Professional Military Education

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"The most important six inches

on the battlefield

is between your ears."

General James Mattis (USMC-Ret.)

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When China Attacks Interview

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When China Attacks: A Warning to America

My guest, Col. Grant Newsham (USMC-Ret.), has a warning for America: China is at war with us. It is time for Americans to understand that China does not believe war starts with the deployment of missiles, tanks, and infantry. From the perspective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), war has already begun. Furthermore, over the last several decades, China has used influence operations, economic policies, political warfare, and lawfare to cripple America. The results have left American communities jobless with rampant drug use, deaths of despair, and social disfunction. As one example, fentanyl related drug overdoses caused 70,000 American deaths in 2021. This number is higher than the number of Americans killed during the Vietnam War. The chemical components of fentanyl are manufactured in China.

After decades of economic growth and political warfare, China has undergone one of the most significant military build-ups during a period of “peace.” What are their next moves? As China has trained, mobilized, and built up its army and navy, the obvious question is for what purpose?

Interview topics include:

  • China’s military capabilities and their views on warfare
  • China has a mission: To defeat the United States and they believe that war is already taking place
  • Does China believe they can successfully invade Taiwan?
  • If China does attack Taiwan, what would the attack look like? How would the United States respond? Is nuclear war possible?
  • What is military-civilian fusion?
  • How does China think of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)
  • How have American elites both in business and politics helped to facilitate China’s rise to power.
  • Regarding the American business class and Wall Street, Grant says, “You can’t expect to win if you’re funding your enemies.”

Check out the book: When China Attacks A Warning to America 

Biography: Grant Newsham is a Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Policy. He is also a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies focusing on Asia-Pacific defense, political, and economic matters. Grant is a retired U.S. Marine Colonel and was the first U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. He also served as reserve head of intelligence for Marine Forces Pacific, and was the U.S. Marine Attaché, US Embassy Tokyo on two occasions.

Check out Grant’s work at the Center for Security Policy. Find Grant on Twitter: @NewshamGrant

Additional Podcasts:

When China Attacks Book Review

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Warning: China Will Attack

Colonel Grant Newsham (USMC-Ret.) has a warning for us. The question is not will China attack. It is when will China attack. Newsham challenges the reader to think about what that attack will look like. The short answer is bloody and destructive.

Are we ready for it? Can America fully comprehend the reality of what happens when China attacks ?

The answer is no. I can speak personally. As I read the chapter where Newsham hypothesizes what the kinetic attack will be like, I found myself thinking, “That sounds ridiculous.” At that point, I realized how inconceivable an attack appears to most Americans. Newsham deserves credit for thinking outside of the box and challenging the reader to think seriously.

Has the China attack already happened?

While Newsham speculates on the future, he makes it clear that an attack has already happened. It has not occurred with guns and tanks. However, China has attacked the US on a series of fronts that include: Political warfare, economic warfare, information operations, chemical warfare, and influence operations.

When China Attacks pulls back the curtain on dozens of key events that have emboldened China to push harder and act more aggressively. Newsham makes it clear that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) goal is to dominate and impose their Marxist-Leninist vision of governance on the world. If America does not grow a spine, we will soon become a vassal state under the thumb of Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Why should Americans care about opposing China? We have reached a low point in American society where we need to proselytize to our fellow citizens that America is good and worth defending and that China does pose an existential threat to our way of life.

Counting the Costs

The most immediate way in which China has destabilized and physically hurt America has been through the spread of COVID-19 and the proliferation of deadly drugs like fentanyl. Regarding COVID-19, Newsham does not suggest that China intentionally leaked the virus. However, he makes the case that China’s actions during the initial outbreak allowed the virus to spread throughout the world. Furthermore, they have not allowed any investigation into the origins of the pandemic. The PRC continues to use their influence at the World Health Organization (WHO) to deflect all blame and avoid any responsibility.

On the issue of fentanyl, America’s drug epidemic has become a national security imperative. Americans are dying at staggering rates with 70,000 deaths in 2021 tied to fentanyl. This casualty count is higher than the number of Americans that were killed during the eight years  that America was at war in Vietnam. Fentanyl is a deadly drug coming from America’s southern border. However, its chemicals are manufactured in China. Beyond the high death count, the second and third order effects of fentanyl is that it leaves American communities devastated by loss and despair.

On the topic of loss and despair, Newsham uses the city of Baltimore as the poster child for a de-industrialized America. Baltimore was a once thriving port city before the ravages of globalization and the outsourcing of trade and manufacturing to China. With the decline of the American middle class, cities like Baltimore have been degraded by crime and poverty. Newsham believes that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was a tipping point in US history that opened the door for jobs to exit the US in search of cheaper labor in China.

How the elites have enabled China

Going further on the economic front, Newsham has very few kind words for Wall Street. Who can blame him? Wall Street banks are willfully blind when it comes to the China threat. The goal is to make money here and now. It is a short-sighted industry that makes no moral distinction about its actions unless told to do so by policymakers. And what happens when US policymakers shows some backbone and stand up to China, for example, through tariffs and sanctions? Wall Street goes ballistic and uses all of its high paid lobbyists not to mention its own people within government to stop it. As Newsham reminds us, President Trump’s own Secretary of the Treasury, Steve Mnuchin, was a former Goldman Sachs executive.

Wall Street is not the only industry to be cowed by Chinese influence. They are emblematic of an elite part of American society that always caves to the Chinese. China’s influence extends into many other American institutions to include the government, Hollywood, higher education, and even the military. By the end of the book, the reader comes away shocked by how deeply embedded China is into all facets of US society. However, on an optimistic note, the fact that our society has not completely capitulated to China seems somewhat of a miracle.

Stiffening the American Will

Additional shades of optimism percolate through the book in that opposition to China is increasingly becoming a bipartisan issue in Washington. While the Trump administration was the first admin to take a hard stand against China, the Biden administration has continued many (but not all) of the Trump-era policies.

Nevertheless, even with the growing recognition that China poses a real threat to America, Newsham makes it clear that our political leaders are still timid. There is still a fear of how China will perceive certain actions. American leaders worry more about how China will respond. They live with a naïve hope that we need China to solve issues like North Korea and climate change. We don’t.

America can still counter China from a position of strength. However, the window of opportunity closes more every year. China’s military continues to grow larger and improve its capabilities. China continues to build new alliances and partners around the globe. Finally, they are unwavering in their determination to attack and seize Taiwan. Again, it a matter of time. The sand in the hourglass is piling up.

Newsham’s book is coming at a critical time. It is a shrill alarm clock telling us to wake up. Don’t hit the snooze button and rollover on this issue. We can and should take actions to deter a Chinese attack. But America must have the will to do so.

Newsham’s concluding words should inspire us to harden our will. He writes, “An enemy always looks formidable. We tend to look at the People’s Republic of China as ten feet tall. They aren’t ten feet tall. We’ve just been on our knees.”

It’s time to stand up!

Resources

Call Sign Chaos: How General Mattis turned the ‘good idea fairy’ into CHAOS

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There is an unofficial term in the U.S. military (at least in the Marine Corps) for the officer (generally an officer), who says, “I have a great idea I want to try.” This term is not altogether endearing. It is typically attached to an exuberant Second Lieutenant Platoon Commander. Close second and third could be Company and Battalion Commanders. The name percolates down to the lower ranks. All Marines are on notice waiting for the inevitable hours-long PME or twenty-mile ruck run. In short, what the unit will hear is that the officer in question is a “good idea fairy.”

Now, the so-called “good idea fairy” officer usually means well. Often, they need the advice and wise counsel of a good Platoon Sergeant or senior SNCO to help mold and shape their proposed good idea. Ironically, if the officer is to lose the title “good idea fairy”, there are two things that have to happen. First, their idea needs to be good in reality. Second, their idea needs to work in practice. Furthermore, even if these two things happen, the “good idea fairy” label can still stick as a negative stigma. After all, new ideas often require changes and breaks from the status quo. These initiatives are often the hammer that smash the phrase, “This is how we’ve always done things.” Thus, for an officer to lose the label “good idea fairy” and turn it into call sign “CHAOS” is a monumental accomplishment. This officer’s good ideas must have been really, really, consistently good for many years.

Colonel Has Another Outstanding Solution (CHAOS)

In General Mattis’ new book, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, I learned that “CHAOS” stands for “Colonel Has Another Outstanding Solution.” This call sign is slightly more bad-ass than “good idea fairy.” General John Toolan (USMC-Ret.) was the originator of the call sign. Since he was subordinate to General Mattis, its probably better that this was the name he came up with instead of using the aforementioned moniker.

In his book, General Mattis talks about many times in which he did, in fact, have solutions. Lots of them too. What would you expect from someone who has also been called the “Warrior Monk.” Of course, this is a nod to his studiousness. General Mattis is known as a voracious reader with an extensive library. He makes it clear that he considers reading a moral imperative and a hallmark of good leadership. Additionally, his solutions would not be possible without dedicated scholarship of history and past wars.

Quick note to clear the air on politics…

As much as political pundits want to kick poor Jim Mattis around like a political football, the fact is that General Mattis’ solutions have clashed with all political parties. From Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, a key theme of the book is the battle between Mattis, the practical warfighter, with the political machine. He does respect and value civilian leadership over the military. But, that doesn’t mean he respects their decisions. As he mentions in the book, he was fired by a Democratic administration and resigned under a Republican one. A true independent indeed.

Send in the Marines… please!

Over a forty-year career, the book covers a lot of modern history. General Mattis served in the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan (OEF) and the Iraq War (OIF). His highest level of Command was as Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander from August 11, 2010 to March 22, 2013.

In Afghanistan, General Mattis led Task Force 58, and became the first Marine to do so. He was responsible for planning and conducting operations in southern Afghanistan. After American troops and Afghans secured Kandahar, General Mattis turned his attention to the mountains of Tora Bora. He claims that he used the 19th Century U.S. Armies “Geronimo Campaign” in the American Southwest as the framework for his plan to capture and kill Osama bin Laden (OBL). He writes that his Marines were ready to close with and destroy OBL and al-Qaeda. “Just send us in!” General Mattis practically shouted.

However, General Tommy Franks overruled him and instead employed Afghan fighters to hunt OBL. Mattis recognized the critical error. But, he also looks back reflectively thinking if he could have done more to sell his plan better. He wonders if he could have done a better job communicating with the decision makers above him on why they should send in the Marines to finish the job.

Nevertheless, he concludes his chapter on Afghanistan by citing a New York Times correspondent, writing “The refusal of CENTCOM to dispatch the Marines was the gravest error of the war.”

Iraq War – 1st MARDIV Commander

General Mattis was also commander of First Marine Division (1st MARDIV). He commanded 1st MARDIV from the invasion of Iraq and the March to Baghdad through Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah. He does not mince words in this chapter. His frustration with the politics surrounding what happened in Fallujah in March and April 2004 is palpable.

Mattis saw the halted Fallujah assault in the Spring of 2004 as yet another missed opportunity. It was a major tactical and strategic blunder. His finger wags again at the politicians and higher ups.

Marines were ready to pounce. “Send in the Marines,” he shouted again. But, political pressure halted the assault. Instead of taking the fight to the enemy, General Mattis believes miscalculated political decisions gave the insurgents (namely Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) a major win.

He concluded that the U.S.and the Marines would have to fight again. They did. In Novemer 2004, the second battle of Fallujah took place. Known as Operation Phantom Fury, it became a major urban battle akin to Hue City in 1968. The Marines fought house to house to destroy the insurgents that had taken the city in the Spring. This battle was much more decisive in the Marines favor. The politicians finally got out of the troops way, and the job got done.

I MEF Commander

After serving several years stateside, General Mattis took command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Thus, he commanded 40,000 Marines to include 15,000 serving in Iraq in 2006.

Commanding U.S. Marines in Iraq two years later, the situation on the ground had changed. Military victories in places like Fallujah laid the groundwork for the improvement. Furthermore, the Anbar awakening was also taking place. Sunni Sheiks in Anbar province turned toward American forces and away from al-Qaeda.

General Mattis explains that U.S. forces built trust with Sunni sheiks and tribes. This goodwill helped turn the security situation around and allowed U.S. troops to “conclusively seize the offensive.” Unlike 2004, Mattis’ return in 2006-2007 was more optimistic. Finally, victory was close at hand.

Legacy Beyond the Battlefield

Reading Call Sign Chaos , I am reminded by how impressive some of General Mattis’ training and doctrine solutions were too. For example, after returning from Iraq in 2004, General Mattis took command of Marine Corps Combat Development Command. During this time, he helped spearhead the Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) in Camp Pendleton, CA. This is a fully simulated immersive experience where small units train in an environment that replicates the confusion and uncertainty of combat overseas. General Mattis drove this “outstanding solution” in the mid-2000s. It was a solution that has saved many lives because of the high quality, realistic training. It fosters decision making in a chaotic environment. Mattis believes this is crucial for small unit leaders to be able to do.

Also, General Mattis partnered with General David Petraeus to write a joint doctrine manual on counterinsurgency (COIN). By writing a doctrinal guide to COIN, General Mattis again helped prepare American units for battle by capturing lessons learned and highlighting best practices for success.

When it comes to doctrine, General Mattis also talks about his time at U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk, VA. He took it upon himself to oppose a popular doctrine called Effects Based Operations (EBO). He opposed this after observing the failure of Israel to employ this type of fighting against Hezbollah in 2006. In this case, General Mattis’ solution was to get back to the fundamentals of warfighting in its most basic form. He re-introduced MCDP-1, Warfighting, which talks about the immutability of the nature of war.

Finally, at the conclusion of his career at JFCOM, General Mattis also recommended that the command be abolished. He did so without any other consideration other than whether it was worth the American taxpayers’ investment. After time in command and talking to his own troops at JFCOM, he concluded that it was not making a meaningful contribution. Thus, as he explains in the book, he fired himself.

CENTCOM Commander

Not long after “firing himself”, he was sitting in President Obama’s office (i.e. the Oval Office) for a job interview. The job was CENTCOM Commander. He got it.

His time as CENTCOM Commander was marked by many of the frustrations with political bureaucracy that are consistent throughout the book. He gripes about the lack of awareness of Obama administration officials to fully comprehend and historically contextualize the situation taking place during the Arab Spring.

Similar to the section where he disagreed with the Bush Administration on Fallujah, he also thinks that President Obama’s decision to pull out of Iraq too soon was a serious strategic mistake. There was clearly wishful thinking that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was going to be a viable Prime Minister that could govern effectively. He wasn’t. General Mattis makes the case that his polarizing, sectarian style of governance led to the Sunni tribes turning against the Iraqi government. This ultimately set conditions for ISIS to seize large territorial gains starting in 2014. (General Mattis is a fan of David Kilcullen, and Mr. Kilcullen’s book Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism is one of the best accounts I have read that describes what happened after American forces left Iraq)

Leadership Legacy

Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead also includes many of what can be called General Mattis’ “greatest hits” i.e. the quotes for which he has gained notoriety and cult status. Like this one:

I come in peace. I didn’t bring artillery. But I’m pleading with you, with tears in my eyes: If you fuck with me, I’ll kill you all.

or this one:

Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.

General Mattis provides the right level of context and perspective that lets most of his critics (are there critics?) know where he was coming from when he said what he said. The most important takeaway is that the quotes are not bluster. They are rather candor, and a leader speaking with authority that comes from wisdom.

Building trust requires clear and effective communication. As a western boy raised in the country, Mattis has the edge of a man who says what is on his mind. If he is known for being blunt and plainspoken, it is clear that he wanted his subordinates to reciprocate this in their feedback. His quotes are brilliant because they are no B.S. And General Mattis’ tolerance for B.S. is extremely low. As a result, Marines knew they could trust him to listen. This is part of what makes General Mattis so revered. Those whom he led had enormous trust in him.

Leadership principles reiterated throughout the book include building trust. “A unit moves at the speed of trust” is a frequent refrain. He also mentions the adage, “Praise in public and criticize in private.”

For his part, General Mattis’ greatest leadership lesson can be simply his personal example of caring and commitment to his Marines. He was the type of leader who “walked the lines.” He wanted to be with his Marines. He wanted them to see him, and for his Marines to know that he was personally on the ground with them sharing in whatever they were going through whether stateside or in combat.

General Mattis’ Influence

General Mattis legacy will endure for years. As previously mentioned, many of his initiatives continue to make the military better. Also, as Secretary of Defense, he published the 2018 National Defense Strategy guidance, which is still being used to drive military strategy and future doctrine. (More to follow on the NDS in this blog/ podcast soon)

On a personal note, he has been a major inspiration behind this blog and the podcast. This was my own “outstanding solution” to help improve PME throughout the Marine Corps and DOD in the form of high-quality interviews and great writing. If you’ve made it this far in the book review, then I trust you’re on board with my own mission.

Remember the goal is to go from “good idea fairy” to CHAOS. It often takes decades of reading and experience to achieve. Nevertheless, with persistence and passion, General Mattis shows that it is possible.       

Additional Reading and Information 

As mentioned, General Mattis is an avid reader. There is an e-mail that went viral in which he explains the value of reading. Essentially, his argument is that it is foolish not to take the lessons and experiences of others and learn from them. One could take a year to get through the entirety of General Mattis’ book list. I am including a few of the top names that I like best from the list and a few that I am hoping to pick up soon.

Three of my favorites:

With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa by E.B. Sledge

Gates of Fire: An Epic Novel of the Battle of Thermopylae by Steven Pressfield

One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer by Nathaniel Fick

Next to read:

The Forgotten Soldier by Guy Sajer

Once an Eagle by Anton Myer

Meditations: A New Translation by Marcus Aurelius

  

Best Military Education Podcasts

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I have compiled a short list of what I consider the best military education podcasts. To be clear, this means the best podcasts for military thinkers and leaders. These are the podcasts that I recommend most often. In conversations, I find myself frequently referencing podcasts on this list. The list might come as somewhat of a surprise.

My top recommendations are unique for several reasons. They do not focus on specific battles, tactics, or periods in history per se. Instead, they stand out for good quality, frequency, and interesting subject matter. After the top recommendations, are podcasts that are focused on specific battles and historical eras.

Top Recommendations

War College by Reuters

I have been a long time listener to War College. A new episode is released every Thursday. It is usually 30-45 minutes long. The host, Matthew Gault, finds guests that are extremely knowledgeable in a wide variety of niche topics related to foreign policy, tactics, and strategy. His interview style is superb, and the guests have in depth knowledge in their areas of expertise. This podcast is also top rated due to the quality of production.

A recent episode called “What North Korea Wants” was fascinating, and the guest, Professor B.R. Myers, explained the dynamics of North Korea’s motives in rich detail.

War College also looks at off the wall topics like the Standing Rock protests and U.S. intelligence agencies use of psychic individuals to crack codes and find secret documents.

War College is packed with unique and thoughtful content. I highly recommend it for military thinkers looking to learn a broad range of military topics and ideas.

Hardcore History by Dan Carlin

Dan Carlin’s Hardcore History is one of the best podcasts in general, and a great one for military scholars and historians. The show only comes out a couple times each year, and episodes are usually part of a series such as “Blueprint for Armageddon”, which focused on World War I. Moreover, they are usually 3-5 hours in length. So a series is the length of a full audio book.

The detail and scope of material in each show is impressive. Also, Dan Carlin is very entertaining, and his style of narration is excellent.

Get started with two of his most recent episodes “Prophets of Doom” and “American Peril“, which are both good stand alone episodes.

The Art of Manliness Podcast

The Art of Manliness podcast is not a military specific podcast. However, there are multiple episodes that deal with military history, leadership, diet, and exercise. As a men’s lifestyle website and podcast, AOM has outstanding content for military personnel. The host releases roughly two episodes each week. He is fascinated with ancient history and has some episodes related to this subject matter.

AOM has featured popular military writers such as Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, author of On Killing, and Robert Coram, who wrote a biography on Col. John Boyd.

Get started with AOM by checking out one of the more recent episodes titled, “War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity.”

EconTalk

This is not a “military” podcast by any means. But, it is incredibly thoughtful, and occasionally touches on military topics. It is important for a military thinker to be well-rounded. EconTalk explores economics, politics, political theory, ethics, and history. The host, Russ Roberts, is a great interviewer, and his guests are outstanding in their respective field of expertise. I recommend this podcast as a way for military thinkers to think outside of the box.

For military specific episodes, I recommend the interview with Leonard Wong on “Honesty and Ethics in the Military.” Another fascinating episode is an interview with Bruce Buena de Mesquita on his book, “The Spoils of War.”

An episode is released on Monday, and they are roughly one hour in length. The production quality is outstanding. Each episode is like sitting in an outstanding college class. Excellent brain food!

World Affairs

This podcast provides thoughtful and in depth weekly interviews on issues of global security. The podcast is typically an hour long, and the episodes encompass a lot of issues involving foreign policy and also some domestic issues.

To be a smart military thinker, it is important to have knowledge in a diverse field of topics. With the World Affairs podcast, military thinkers will understand world issues more clearly. I enjoy each week’s episode tremendously.

Battles and Campaigns

There are a lot of podcasts that focus on specific periods of history and the battles that took place during that time. Most of my preferred podcasts are interview based, which is, of course, my own preference. A lot of the podcasts that involve battles and campaigns feel like a college lecture rather than a back and forth of ideas. As a result, I tend to pick and choose these episodes based on something that I want to study specifically. Unlike, the podcasts listed above, I pick and choose episodes from the lists below.

My recommendations for military history podcasts include the following:

  1. The Civil War (1861-1865): A History Podcast. I love Civil War history, and this podcast does not disappoint. It has a lot of great information. The hosts are very knowledgeable, and each episode has a nice structure to it.
  2. Ancient Warfare Podcast. I have started listening to some episodes, and so far I like what I hear. A lot of good information.
  3. American Military History Podcast. Episodes come out on a weekly basis, and they are roughly 30 minutes in length. I enjoyed the Revolutionary War episodes immensely.
  4. WWII Podcast. I like this podcast a lot for WWII information. Highly recommend.

Honorable Mention

War on the Rocks is a great podcast. They haven’t put out an episode in a long time. But, when they did, I used to listen immediately. Hopefully, there will be something out soon.

If you have any recommendations, please feel free to e-mail me: tim@professionalmilitaryeducation.com

Finally, the Professional Military Education isn’t too shabby either!!

 

 

 

Secretary Mattis Update on the “Defeat ISIS Campaign”

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The following video is an update from Defense Secretary James Mattis on the “accelerated” campaign against  ISIS. Below are several highlights from the address from May 19, 2017, and some analysis. Secretary Mattis begins by describing two “significant” changes that have been directed from the President:

Change #1: Delegation of authority to the “right” level to quickly move against “enemy vulnerabilities.”

Analysis: The military and the Marine Corps (where Secretary Mattis served for 40+ years) are strong advocates for the principle of decentralized execution. I’ll provide some clarity on this with a very broad and generic summary of how this might look at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, this means small unit leadership executes plans and makes decisions to accomplish a mission. The tactical level is typically led by NCO’s and company grade officers at the team, squad, and platoon level. The operational level, for example, may refer to battalions and brigades conducting campaigns, which we know generally as deployments. For Marines, this would be the equivalent of a MEU, UDP or SPMAGTF. The strategic level refers to delegation to Combatant Commanders to make decisions in their area of operations. Thus, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, planning is “centralized,” but the execution and decision making are ultimately conducted by those who are closely involved in the execution of the plan i.e. the squad on patrol, the battalion on a MEU, or the combatant commander overseeing his area of responsibility, which would be central command or CENTCOMM in the case of Iraq and Syria. Marines such as Secretary Mattis understand the importance of making decisions at the lowest possible level to generate tempo and to be quicker than one’s enemy. If this sounds a lot like Colonel Boyd’s OODA Loop cycle then it’s important to note that Boyd had a major impact on the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting. In delegating responsibility, the goal is to allow leaders closest to the fight to make critical decisions that will put pressure on the enemy and to maintain pressure until the enemies’ will to fight breaks down.
Change #2: Secretary Mattis describes a tactical shift from “an attrition” fight to surrounding the enemy in their strongholds in order to annihilate ISIS and “prevent the return home of escaped foreign fighters.”

Analysis: Marines believe in the principles of maneuver warfare rather than attrition. A basic definition of attrition is war based on trying to exert more force against the enemy and overwhelm them with a mass of troops and equipment. An example of this is often cited in World War I style trench warfare. Another example of attrition would be the use of body counts in Vietnam. This is a way of trying to kill more enemy than friendly forces. The attrition style of warfighting is anathema to the Marine Corps’ principle of maneuver warfare (perhaps this is why you may have noticed the inflection in Secretary Mattis voice during the address when he mentioned “attrition”). Maneuver warfare is based on putting the right people in the right place at the right time to attack the enemy from a position of advantage. From a position of advantage, one can shatter the enemies’ cohesion and destroy their will to fight. With maneuver warfare, one does not necessarily have to kill the enemy (although that is often a significant part of it). Maneuver warfare is often confused with movement (although movement can be a part of it). But, the best way to understand it in this context is the necessity to get coalition forces into a position where they can put the enemy in a no win solution and convince the enemy that their cause is hopeless. The enemy may realize this the hard way as conventional munitions explode on or around him. It can also occur through psychological and information operations too. What Secretary Mattis is suggesting is that coalition forces are putting the enemy in a no-win situation where the only options they have are to surrender or die.

 

Other highlights from Defense Secretary Mattis’s address:

    1. No Change to rules of engagement (ROE) and attempts to limit collateral damage. Analysis: American military theory recognizes the principles espoused by the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz that war has a moral component to it. America’s continued attempts to lead and assert moral authority are keys to victory.
    2. The coalition is comprised of 68 members to include 65 nations sharing intelligence and working closely together. This also includes 26 coalition nations making direct military contributions. Analysis: When Secretary Mattis co-authored a piece called “Restoring our National Security”, he discussed the importance of creating alliances and stressed the absolute necessity to work with coalition partners. We are seeing this vision being executed.
    3. Maintaining a view toward the aftermath when the violence stops. Analysis: A major theme of this blog and the podcast has been understanding warfare as Carl Von Clausewitz explained it as a conflict that has a political dimension to it. Thus, the aftermath of violence matters as much as the actual battles that take place. On the first podcast episode, I had a conversation with Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose about his book, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle.  He discussed his theory called “the Clausewitzian Challenge,” and how it relates to properly ending a war.  
    4. Status on the fighting: In Iraq, East Mosul is in friendly hands while West Mosul and Tal Afar are completely surrounded by friendly forces. In Syria, coalition forces continue to support Syrian Democratic Forces and are pushing to defeat ISIS in Raqqa.

Secretary Mattis explained three enduring goals in this fight:

  • Deny ISIS a geographic haven.
  • Eliminate ISIS ability to operate externally.
  • Reduce ISIS ability to finance operations and recruit.

 

Finally, Secretary Mattis highlighted several of the major victories that have occurred thus far:

  • 4 million people liberated by coalition forces.
  • Coalition forces have recaptured 50% of territory once held by ISIS.
  • ISIS has not been able to take back any of the recaptured territory.

Origins of Strategy

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In anticipation of my upcoming interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman on his book, Strategy: A History, I am providing some helpful resources to think about strategy. For more information on an overview of the book, check out the currently reading post I wrote when I first started reading the book several weeks ago. Prior to the section of the book called “Strategies of Force,” there is a section on the origins of strategy. There are some interesting subjects related to the Bible notably the story of David vs. Goliath as well as Greek mythology in the story of the Trojan horse, and the Greeks conquering of the city of Troy. However, I want to focus on a few specific individuals who I think have contributed significantly to modern strategic thinking. These individuals are profiled in the book.

Thucydides

Thucydides was one of the first military historians. He lived from 460- 395 BCE, and twenty years of his life was spent in exile. During this time, he honed his craft as a historian, and put his thoughts on paper writing what became the definitive work on the Peloponnesian War. The History of the Peloponnesian War is a classic work in military history and strategy. This war was fought between the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire, which was called the Delian League from 431 to 404 BCE. In the first episode of the PME podcast, I spoke with Gideon Rose about his book How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. He provided a list of his top five books for thinking about foreign policy. Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War is at the top of his list. Mr. Rose says the following about Thucydides:

 

Thucydides is the single best treatment of international relations, foreign policy and military affairs that exists. It is the best description of what life in a multipolar world is like, what politics and war are like for the units involved, of the basic realities of international relations.

-Gideon Rose, editor Foreign Affairs

In his book, Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman mentions that Thucydides is often considered one of the “founders of realism.” One of the most famous quotes on realism comes from the Melian Dialogue, where the Athenians counter the Melians with the claim that “the strong do what they can while the weak must suffer what they must.” This was as the Melians pled with the Athenians not to conquer them rather to respect their neutrality. The idea of “might makes right” comes from the realist school of thought. It is interesting because Thucydides is unique as a theorist who did not try to interpret events from an ideological perspective. He sought to be as objective as possible in his history. He wanted to show war and human nature as it was in reality rather than how he wished it to be in theory. Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that Thucydides’ “narrative illuminated some of the central themes of all strategy: the limits imposed by the circumstances of the time, the importance of coalitions as a source of strength but also instability, the challenge of coping with internal opponents and external pressures simultaneously, the difficulties of strategies that are defensive and patient in the face of demands for quick and decisive offensives, the impact of the unexpected, and- perhaps most importantly- the role of language as strategic instrument” (Freedman 30).

On the role of language, one of the greatest speeches to be recorded in the History of the Peloponnesian War was Pericles funeral oration.  This speech has become distinctive for its praise of the Athenians willingness to fight and die for democratic society. Pericles champions the nobility of their sacrifice in his speech. Echoes of Pericles speech can be heard in many other historical orations such as Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.

 

Sun Tzu

If you’ve heard the quote, “All Warfare is based on deception,” then you are at least vaguely familiar with Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu wrote a book entitled The Art of War. This book holds a special place in strategic thinking not only for the military strategists but also business “strategists.” Don’t believe me? Watch Bud Fox impress his boss, Gordon Gecko, in this scene from Wall Street (1987). Of course, this was after Gordon Gecko told Bud Fox to read The Art of War. Gordon Gecko also said, “If you want a friend, get a dog,” but I don’t think Mr. Gecko got that quote from Sun Tzu.


There is not a lot of information on Sun Tzu as an individual. He developed his theories sometime around 500 BCE during the Chinese “Warring States” period. As the quote on deception implies, Sun Tzu suggested that all strategy is based on the ability to confuse the enemy and not reveal one’s own strengths and weaknesses. He has also said that it is best to “subdue the enemy without fighting” (Freedman 44). My appreciation for Sun Tzu comes from his contribution to the theory of maneuver warfare. Sun Tzu recognized the need for strategic patience. He understood that it was important to set the conditions for an army to be successful on the battlefield. This means not being too impulsive or hasty rather striking from a position of advantage. In terms of maneuver warfare, this suggests sourcing the right assets to the right people at the right time in accomplishment of a clearly defined objective.

Sir Lawrence Freedman also highlights that Sun Tzu viewed war as a “contract.” He explains that Sun Tzu saw “battle as a ‘chance of arms,’ a form of consensual violence out of which would emerge a victor” (49). In many ways, this view anticipated the ideas of Carl Von Clausewitz whose own theories would view war in contractual terms namely as a means of resolving policy disputes between two powers who could not resolve disputes through peaceful diplomatic means.

Finally, Sun Tzu’s ideas were later adopted by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Also, Napoleon Bonaparte was said to have read Sun Tzu.

 

Machiavelli  

If you’ve heard the term “Machiavellian,” it has probably been used as a way of describing someone that is willing to backstab or act in a deceptive manner to get what they want. From the work of Niccolo Machiavelli, who wrote The Prince, we get the mantra that “the ends justifies the means.” This suggests a willingness to win and succeed at all costs. This could mean lying, cheating, or stealing to get what one wants. Sounds pretty brutal, right? Well, the Florentine political scientist, Mr. Machiavelli, should actually be given more credit for his contribution to strategy. He did not advise cruelty for cruelties sake. His conception of human nature is bleak, and he definitely sees men as cunning and deceptive. However, as Freedman writes, “At some point the appearance of virtue could not be wholly detached from practice. Machiavelli understood that to hold on to power, it was necessary to reduce the reliance on harsh, cruel methods and to behave in moderate, graceful ways” (Freedman 53). So even though Machiavelli is understood to have laid the foundation for a ruthless means of achieving and maintaining power, we see a lot of the same strands of thought as existed with Thucydides. Machiavelli is writing about human nature as he sees it. In warring societies, it is easy to see human nature as fundamentally cruel and indifferent i.e. the politics of realism as discussed with Thucydides. “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.”

But, Freedman concludes that Machiavelli was more “balanced” in his thought meaning that he saw the good strategist as someone who could go “beyond false impressions and harsh punishments,” and instead could govern based on “real accomplishments and general respect” (Freedman 53).

 

Conclusion: People have devoted hundreds of pages in dissection of the thoughts of the strategists that I have mentioned. Sir Lawrence Freedman talks about them in his section on the “origins of strategy.” I wanted to highlight their contributions to strategic thinking, and hopefully get people interested in studying them more closely in detail. Of the three listed above, Thucydides is the strategist that I most closely study. Although, Sun Tzu is a close second. I do appreciate the ideas of Machiavelli and think about his assertion that a leader cannot be both “loved and feared” and in choosing between the two, it is far better to be “feared” than to be “loved.” Powerful stuff.

 

Books Mentioned:
Strategy: A History

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

History of the Peloponnesian War

The Art of War

The Prince: Second Edition
Works Cited:

                      1.     Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.