military

Best Military Education Podcasts

By PMEComplete on July 9, 2017

I have compiled a short list of what I consider the best military education podcasts. To be clear, this means the best podcasts for military thinkers and leaders. These are the podcasts that I recommend most often. In conversations, I find myself frequently referencing podcasts on this list. The list might come as somewhat of a surprise.

My top recommendations are unique for several reasons. They do not focus on specific battles, tactics, or periods in history per se. Instead, they stand out for good quality, frequency, and interesting subject matter. After the top recommendations, are podcasts that are focused on specific battles and historical eras.

Top Recommendations

War College by Reuters

I have been a long time listener to War College. A new episode is released every Thursday. It is usually 30-45 minutes long. The host, Matthew Gault, finds guests that are extremely knowledgeable in a wide variety of niche topics related to foreign policy, tactics, and strategy. His interview style is superb, and the guests have in depth knowledge in their areas of expertise. This podcast is also top rated due to the quality of production.

A recent episode called “What North Korea Wants” was fascinating, and the guest, Professor B.R. Myers, explained the dynamics of North Korea’s motives in rich detail.

War College also looks at off the wall topics like the Standing Rock protests and U.S. intelligence agencies use of psychic individuals to crack codes and find secret documents.

War College is packed with unique and thoughtful content. I highly recommend it for military thinkers looking to learn a broad range of military topics and ideas.

Hardcore History by Dan Carlin

Dan Carlin’s Hardcore History is one of the best podcasts in general, and a great one for military scholars and historians. The show only comes out a couple times each year, and episodes are usually part of a series such as “Blueprint for Armageddon”, which focused on World War I. Moreover, they are usually 3-5 hours in length. So a series is the length of a full audio book.

The detail and scope of material in each show is impressive. Also, Dan Carlin is very entertaining, and his style of narration is excellent.

Get started with two of his most recent episodes “Prophets of Doom” and “American Peril“, which are both good stand alone episodes.

The Art of Manliness Podcast

The Art of Manliness podcast is not a military specific podcast. However, there are multiple episodes that deal with military history, leadership, diet, and exercise. As a men’s lifestyle website and podcast, AOM has outstanding content for military personnel. The host releases roughly two episodes each week. He is fascinated with ancient history and has some episodes related to this subject matter.

AOM has featured popular military writers such as Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, author of On Killing, and Robert Coram, who wrote a biography on Col. John Boyd.

Get started with AOM by checking out one of the more recent episodes titled, “War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity.”

EconTalk

This is not a “military” podcast by any means. But, it is incredibly thoughtful, and occasionally touches on military topics. It is important for a military thinker to be well-rounded. EconTalk explores economics, politics, political theory, ethics, and history. The host, Russ Roberts, is a great interviewer, and his guests are outstanding in their respective field of expertise. I recommend this podcast as a way for military thinkers to think outside of the box.

For military specific episodes, I recommend the interview with Leonard Wong on “Honesty and Ethics in the Military.” Another fascinating episode is an interview with Bruce Buena de Mesquita on his book, “The Spoils of War.”

An episode is released on Monday, and they are roughly one hour in length. The production quality is outstanding. Each episode is like sitting in an outstanding college class. Excellent brain food!

World Affairs

This podcast provides thoughtful and in depth weekly interviews on issues of global security. The podcast is typically an hour long, and the episodes encompass a lot of issues involving foreign policy and also some domestic issues.

To be a smart military thinker, it is important to have knowledge in a diverse field of topics. With the World Affairs podcast, military thinkers will understand world issues more clearly. I enjoy each week’s episode tremendously.

Battles and Campaigns

There are a lot of podcasts that focus on specific periods of history and the battles that took place during that time. Most of my preferred podcasts are interview based, which is, of course, my own preference. A lot of the podcasts that involve battles and campaigns feel like a college lecture rather than a back and forth of ideas. As a result, I tend to pick and choose these episodes based on something that I want to study specifically. Unlike, the podcasts listed above, I pick and choose episodes from the lists below.

My recommendations for military history podcasts include the following:

The Civil War (1861-1865): A History Podcast. I love Civil War history, and this podcast does not disappoint. It has a lot of great information. The hosts are very knowledgeable, and each episode has a nice structure to it.
Ancient Warfare Podcast. I have started listening to some episodes, and so far I like what I hear. A lot of good information.
American Military History Podcast. Episodes come out on a weekly basis, and they are roughly 30 minutes in length. I enjoyed the Revolutionary War episodes immensely.
WWII Podcast. I like this podcast a lot for WWII information. Highly recommend.

Honorable Mention

War on the Rocks is a great podcast. They haven’t put out an episode in a long time. But, when they did, I used to listen immediately. Hopefully, there will be something out soon.

If you have any recommendations, please feel free to e-mail me: tim@professionalmilitaryeducation.com

Finally, the Professional Military Education isn’t too shabby either!!

Secretary Mattis Update on the “Defeat ISIS Campaign”

By PMEComplete on May 23, 2017

The following video is an update from Defense Secretary James Mattis on the “accelerated” campaign against ISIS. Below are several highlights from the address from May 19, 2017, and some analysis. Secretary Mattis begins by describing two “significant” changes that have been directed from the President:

Change #1: Delegation of authority to the “right” level to quickly move against “enemy vulnerabilities.”

Analysis: The military and the Marine Corps (where Secretary Mattis served for 40+ years) are strong advocates for the principle of decentralized execution. I’ll provide some clarity on this with a very broad and generic summary of how this might look at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, this means small unit leadership executes plans and makes decisions to accomplish a mission. The tactical level is typically led by NCO’s and company grade officers at the team, squad, and platoon level. The operational level, for example, may refer to battalions and brigades conducting campaigns, which we know generally as deployments. For Marines, this would be the equivalent of a MEU, UDP or SPMAGTF. The strategic level refers to delegation to Combatant Commanders to make decisions in their area of operations. Thus, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, planning is “centralized,” but the execution and decision making are ultimately conducted by those who are closely involved in the execution of the plan i.e. the squad on patrol, the battalion on a MEU, or the combatant commander overseeing his area of responsibility, which would be central command or CENTCOMM in the case of Iraq and Syria. Marines such as Secretary Mattis understand the importance of making decisions at the lowest possible level to generate tempo and to be quicker than one’s enemy. If this sounds a lot like Colonel Boyd’s OODA Loop cycle then it’s important to note that Boyd had a major impact on the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting. In delegating responsibility, the goal is to allow leaders closest to the fight to make critical decisions that will put pressure on the enemy and to maintain pressure until the enemies’ will to fight breaks down.
Change #2: Secretary Mattis describes a tactical shift from “an attrition” fight to surrounding the enemy in their strongholds in order to annihilate ISIS and “prevent the return home of escaped foreign fighters.”

Analysis: Marines believe in the principles of maneuver warfare rather than attrition. A basic definition of attrition is war based on trying to exert more force against the enemy and overwhelm them with a mass of troops and equipment. An example of this is often cited in World War I style trench warfare. Another example of attrition would be the use of body counts in Vietnam. This is a way of trying to kill more enemy than friendly forces. The attrition style of warfighting is anathema to the Marine Corps’ principle of maneuver warfare (perhaps this is why you may have noticed the inflection in Secretary Mattis voice during the address when he mentioned “attrition”). Maneuver warfare is based on putting the right people in the right place at the right time to attack the enemy from a position of advantage. From a position of advantage, one can shatter the enemies’ cohesion and destroy their will to fight. With maneuver warfare, one does not necessarily have to kill the enemy (although that is often a significant part of it). Maneuver warfare is often confused with movement (although movement can be a part of it). But, the best way to understand it in this context is the necessity to get coalition forces into a position where they can put the enemy in a no win solution and convince the enemy that their cause is hopeless. The enemy may realize this the hard way as conventional munitions explode on or around him. It can also occur through psychological and information operations too. What Secretary Mattis is suggesting is that coalition forces are putting the enemy in a no-win situation where the only options they have are to surrender or die.

Other highlights from Defense Secretary Mattis’s address:

1. No Change to rules of engagement (ROE) and attempts to limit collateral damage. Analysis: American military theory recognizes the principles espoused by the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz that war has a moral component to it. America’s continued attempts to lead and assert moral authority are keys to victory.
2. The coalition is comprised of 68 members to include 65 nations sharing intelligence and working closely together. This also includes 26 coalition nations making direct military contributions. Analysis: When Secretary Mattis co-authored a piece called “Restoring our National Security”, he discussed the importance of creating alliances and stressed the absolute necessity to work with coalition partners. We are seeing this vision being executed.
3. Maintaining a view toward the aftermath when the violence stops. Analysis: A major theme of this blog and the podcast has been understanding warfare as Carl Von Clausewitz explained it as a conflict that has a political dimension to it. Thus, the aftermath of violence matters as much as the actual battles that take place. On the first podcast episode, I had a conversation with Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose about his book, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. He discussed his theory called “the Clausewitzian Challenge,” and how it relates to properly ending a war.
4. Status on the fighting: In Iraq, East Mosul is in friendly hands while West Mosul and Tal Afar are completely surrounded by friendly forces. In Syria, coalition forces continue to support Syrian Democratic Forces and are pushing to defeat ISIS in Raqqa.

Secretary Mattis explained three enduring goals in this fight:

Deny ISIS a geographic haven.
Eliminate ISIS ability to operate externally.
Reduce ISIS ability to finance operations and recruit.

Finally, Secretary Mattis highlighted several of the major victories that have occurred thus far:

4 million people liberated by coalition forces.
Coalition forces have recaptured 50% of territory once held by ISIS.
ISIS has not been able to take back any of the recaptured territory.

Origins of Strategy

By PMEComplete on May 11, 2017

In anticipation of my upcoming interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman on his book, Strategy: A History, I am providing some helpful resources to think about strategy. For more information on an overview of the book, check out the currently reading post I wrote when I first started reading the book several weeks ago. Prior to the section of the book called “Strategies of Force,” there is a section on the origins of strategy. There are some interesting subjects related to the Bible notably the story of David vs. Goliath as well as Greek mythology in the story of the Trojan horse, and the Greeks conquering of the city of Troy. However, I want to focus on a few specific individuals who I think have contributed significantly to modern strategic thinking. These individuals are profiled in the book.

Thucydides

Thucydides was one of the first military historians. He lived from 460- 395 BCE, and twenty years of his life was spent in exile. During this time, he honed his craft as a historian, and put his thoughts on paper writing what became the definitive work on the Peloponnesian War. The History of the Peloponnesian War is a classic work in military history and strategy. This war was fought between the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire, which was called the Delian League from 431 to 404 BCE. In the first episode of the PME podcast, I spoke with Gideon Rose about his book How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. He provided a list of his top five books for thinking about foreign policy. Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War is at the top of his list. Mr. Rose says the following about Thucydides:

Thucydides is the single best treatment of international relations, foreign policy and military affairs that exists. It is the best description of what life in a multipolar world is like, what politics and war are like for the units involved, of the basic realities of international relations.

-Gideon Rose, editor Foreign Affairs

In his book, Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman mentions that Thucydides is often considered one of the “founders of realism.” One of the most famous quotes on realism comes from the Melian Dialogue, where the Athenians counter the Melians with the claim that “the strong do what they can while the weak must suffer what they must.” This was as the Melians pled with the Athenians not to conquer them rather to respect their neutrality. The idea of “might makes right” comes from the realist school of thought. It is interesting because Thucydides is unique as a theorist who did not try to interpret events from an ideological perspective. He sought to be as objective as possible in his history. He wanted to show war and human nature as it was in reality rather than how he wished it to be in theory. Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that Thucydides’ “narrative illuminated some of the central themes of all strategy: the limits imposed by the circumstances of the time, the importance of coalitions as a source of strength but also instability, the challenge of coping with internal opponents and external pressures simultaneously, the difficulties of strategies that are defensive and patient in the face of demands for quick and decisive offensives, the impact of the unexpected, and- perhaps most importantly- the role of language as strategic instrument” (Freedman 30).

On the role of language, one of the greatest speeches to be recorded in the History of the Peloponnesian War was Pericles funeral oration. This speech has become distinctive for its praise of the Athenians willingness to fight and die for democratic society. Pericles champions the nobility of their sacrifice in his speech. Echoes of Pericles speech can be heard in many other historical orations such as Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.

Sun Tzu

If you’ve heard the quote, “All Warfare is based on deception,” then you are at least vaguely familiar with Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu wrote a book entitled The Art of War. This book holds a special place in strategic thinking not only for the military strategists but also business “strategists.” Don’t believe me? Watch Bud Fox impress his boss, Gordon Gecko, in this scene from Wall Street (1987). Of course, this was after Gordon Gecko told Bud Fox to read The Art of War. Gordon Gecko also said, “If you want a friend, get a dog,” but I don’t think Mr. Gecko got that quote from Sun Tzu.

There is not a lot of information on Sun Tzu as an individual. He developed his theories sometime around 500 BCE during the Chinese “Warring States” period. As the quote on deception implies, Sun Tzu suggested that all strategy is based on the ability to confuse the enemy and not reveal one’s own strengths and weaknesses. He has also said that it is best to “subdue the enemy without fighting” (Freedman 44). My appreciation for Sun Tzu comes from his contribution to the theory of maneuver warfare. Sun Tzu recognized the need for strategic patience. He understood that it was important to set the conditions for an army to be successful on the battlefield. This means not being too impulsive or hasty rather striking from a position of advantage. In terms of maneuver warfare, this suggests sourcing the right assets to the right people at the right time in accomplishment of a clearly defined objective.

Sir Lawrence Freedman also highlights that Sun Tzu viewed war as a “contract.” He explains that Sun Tzu saw “battle as a ‘chance of arms,’ a form of consensual violence out of which would emerge a victor” (49). In many ways, this view anticipated the ideas of Carl Von Clausewitz whose own theories would view war in contractual terms namely as a means of resolving policy disputes between two powers who could not resolve disputes through peaceful diplomatic means.

Finally, Sun Tzu’s ideas were later adopted by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Also, Napoleon Bonaparte was said to have read Sun Tzu.

Machiavelli

If you’ve heard the term “Machiavellian,” it has probably been used as a way of describing someone that is willing to backstab or act in a deceptive manner to get what they want. From the work of Niccolo Machiavelli, who wrote The Prince, we get the mantra that “the ends justifies the means.” This suggests a willingness to win and succeed at all costs. This could mean lying, cheating, or stealing to get what one wants. Sounds pretty brutal, right? Well, the Florentine political scientist, Mr. Machiavelli, should actually be given more credit for his contribution to strategy. He did not advise cruelty for cruelties sake. His conception of human nature is bleak, and he definitely sees men as cunning and deceptive. However, as Freedman writes, “At some point the appearance of virtue could not be wholly detached from practice. Machiavelli understood that to hold on to power, it was necessary to reduce the reliance on harsh, cruel methods and to behave in moderate, graceful ways” (Freedman 53). So even though Machiavelli is understood to have laid the foundation for a ruthless means of achieving and maintaining power, we see a lot of the same strands of thought as existed with Thucydides. Machiavelli is writing about human nature as he sees it. In warring societies, it is easy to see human nature as fundamentally cruel and indifferent i.e. the politics of realism as discussed with Thucydides. “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.”

But, Freedman concludes that Machiavelli was more “balanced” in his thought meaning that he saw the good strategist as someone who could go “beyond false impressions and harsh punishments,” and instead could govern based on “real accomplishments and general respect” (Freedman 53).

Conclusion: People have devoted hundreds of pages in dissection of the thoughts of the strategists that I have mentioned. Sir Lawrence Freedman talks about them in his section on the “origins of strategy.” I wanted to highlight their contributions to strategic thinking, and hopefully get people interested in studying them more closely in detail. Of the three listed above, Thucydides is the strategist that I most closely study. Although, Sun Tzu is a close second. I do appreciate the ideas of Machiavelli and think about his assertion that a leader cannot be both “loved and feared” and in choosing between the two, it is far better to be “feared” than to be “loved.” Powerful stuff.

Books Mentioned:
Strategy: A History

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

History of the Peloponnesian War

The Art of War

The Prince: Second Edition
Works Cited:

1. Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.