiated with an Iranian regime that reserves the moniker “great Satan” for the United States. In the book Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals that Reshaped the Middle East, Wall Street Journal reporter Jay Solomon explores the evolution of the conflict, the rise of Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. attempts to sabotage it, the details of the nuclear agreement, and offers some perspective on the long-term implications. Although the book is short on covering hostilities throughout the 1980’s, Mr. Solomon digs into the conflicts that have defined the Middle East over the last 15 years with a wide range of knowledge and insight into how Iran has sought to shape events in the region.

One of the major themes of the book is the extent to which distrust pervades the fraught relationship between the U.S. and Iran. At times, there have been moments in which rapprochement seemed to be a possibility. But, these moments were fleeting in the face of historical animosity and skepticism of the other side’s intentions. For instance, Mr. Solomon mentions a period after 9/11 in which the U.S. and Iran seemed to have a common enemy in the Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it wasn’t too long after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan that Iran was placed in “the axis of evil.” The extent to which the U.S. miscalculated how Iran might benefit from an invasion of Iraq is explored in the book. Mr. Solomon explains that there were neoconservatives within the Bush administration, who hoped overthrowing Saddam Hussein would lead to the establishment of a Shia government that could counter Iran’s influence. However, the exact opposite happened, and Iran was able to capitalize on post-invasion Iraq by expanding their reach inside the country. Mr. Solomon describes how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force are used to spread the revolution and help Iran achieve its strategic objectives not only within Iraq but also Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian territories. The Iran Wars shows the extent to which U.S. planners continually underestimate the complexity of Middle Eastern events while overlooking the multitude of intentions and shapeshifting alliances that allow Iran to adapt to circumstances and consolidate power.

In spite of U.S. setbacks in the early 2000s and significant strategic missteps, there were successes that ultimately laid the groundwork for driving the Iranians to negotiate. The best chapter of Mr. Solomon’s book contains an in-depth look at the nature of America’s financial war against Iran. This chapter’s major lesson was the extent to which America was able to use an “irregular” form of warfare to achieve its policy aims. Mr. Solomon chronicles several notable individuals to include Stuart Levy, undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence from 2004-2011, along with Robert Morganthau, New York County district attorney from 1975-2009. These individuals sought to use their power to completely shut Iran out of the global banking systems. America’s ability to systematically isolate Iran economically led to the collapse of the rial by as much as 40% in a single trading day. Industries throughout Iran were shuttered. Oil exports dropped significantly as Iran was cut out of European and Asian markets and left in a state of financial desperation. The book emphasizes how complicated this process was, and is instructive on the difficulty of enforcing sanctions to achieve their full effect.

With Iran on the brink of financial ruin, Mr. Solomon turns his focus to the Obama administration and the extent to which they pursued the nuclear agreement. The Obama doctrine stood in stark contrast to that of Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush who took a harder line against Iran. But, even as President Obama was seeking to reach out to Tehran and work toward better relations, there were many events within Iran and the Middle East that presented hurdles to this delicate process. The first of these was Iran’s “Green Movement” in which hard line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected under widespread controversy and claims of corruption. As Iranian protestors took to the streets, President Obama faced the dilemma of supporting the protests and inflaming tensions with the current Iranian regime or backing down and allowing events to play out without U.S. influence. The latter course of action was taken. This would foreshadow decisions that occurred several years later during the Arab Spring and subsequent Syrian Civil War. Mr. Solomon suggests that in an effort to prevent any possible derailment of the nuclear agreement, the Obama administration decided not to enforce established “red lines” that might hinder progress toward a nuclear agreement. This was based on the calculation that Iran as a major backer of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad would withdraw from talks if any military action was taken against Assad’s regime.

With the deal itself, Mr. Solomon provides an impressive amount of insight. The book loosely argues that the Obama administration wanted desperately to achieve an agreement and was willing to offer concessions along the way to make it happen. This occurred often to the ire of French leaders, who believed the U.S. was giving too much ground and not exerting the leverage that they held due to sanctions. Mr. Solomon seems sympathetic to this viewpoint, yet he does not report the facts in a partisan or ideological manner. In the end, he is balanced in his reporting by suggesting that the Obama administration and Secretary of State John Kerry truly believed that the nuclear agreement helped prevent a war between Iran and Israel.

The Iran Wars not only does a fantastic job covering the development of the 2015 nuclear agreement and the terms of it, but the book is also remarkable for its ability to present the complexity of Middle Eastern events and relationships. In this regard, President Obama’s personal letter to Ayatollah Khamenei to work with Iran to battle ISIS signifies how nuanced the fault lines of Middle Eastern affairs truly are. However, if there is one major point to be taken away from the book, it is the extent to which Iran had the patience and knowledge of the U.S. political system to use it against itself. Mr. Obama has left office, yet Ayatollah Khamenei remains and the spirit of the Iranian revolution still pervades Iran’s most formidable state institutions to include the IRGC. President Obama’s signature foreign policy agreement had a timeline associated with it, but even as a new U.S. administration ponders re-negotiating the terms, one can see how precarious the agreement truly is. U.S. diplomats negotiated with Iranians who spoke English and were educated in the U.S. Their knowledge of America’s political system should have been obvious. For the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran that have faced Democrat and Republican administrations for the past 35 years, changing presidential administrations is nothing new. They can wait, outlast, and quietly continue to spread their power and influence.

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