strategy

“How Terrorism Ends” Book Review

By PMEComplete on June 24, 2017

I am a sucker for a good “how-to” book. It seems like the market is saturated with these types of books from weight loss and relationships to cooking and personal finance. There is a “how-to” book for nearly everything that people care about on a personal level. But, in the world of counterterrorism, I could only find one pseudo “how-to” book. That is the question of “how terrorism ends?” The book that I found on this subject has some thoughts and excellent considerations. As a generic “how-to”, it is less prescriptive than a cooking recipe or an investment strategy. But, as a work of historical analysis, it provides insightful answers into how specific terrorist groups have ended. Overall, “How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns” by Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin is a phenomenal achievement, and a must read for anyone interested in counterterrorism and national security strategy. The subtitle of the book, “Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns” is the main thrust of Professor Cronin’s work. She uses a specific framework for understanding how the “decline and demise” has or has not happened for 457 terrorist groups classified as such by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Her model follows a six-part framework related to the end of terrorism: the capture or killing of the leader (decapitation), integration within a formal political process (negotiation), achievement of strategic objectives (success), implosion (failure), elimination through force (repression), and reorientation, which means the terrorist group transitions to a different activity such as crime, insurgency, or political activism. In her final chapter, she discusses how this framework specifically applies to al-Qaeda, which Kronin authoritatively states “will end” (Note: The book was published in 2009 prior to the rise of ISIS in its current state).

The brilliance of Professor Kronin’s book is that she draws on different historical examples of terrorist groups as diverse as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), radical student groups like the Weathermen, and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) to name a few. Professor Kronin does not advocate a specific strategy. In each section of her six-part framework, she focuses on different social, political, economic, and religious forces that either set the conditions for a terrorist group’s success or failure. If there is an enduring theme of her work, it is the extent to which terrorist groups seek to leverage the state’s response to their advantage. She claims that terrorism itself is a “weak tactic”, but its strength is driven by the bungled policy and strategic missteps that a state makes in attempting to fight “fire with fire.” Her theory is reminiscent of counterinsurgency expert, David Kilcullen, who argues in his book “The Accidental Guerilla” that western solutions to terrorism typically rely on a single-minded conventional military response instead of seeing the terrorist problem as one requiring better intelligence, improved law enforcement, selective use of force, and information operations to counter the narrative of terrorist groups.

3/6/1970 – Explosion and fire at 18 West 11th Street in Greenwich Village. NYTCREDIT: Neal Boenzi/The New York Times. (Source: Columbia Journalism School)

Professor Kronin defines terrorist groups as being political in nature, non-state actors, who disregard international laws and indiscriminately kill civilians and noncombatants. By its nature as a non-state actor, terrorism is tough to eliminate. Nevertheless, it does not present the same strategic and existential threats as a conventionally capable state actor such as North Korea, Russia, or China. That is what makes terrorism a complex issue to tackle. Solutions often defy state versus state logic. For example, killing the leader of a terrorist group seems to be an easy way to end it. But, Kronin explains that in many cases, the killing of a key leader will not have a decisive effect. She predicted this with al-Qaeda (the book was written prior to Bin Laden’s death). Although the death of Bin Laden was a major setback for al-Qaeda, Professor Kronin was correct that it did not end the group. This does not mean that a state shouldn’t kill the leader. But, by itself, decapitation is rarely the definitive solution, and terrorist groups can adapt beyond the cult of personality of a single leader. Professor Kronin does argue that in select cases capturing a terrorist leader has a more profound impact. This was true for Abimael Guzman, leader of Sendero Luminoso aka “The Shining Path”, a Marxist terrorist group in Peru that was responsible for the death of 69,000 people. Guzman was captured on September 12, 1992. When the terrorist leader was displayed wearing a prison jump suit in a cage and urging his followers to surrender their arms, Kronin explains that The Shining Path suffered a significant blow. In the years that followed “violence fell by 50 percent and continued to decline thereafter.” On the other hand, in cases such as Israel’s campaign of targeted killings of Palestinian terrorist leaders, Russia’s killing of Chechen leaders, and in the Philippines where Abu Sayyaf’s leadership has been killed, terrorism did not end rather persists as new leaders enthusiastically replace the old.

Leader Abimael Guzman of The Shining Path in prison. (Source: BBC)

With negotiations, Professor Kronin points out that terrorism and violence tend to increase during periods of negotiation. Negotiation is not a strategy that is used often, and with 457 terrorist groups studied, there were only 18% that negotiated. The IRA in Northern Ireland provides an example of negotiations working in the long run although there were many terrorist acts that took place in conjunction with negotiations throughout the 1990s. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is another example of negotiations causing spikes in violence. Professor Kronin explains that “the Palestinians began to see terrorist attacks as complementary to the peace process instead of at odds with it, because they believed that negotiations alone would never lead to Israel’s withdrawal” (Kronin 57). She also discusses the FARC terrorist group in Colombia. Negotiations with the FARC have been ongoing, and Kronin shows at another point in the book that the FARC also fell under the category of reorientation as they transitioned from a terrorist group to a criminal cartel. Furthermore, American funding for the “war on terror” significantly increased the Colombian government’s ability to pressure the FARC militarily and use better intelligence against the group. Between reorientation, repression and on-going negotiations events culminated in November 2016 when the FARC negotiated a formal peace agreement with the Colombian government. As of this writing, the peace agreement may prove to be one of the most successful examples of negotiations working between a state and a terrorist group turned criminal enterprise. The FARC is willingly disarming, former fighters are being granted full rights as citizens, and the group is being integrated into Colombia’s political establishment. In spite of criminal activity and political unrest that persists in Latin America, the western hemisphere has no formal wars being fought at this moment in world history.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos (left) and FARC representative Timoleon Jimenez negotiate. (Source: CNN)

With terrorist groups that have achieved success, Professor Kronin explains that success largely depends upon the action of the state which the group opposes. She summarizes this by explaining, “When a campaign is well under way, two further conditions improve the odds for success: first, the state has to overreact in its response; second, the terrorist group has to capture the imagination of a broader audience, mobilize popular support, and gain strength” (Kronin 93). This happened to a limited extent in the case of the Israeli terrorist goup, Irgun (IZL), who carried out attacks on the British in Palestine during and after World War II. Irgun’s methods of attack were incredibly brutal and violent including two British soldiers being strangled and hung on July 30, 1947. In some cases, British soldiers mutilated bodies were booby-trapped causing injuries to responding British soldiers. The British government came under heavy domestic political pressure to withdraw its troops from Palestine, which was easy to justify considering a myriad of internal post-war political challenges. When the state of Israel was created in May 1948, Irgun was formally absorbed into the Israeli army. In so far as they achieved their strategic objectives, Irgun is an example of a successful terrorist group. Indeed, one of its leaders, Menachem Begin would eventually become the sixth Prime Minister of Israel.

Within the category of failure, which includes implosion, loss of operational control, and marginalization, Professor Kronin suggests that this is one of the better strategies for defeating al-Qaeda. However, this category was lighter on historical case studies, which presents a problem for the model as it suggests the inherent difficulty of the strategy. There is no immediate political payoff as there is with something like a strategy of repression or decapitation. Nevertheless, Kronin seems to think that in the case of al-Qaeda, the organization is vulnerable to imploding from internal fractionalization as well as loss of popular support due to their indiscriminate killing of innocent people to include many Muslims. On this note, I found myself wishing that Professor Kronin had spent several more years working on the book to examine the so-called Islamic State and offer perspective on how ISIS might end. I imagine that most of her conclusions for al-Qaeda would apply to ISIS. Recently, repression and the use of force has worked to take back territory from ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This presents an inverse challenge of reorientation. ISIS was a terrorist group that formed a state. A state actor is easier to target with conventional means. However, as they reorient from a terrorist state back to a dispersed terrorist network conventional force becomes challenging. Although destruction of the physical state of ISIS is undoubtedly important, I don’t anticipate from reading Professor Kronin’s book that loss of territory will bring about the end of ISIS. Like al-Qaeda, the group will scatter and reconstitute in other destabilized parts of the world’s Muslim communities (referred to as the “Umma” in al-Qaeda’s strategic blueprint, published in 2004 called “The Management of Savagery”). In fact, ISIS has already dispersed to parts of the world where they can take advantage of unstable governments and exploit a lack of rule of law.

ISIS Fighter carrying the groups black flag. (Source: PBS)

Concerning repression or using overwhelming force against a terrorist group, Professor Kronin offers the most skepticism. She explains the strategic objectives of a terrorist group as being provocation of the state, polarization, mobilization, or a combination of all three. She states that repression appears to be the logical and intuitive countermeasure to terrorism. But, what emerges from her analysis is that conventional response only benefits the state politically by fulfilling a sense of justice and that the state is “doing something” about the terrorist problem. However, that doesn’t mean repression is effective. Russia has spent years using overwhelming force against Chechen terrorists and have fought a full-scale insurgency in Chechnya, yet they have routinely been targeted by Chechen terrorists with an attack occurring in a subway station in Saint Petersburg as recently as April 2017. Professor Kronin does not suggest that use of force can’t work. She explains clearly that “repression succeeds when mobilizing the rightful forces of the state effectively against the violent perpetrators (and their supporters) within a community, without either catalyzing a larger countermobilization by that community or demobilization of the government’s own support” (Kronin 143). Thus, force has its rightful place in counterterrorist strategy. But, it will not be sufficient to deal with the problem as a whole. Like decapitation, it must be integrated into a broader strategy.

A terrorist attack on a Russian subway station on April 3, 2017 killed and wounded many civilians. (Source: New York Times)

Finally, with her analysis of al-Qaeda, Professor Kronin provides sobering insights. Unfortunately, religious based terrorist organizations are the most enduring with a group called the Hindu Thugs holding the record for survival at 600 years. Professor Kronin claims that al-Qaeda is unique due to its ability to use the internet and media for networking and propaganda. Structurally, al-Qaeda operates in a three-tiered system with the core members at the top followed by a diffuse network (al-Qaeda’s dispersed cells) and then those on the periphery (i.e. al-Qaeda inspired individuals). This presents a unique challenge because 21st century communication methods enable al-Qaeda to operate in a decentralized manner that can present significant problems to America and other nations. However, Professor Kronin also explains that this decentralization may also be the group’s critical vulnerability as it can cause fractionalization and loss of operational control. Therefore, we see the genesis of a strategy that the US has attempted to varying degrees of success namely the selective targeting of terrorist networks. Unfortunately, this strategy has evolved with experience, and many hard lessons. Warfighting (MCDP-1) describes war as the “extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force” (MCDP-1 23). Thus, from the beginning, the “war on terror” was a paradoxically mismanaged strategy as America automatically bestowed political legitimacy on a terrorist group by declaring war on them. This is the mentality that Professor Kronin is determined to break. A terrorist group is not a state with conventional capabilities, and to respond to it as such can have disastrous consequences for the state and enormous benefits for terrorist groups. Defeating terrorism takes patience and a clear understanding of the nature of the threat. It involves careful study and strategic analysis. Professor Kronin has made a significant contribution toward that goal. The question remains whether the decision-makers in Washington will translate historical lessons into effective policy. Additionally, it is foolish to wish away the inevitability of another terrorist attack either by a lone gunman or a determined cell. The strategic response should also be calculated based on lessons learned. While answers may not be clear and tough solutions may not win votes, at the very least, merely asking the question, “how does terrorism end?” could be the first step on the road to better strategy.

Sources:

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009. Print.
Warfighting. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1997. Print.

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On Strategy: An Interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman

By PMEComplete on May 28, 2017

Sir Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies at King’s College and the author of numerous books and publications to include Strategy: A History. In Episode 7 of the PME podcast, we talk about strategy. What is strategy and what it is not? We trace its historical roots, and discuss how traditional views of strategy still apply or do not apply to today’s conflicts and future conflicts. Additionally, Sir Lawrence Freedman was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1995 and awarded the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 1996. He was appointed Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign in 1997. He was awarded the KCMG (Knight Commander of St Michael and St George) in 2003. Finally, he was appointed in June 2009 to serve as a member of the official inquiry into Britain and the 2003 Iraq War.

Key Takeaways:
“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
-Mike Tyson
• What is strategy? Strategy involves making decisions when faced with “other people with their own plans and interests.” It requires flexibility. Planning is part of strategy, but having a plan is not a strategy. “Problem solving” is a critical component of strategy.
• In late nineteenth century Germany, Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke the elder was chief of staff of the Prussian Army. He was a student of Carl von Clausewitz. As a military strategist, Von Moltke emphasized the importance of flexibility. He said, “A plan breaks down on first contact.” Additionally, Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke saw military strategy as a “system of expedients.”

• Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that American foreign policy doctrine (i.e. the Nixon Doctrine, Carter Doctrine, Bush Doctrine, Obama Doctrine) is a means of “signaling” to the world America’s priorities or intentions. It is part of strategy, but it is not itself a strategy.

• Sun Tzu’s influence on strategy was based on the idea of “cunning and cleverness.” However, the flaw in strategy based on cunning is when both sides attempt to use cunning and cleverness against each other. We talk about whether countries like Russia and China use Sun Tzu’s methods to achieve their strategic aims. What are Russia’s interests? A conversation I had with Steven Lee Myers on his book The New Tsar is worth checking out to discover more on that topic.

• Thucydides was the first “realist” historian. He wrote a book about the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens in a book appropriately called The History of the Peloponnesian War. Sir Lawrence Freedman sites a book called Destined for War by Graham Allison. Destined for War describes a theory called the “Thucydides Trap” which is based on the idea that one power becomes fearful of the rise of another power and postulates that this might have ramifications for current and future relations between the United States and China. However, Sir Lawrence Freedman sees some flaws in this theory, and thinks that Thucydides had an interest in trying to preserve the reputation of Pericles.
• We discuss whether there is something “elemental” to strategy. Sir Lawrence Freedman looked at chimpanzees and how they form coalitions and act in strategic ways. Winston Churchill (not a chimpanzee rather British Prime Minister) was good at applying the chimp-like principles of creating coalitions to achieve his strategic aims. Churchill sought to partner with President Roosevelt to get the U.S. on the allied side. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Churchill sought to build a coalition with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union to fight the Nazis.

• We talk about Napoleon and the development of strategy during the Enlightenment. Much like Thucydides rejection of the gods, the enlightenment rejected superstitious beliefs and emphasized what reason and human rationality could do to achieve strategic aims.

• Two critical 19th Century strategic thinkers include the Swiss officer, Antoine Henri Jomini, and the Prussian military theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz. Jomini emphasized the “decisive battle” strategy. Meanwhile, Clausewitz focused on the policy objectives of war. Clausewitz is also famous for developing the term “fog of war,” which refers to the uncertainty and the chaos of war when it involves two competing wills, each one trying to impose itself on the other.

• The challenges of military strategy. How do wars end? We talk about “The Clausewitzian Challenge”, and I allude to my previous conversation with Gideon Rose, editor of Foreign Affairs, who wrote an excellent book called How Wars End.

• Finally, we talk about the strategy of the Cold War and nuclear deterrence. Sir Lawrence Freedman mentions a strategist named Thomas Schelling, who is worth studying for his contributions to strategy based on Game Theory. We discuss the “rationality of irrationality,” which refers to the necessity to use caution based on a fear that one side might act out of irrationality.

• Sir Lawrence Freedman has a new book coming out in the Fall of 2017 called, The Future of War: A History. The book focuses on how people in the past have tried to predict changes in warfare and predict the future of war.

For more information: Check out www.professionalmilitaryeducation.com

Be sure to follow Sir Lawrence Freedman on Twitter @LawDavF and check out the book, Strategy: A History

Books and Resources mentioned in the podcast:

Strategy: A History
The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin
History of the Peloponnesian War
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
On War, Indexed Edition
The Art of War

HELP SPREAD THE WORD!
If you like this interview and want to hear others, be sure to subscribe in iTunes. Support the show with written reviews, share on social media, and through word of mouth. For any requests for additional shows or guests, e-mail me: tim@professionalmilitaryeducation.com

Thanks for listening!

(Sir Lawrence Freedman image Source)

Colonel John Boyd: American Strategist

By PMEComplete on May 26, 2017

I have been focusing on strategy and strategic thinkers in anticipation of the release of my interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman, author of Strategy: A History. In his book, Freedman discusses the contribution of Colonel John Boyd to strategy. Colonel Boyd was a fighter pilot, who served in the United States Air Force during World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Throughout his career, Boyd studied dogfighting principles, and looked at the ability of an aircraft to maneuver into positions of advantage where it could shoot down an opposing aircraft. After Colonel Boyd served in Korea, he was assigned to the Air Force’s Fighter Weapons School where he gained the moniker “40 second Boyd,” which referred to the fact that he could out maneuver an opposing aircraft in forty seconds or less. In his career, Boyd studied science, mathematics, and history in an effort to develop theories of warfare, maneuver, and also develop ideas for the ideal fighter aircraft. As part of a relentless drive to explore his theories of maneuver, Boyd earned an engineering degree from Georgia Tech. Colonel Boyd is widely known in business and military circles for his popular idea of the OODA Loop. “OODA” stands for observe, orient, decide, act. The principle of the OODA Loop became extremely important to military thinkers, who were interested in “maneuver warfare.” The purpose of the OODA Loop is to generate a cycle of decision-making that is quicker than the enemies’ decision-making cycle. The goal is for friendly forces to observe, orient, decide, and act at a pace that is greater than the enemy. The Marine Corps championed this philosophy, and codified it into its doctrine on Warfighting and Tactics.

Boyd’s Work and a Break from Attrition Warfare

The Marine Corps has embraced the work of Colonel Boyd because of its emphasis on the “mental domain” (Freedman 199). Warfare based on “attrition” typically refers to a mass of forces trying to overcome another mass of forces. Vietnam is seen as an example of attrition warfare because the U.S. prioritized “body counts” as a metric for success in combat. However, despite the fact that the U.S. could achieve higher casualty counts, the strategy did not disrupt and shatter the enemies will to fight. As a result, in the post-Vietnam era, the mental and moral component of warfare has been developed as a more effective component of strategy. With respect to Colonely Boyd, Sir Lawrence Freedman writes:

Boyd distinguished between attrition warfare, focused on the physical domain and using firepower as a destructive force, and maneuver warfare, focused on the mental domain where the aim was to generate “surprise and shock” by using ambiguity, mobility, and deception. (Freedman 199)

Although Colonel Boyd never wrote a book explaining his ideas, they exist in a series of briefs that he gave when he was working at the Pentagon. One of these briefs is called “Patterns of Conflict.” At the beginning of the brief, Boyd describes the goal to “collapse adversary’s system into confusion and disorder causing him to over- and under-react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading.” This encapsulates the principles of a “friendly OODA Loop” moving faster than an “enemy OODA Loop” in an effort to shatter the enemies’ cohesion.

Here is Colonel Boyd’s illustrated depiction of the OODA Loop from “The Essence of Winning and Losing.” It is important to see that the OODA Loop relies on a series of feedback loops that inform decision making. It must be emphasized that this process does not have to be hasty or rushed. Speed is relative to the enemy. This process only needs to happen quicker than the enemies’ ability to observe, orient, decide, and act. With the feedback loops, we see several criteria upon which success is based. The ability to communicate important information in a timely manner is crucial. Thus, any organization, military or otherwise, must look to implement systems of organization in which the right information flows to the right people at the right time.

The process of effective decision-making is a major part of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps understands it. Furthermore, the emphasis is on giving leadership at all levels especially the tactical and operational levels the ability to make fast, intelligent decisions that contribute to the success of the mission. In a paper entitled “Destruction and Creation,” Colonel Boyd wrote:

Decisions must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change.

This paper was part of Boyd’s thinking on the second law of thermodynamics and entropy in which he studied the way mental concepts developed in environments of chaos and uncertainty. In his conclusion, Boyd writes, “These mental concepts are employed as decision models by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions needed to cope with their environment—or to improve their capacity for independent action.” Again, we see the influence on how military thinkers would develop the idea of empowering small unit leaders to be able to make decisions in environments of chaos and uncertainty, which the Marine Corps recognizes as part of the nature of war. Furthermore, by decentralizing actions and empowering small units, the Marine Corps recognizes the ability of small units to achieve large victories and defeat larger units. Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that military thinkers like Bill Lind would develop these concepts based on historical models such as the blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg based operations were based on destroying the “will of the opposing high command by creating unexpected and unfavorable operational and strategic situations” (Freedman 200). Freedman mentions that the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting published in the 1989 FMFM-1 explained warfare by maneuver as a process in which a physically superior foe could be defeated if “his moral and physical cohesion” was destroyed (Freedman 201).

Boyd’s Contributions to the Military

If one has a mental caricature of a stubborn, iconoclastic Colonel, Boyd seems to fit the stereotype perfectly. He was famous for his brash and combative nature in voicing his ideas. Robert Coram is the author of a comprehensive biography called Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. In the biography, Coram mentions that Boyd occasionally became heated in debates to the point in which he would shove the lit end of his cigar into the tie of a co-worker at the Pentagon. In the book, Coram paints a detailed portrait of a man who approached all aspects of norms and etiquette within the Pentagon with a devil may care attitude. Indeed, Boyd’s single-minded focus on promoting his theories caused him to neglect considerations of his own personal promotion and pay. When he retired from the military, he famously did not want to be paid for his work as a consultant. Unfortunately, Coram describes Boyd’s character as having an adverse affect on his family too. Thus, in many ways, Boyd’s greatest strength- his passion for his work- was also the source of his greatest flaw- neglect for those closest to him.

Nevertheless, Boyd endeared himself to a cohort of followers, who became known as the “acolytes.” These individuals were determined to promote Boyd’s legacy and ideas. They responded to his infamous decree that one must either decide to “be somebody or do something.” In terms of his contributions to the military, Boyd applied his theories of Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) in the F-15 and F-16 program. The E-M theory was instrumental in developing aerial tactics. Coram writes the following of E-M:

It provided a scientific means by which the maneuverability of an aircraft could be evaluated and tactics designed both to overcome the design flaws of one’s own aircraft and to minimize or negate the superiority of the opponent’s aircraft, and, finally, it became a fundamental tool in designing fighter aircraft.

Much of Coram’s book documents Boyd’s fight to develop the F-15 and F-16 into fighter aircraft capable of winning dogfights. As a result, Boyd frequently clashed with people in the Pentagon who wanted to weigh the aircraft down with needless technology that did not maximize the efficiency of the platform. Coram shows that Boyd was also fighting the institutional wisdom of Air Force strategists, who focused on the Air Force’s ability to fly long range missions to drop conventional munitions, but had neglected the function of the Air Force to fight battles in the air.

Perhaps one of Colonel Boyd’s greatest contributions to the military came through the relationship he had developed with Dick Cheney, who met Boyd when Cheney was a member of the House of Representatives. When Cheney became Secretary of Defense, he was a key figure in planning for the Gulf War that would take place as part of America’s military effort to liberate Kuwait from Saddam’s Iraqi Army. Coram writes that Cheney overruled initial plans of General Norman Schwarzkopf in favor of plans that applied maneuver principles that Boyd had talked with him about. Part of Boyd’s influence on strategy involved bypassing enemy center’s of gravity, which the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz called Schwerpunkt, and creating confusion and chaos in the enemies’ systems. The following excerpt from Coram’s biography illustrates how Colonel Boyd’s ideas had such a profound impact on military operations during the Gulf War:

What is still not generally known to the public is how well the Marines performed in the Gulf. Brigadier General Mike Myatt, a graduate of the Fort Pickett free-play exercises and a man intimately familiar with Boyd’s work, was then commander of the 1st Marine Division. Three days before the war officially began, Myatt’s men raided deep behind Iraqi lines. They bypassed strong points, forgot their flanks, and penetrated so deeply and caused such confusion that the Iraqi Army rushed in reinforcements against what they anticipated would be the main thrust of the American invasion. Then they began surrendering by the thousands. Nowhere can be found a better example of Boyd’s ideas on “folding the enemy in on himself” than in the fact that some fifteen Iraqi divisions surrendered to two divisions of Marines.

Coram writes further:

Everything successful about the Gulf War is a direct reflection of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict”- multiple thrusts and deception operations that created ambiguity and caused the enemy to surrender by the thousands.

The quick and decisive defeat of the Iraqi Army by coalition forces was a remarkable achievement. Combat operations were declared over within 100 hours from the time they began. Despite strategic blunders that occurred after combat ended, it is clear that at the tactical and operational levels, the American military had proven capable of executing fantastic blitzkrieg-style maneuvers. Considering the fact that the previous war America had fought in Vietnam was based on attrition, the Gulf War was a remarkable turnaround. It was vindication for military strategists like Boyd, who had worked for years to promote a style of warfare based on maneuver.

In his late years and after his death, the Marine Corps honored Colonel Boyd more than any other branch of service. In fact, Boyd is hardly mentioned by the Air Force to this day. But, he is revered by the Marine Corps. Coram wrote, “When Boyd died, Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak wrote a moving tribute in a defense journal saying Boyd was the architect of America’s victory in the Gulf War.” Coram also explains that many Marines attended Boyd’s funeral to pay homage to a man, who had influenced the doctrinal publication of Warfighting.

Conclusion

Colonel Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” is an excellent presentation to read and study. Marines will recognize that many of Boyd’s ideas appear in our doctrine, and directly impact the logic and thinking of our tactics. Robert Coram’s biography is extremely well-written, and worth reading not only as an entertaining look at an influential military leader, but also for some fascinating history on the Air Force, stories on the inner workings of the Pentagon, and to see how one man can have a positive impact on the institutional inertia of large organizations like the Department of Defense. Finally, the website Slightly East of New is a good place to find Boyd’s work as well as articles and resources related to his life and thinking.

Cited in this Post:

Strategy: A History

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

Secretary Mattis Update on the “Defeat ISIS Campaign”

By PMEComplete on May 23, 2017

The following video is an update from Defense Secretary James Mattis on the “accelerated” campaign against ISIS. Below are several highlights from the address from May 19, 2017, and some analysis. Secretary Mattis begins by describing two “significant” changes that have been directed from the President:

Change #1: Delegation of authority to the “right” level to quickly move against “enemy vulnerabilities.”

Analysis: The military and the Marine Corps (where Secretary Mattis served for 40+ years) are strong advocates for the principle of decentralized execution. I’ll provide some clarity on this with a very broad and generic summary of how this might look at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, this means small unit leadership executes plans and makes decisions to accomplish a mission. The tactical level is typically led by NCO’s and company grade officers at the team, squad, and platoon level. The operational level, for example, may refer to battalions and brigades conducting campaigns, which we know generally as deployments. For Marines, this would be the equivalent of a MEU, UDP or SPMAGTF. The strategic level refers to delegation to Combatant Commanders to make decisions in their area of operations. Thus, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, planning is “centralized,” but the execution and decision making are ultimately conducted by those who are closely involved in the execution of the plan i.e. the squad on patrol, the battalion on a MEU, or the combatant commander overseeing his area of responsibility, which would be central command or CENTCOMM in the case of Iraq and Syria. Marines such as Secretary Mattis understand the importance of making decisions at the lowest possible level to generate tempo and to be quicker than one’s enemy. If this sounds a lot like Colonel Boyd’s OODA Loop cycle then it’s important to note that Boyd had a major impact on the Marine Corps’ doctrine of Warfighting. In delegating responsibility, the goal is to allow leaders closest to the fight to make critical decisions that will put pressure on the enemy and to maintain pressure until the enemies’ will to fight breaks down.
Change #2: Secretary Mattis describes a tactical shift from “an attrition” fight to surrounding the enemy in their strongholds in order to annihilate ISIS and “prevent the return home of escaped foreign fighters.”

Analysis: Marines believe in the principles of maneuver warfare rather than attrition. A basic definition of attrition is war based on trying to exert more force against the enemy and overwhelm them with a mass of troops and equipment. An example of this is often cited in World War I style trench warfare. Another example of attrition would be the use of body counts in Vietnam. This is a way of trying to kill more enemy than friendly forces. The attrition style of warfighting is anathema to the Marine Corps’ principle of maneuver warfare (perhaps this is why you may have noticed the inflection in Secretary Mattis voice during the address when he mentioned “attrition”). Maneuver warfare is based on putting the right people in the right place at the right time to attack the enemy from a position of advantage. From a position of advantage, one can shatter the enemies’ cohesion and destroy their will to fight. With maneuver warfare, one does not necessarily have to kill the enemy (although that is often a significant part of it). Maneuver warfare is often confused with movement (although movement can be a part of it). But, the best way to understand it in this context is the necessity to get coalition forces into a position where they can put the enemy in a no win solution and convince the enemy that their cause is hopeless. The enemy may realize this the hard way as conventional munitions explode on or around him. It can also occur through psychological and information operations too. What Secretary Mattis is suggesting is that coalition forces are putting the enemy in a no-win situation where the only options they have are to surrender or die.

Other highlights from Defense Secretary Mattis’s address:

1. No Change to rules of engagement (ROE) and attempts to limit collateral damage. Analysis: American military theory recognizes the principles espoused by the Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz that war has a moral component to it. America’s continued attempts to lead and assert moral authority are keys to victory.
2. The coalition is comprised of 68 members to include 65 nations sharing intelligence and working closely together. This also includes 26 coalition nations making direct military contributions. Analysis: When Secretary Mattis co-authored a piece called “Restoring our National Security”, he discussed the importance of creating alliances and stressed the absolute necessity to work with coalition partners. We are seeing this vision being executed.
3. Maintaining a view toward the aftermath when the violence stops. Analysis: A major theme of this blog and the podcast has been understanding warfare as Carl Von Clausewitz explained it as a conflict that has a political dimension to it. Thus, the aftermath of violence matters as much as the actual battles that take place. On the first podcast episode, I had a conversation with Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose about his book, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. He discussed his theory called “the Clausewitzian Challenge,” and how it relates to properly ending a war.
4. Status on the fighting: In Iraq, East Mosul is in friendly hands while West Mosul and Tal Afar are completely surrounded by friendly forces. In Syria, coalition forces continue to support Syrian Democratic Forces and are pushing to defeat ISIS in Raqqa.

Secretary Mattis explained three enduring goals in this fight:

Deny ISIS a geographic haven.
Eliminate ISIS ability to operate externally.
Reduce ISIS ability to finance operations and recruit.

Finally, Secretary Mattis highlighted several of the major victories that have occurred thus far:

4 million people liberated by coalition forces.
Coalition forces have recaptured 50% of territory once held by ISIS.
ISIS has not been able to take back any of the recaptured territory.

Origins of Strategy

By PMEComplete on May 11, 2017

In anticipation of my upcoming interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman on his book, Strategy: A History, I am providing some helpful resources to think about strategy. For more information on an overview of the book, check out the currently reading post I wrote when I first started reading the book several weeks ago. Prior to the section of the book called “Strategies of Force,” there is a section on the origins of strategy. There are some interesting subjects related to the Bible notably the story of David vs. Goliath as well as Greek mythology in the story of the Trojan horse, and the Greeks conquering of the city of Troy. However, I want to focus on a few specific individuals who I think have contributed significantly to modern strategic thinking. These individuals are profiled in the book.

Thucydides

Thucydides was one of the first military historians. He lived from 460- 395 BCE, and twenty years of his life was spent in exile. During this time, he honed his craft as a historian, and put his thoughts on paper writing what became the definitive work on the Peloponnesian War. The History of the Peloponnesian War is a classic work in military history and strategy. This war was fought between the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire, which was called the Delian League from 431 to 404 BCE. In the first episode of the PME podcast, I spoke with Gideon Rose about his book How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. He provided a list of his top five books for thinking about foreign policy. Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War is at the top of his list. Mr. Rose says the following about Thucydides:

Thucydides is the single best treatment of international relations, foreign policy and military affairs that exists. It is the best description of what life in a multipolar world is like, what politics and war are like for the units involved, of the basic realities of international relations.

-Gideon Rose, editor Foreign Affairs

In his book, Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman mentions that Thucydides is often considered one of the “founders of realism.” One of the most famous quotes on realism comes from the Melian Dialogue, where the Athenians counter the Melians with the claim that “the strong do what they can while the weak must suffer what they must.” This was as the Melians pled with the Athenians not to conquer them rather to respect their neutrality. The idea of “might makes right” comes from the realist school of thought. It is interesting because Thucydides is unique as a theorist who did not try to interpret events from an ideological perspective. He sought to be as objective as possible in his history. He wanted to show war and human nature as it was in reality rather than how he wished it to be in theory. Sir Lawrence Freedman explains that Thucydides’ “narrative illuminated some of the central themes of all strategy: the limits imposed by the circumstances of the time, the importance of coalitions as a source of strength but also instability, the challenge of coping with internal opponents and external pressures simultaneously, the difficulties of strategies that are defensive and patient in the face of demands for quick and decisive offensives, the impact of the unexpected, and- perhaps most importantly- the role of language as strategic instrument” (Freedman 30).

On the role of language, one of the greatest speeches to be recorded in the History of the Peloponnesian War was Pericles funeral oration. This speech has become distinctive for its praise of the Athenians willingness to fight and die for democratic society. Pericles champions the nobility of their sacrifice in his speech. Echoes of Pericles speech can be heard in many other historical orations such as Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.

Sun Tzu

If you’ve heard the quote, “All Warfare is based on deception,” then you are at least vaguely familiar with Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu wrote a book entitled The Art of War. This book holds a special place in strategic thinking not only for the military strategists but also business “strategists.” Don’t believe me? Watch Bud Fox impress his boss, Gordon Gecko, in this scene from Wall Street (1987). Of course, this was after Gordon Gecko told Bud Fox to read The Art of War. Gordon Gecko also said, “If you want a friend, get a dog,” but I don’t think Mr. Gecko got that quote from Sun Tzu.

There is not a lot of information on Sun Tzu as an individual. He developed his theories sometime around 500 BCE during the Chinese “Warring States” period. As the quote on deception implies, Sun Tzu suggested that all strategy is based on the ability to confuse the enemy and not reveal one’s own strengths and weaknesses. He has also said that it is best to “subdue the enemy without fighting” (Freedman 44). My appreciation for Sun Tzu comes from his contribution to the theory of maneuver warfare. Sun Tzu recognized the need for strategic patience. He understood that it was important to set the conditions for an army to be successful on the battlefield. This means not being too impulsive or hasty rather striking from a position of advantage. In terms of maneuver warfare, this suggests sourcing the right assets to the right people at the right time in accomplishment of a clearly defined objective.

Sir Lawrence Freedman also highlights that Sun Tzu viewed war as a “contract.” He explains that Sun Tzu saw “battle as a ‘chance of arms,’ a form of consensual violence out of which would emerge a victor” (49). In many ways, this view anticipated the ideas of Carl Von Clausewitz whose own theories would view war in contractual terms namely as a means of resolving policy disputes between two powers who could not resolve disputes through peaceful diplomatic means.

Finally, Sun Tzu’s ideas were later adopted by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Also, Napoleon Bonaparte was said to have read Sun Tzu.

Machiavelli

If you’ve heard the term “Machiavellian,” it has probably been used as a way of describing someone that is willing to backstab or act in a deceptive manner to get what they want. From the work of Niccolo Machiavelli, who wrote The Prince, we get the mantra that “the ends justifies the means.” This suggests a willingness to win and succeed at all costs. This could mean lying, cheating, or stealing to get what one wants. Sounds pretty brutal, right? Well, the Florentine political scientist, Mr. Machiavelli, should actually be given more credit for his contribution to strategy. He did not advise cruelty for cruelties sake. His conception of human nature is bleak, and he definitely sees men as cunning and deceptive. However, as Freedman writes, “At some point the appearance of virtue could not be wholly detached from practice. Machiavelli understood that to hold on to power, it was necessary to reduce the reliance on harsh, cruel methods and to behave in moderate, graceful ways” (Freedman 53). So even though Machiavelli is understood to have laid the foundation for a ruthless means of achieving and maintaining power, we see a lot of the same strands of thought as existed with Thucydides. Machiavelli is writing about human nature as he sees it. In warring societies, it is easy to see human nature as fundamentally cruel and indifferent i.e. the politics of realism as discussed with Thucydides. “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.”

But, Freedman concludes that Machiavelli was more “balanced” in his thought meaning that he saw the good strategist as someone who could go “beyond false impressions and harsh punishments,” and instead could govern based on “real accomplishments and general respect” (Freedman 53).

Conclusion: People have devoted hundreds of pages in dissection of the thoughts of the strategists that I have mentioned. Sir Lawrence Freedman talks about them in his section on the “origins of strategy.” I wanted to highlight their contributions to strategic thinking, and hopefully get people interested in studying them more closely in detail. Of the three listed above, Thucydides is the strategist that I most closely study. Although, Sun Tzu is a close second. I do appreciate the ideas of Machiavelli and think about his assertion that a leader cannot be both “loved and feared” and in choosing between the two, it is far better to be “feared” than to be “loved.” Powerful stuff.

Books Mentioned:
Strategy: A History

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

History of the Peloponnesian War

The Art of War

The Prince: Second Edition
Works Cited:

1. Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

Strategy: A History

By PMEComplete on April 20, 2017

Sir Lawrence Freedman’s book, Strategy: A History, suggests that strategy is often discussed in terms of planning. What this means is that people have strategies for losing weight, getting in shape or managing their personal finances. Businesses have strategies for increasing their bottom line and selling more products. Politicians devise strategies for their campaigns and time in office. In warfare, military strategy has been subjected to the same type of “linear” planning. The error in “strategic” planning is that it is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of war and human social interaction. Indeed, the Marine Corps has defined war as a “social process.” This is an enlightening way of understanding war. Marines are famous for saying, “The enemy gets a vote” and a “plan breaks down on first contact.” Indeed, the book begins with one of my favorite quotes from a famous boxer.

Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.

– Mike Tyson

So what is strategy according to Lawrence Freedman? He says early in the book, “Strategy is the art of creating power.” Planning is part of creating power. But, a plan is not a strategy. A strategy recognizes human dynamics and strategists know how to deal with the human dynamics that are part of conflict. As I continue reading through this book, it has been helpful to reflect on this thesis: “Strategy is the art of creating power.”

Most of my reading has been focused on the second part of the book entitled “Strategies of Force.” In this part, Freedman chronicles some of the most notable military strategists in history to include:

Thucydides
Sun Tzu
Napoleon Bonaparte
Carl Von Clausewitz
Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Lawrence of Arabia
Mao Tse-Tung
Colonel John Boyd

Throughout the “Strategies of Force”, Sir Lawrence Freedman covers an impressive amount of changes in the character of warfare. Military strategy as a dynamic conflict between opposing human wills remains unchanged. However, the methods and means by which state and non-state actors seek to consolidate power has changed and continually manifests itself in new ways especially as technology develops. Thus, the science of military technology and tactics will continue to evolve. But, we seek to study and understand history and human nature in order to discern the art of how to apply science in an effort to pursue good strategy.

With increased U.S. military presence in Syria, a Navy aircraft carrier group moving toward North Korea, and possible re-negotiation of the Iranian nuclear deal, this book seemed like an important one to read and study. Additionally, I bought this book after reading an article from the Lawfare blog called, “Why Strategies Disappoint- and How to Fix Them.” I highly recommend checking out that article and look at the below video where Sir Lawrence Freedman talks about his book: Strategy: A History

How Wars End: An Interview with Gideon Rose

By PMEComplete on January 15, 2017

I recently had a conversation with Gideon Rose, editor of Foreign Affairs. We discussed his book, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (Simon & Schuster, October 2010). It was a great interview! Check it out, and be sure to look at the show notes below as you listen. I provide links to different articles and books mentioned throughout the interview. Enjoy!

Gideon Rose is the editor of Foreign Affairs, a former National Security Council official in the Clinton administration, an expert on national security and terrorism, and the author of How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (Simon & Schuster, October 2010). Here is a link to his biography.

Carl von Clausewitz was a 19th Century Prussian military theorist. He wrote a classic work on military theory and strategy called On War. Link to the book: On War, Indexed Edition

The National Command Authority is described as follows:

Directions for military operations emanate from the National Command Authority, a term used to collectively describe the President and the Secretary of Defense. The President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the ultimate authority. The Office of the Secretary of Defense carries out the Secretary’s policies by tasking the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands. (From the DOD website)

Tommy Franks is a retired U.S. Army General, who served as the U.S. Central Command commander during the planning and invasion of the 2003 war in Iraq. Here is a link to his memoir: AMERICAN SOLDIER

Anthony Zinni is a retired Marine Corps General, who served as the commander of Central Command in the from 1997 until September 2000. After retiring from the Marine Corps, he was critical of Iraq War plans. He has written several books including his latest book Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win Or Lose Off The Battlefield

Eric Shinseki is a retired U.S. Army General, who served as chief of staff to the U.S. Army in 2003 when he claimed more troops were needed for the war in Iraq. This was an opinion that contradicted the policies advocated by the Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld. Here is a NYT article from that period that highlights the dispute.

The book How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon was mentioned. That book was written by Rosa Brooks, and was recently reviewed on this website, here is a link the book review.

Two books that Gideon Rose highly recommended include Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime by Eliot Cohen and Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Peterson helped plan the ground campaign for the Iraq War. He wrote a paper for the National War College entitled “Central but Inadequate: The Application of Theory in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” He is quoted early in the book as follows:

Over a month before the war began, the Phase IV planning group concluded that the campaign would produce conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives.

Richard Myers is a retired four-star U.S. Air Force General and a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the planning for the Iraq War and the 2003 invasion. He wrote a book in 2009 called Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security. The role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to serve as “the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC)” (from the JCS website).

During the interview, multiple retired generals are mentioned who came out against the Iraq War strategy in 2006. There is a good article from Vanity Fair called “The Night of the Generals” which explains this episode in detail.

Several references are made to the Berlin Airlift, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine, which were mentioned as actions and policies that occurred after World War II and marked the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis is cited in Rose’s book.

Gideon Rose mentions Ambassador James Dobbins, who is a senior fellow at the Rand Corporation. He also mentions Ken Pollack, who wrote an article for Foreign Affairs before the Iraq War, and later a book called The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (2002).

The author Thomas Ricks is mentioned as well as his book Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005, which is critical of the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq ambassador Paul Bremmer, who was in charge of the CPA.

Mark Moyar, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is mentioned in the discussion on the Vietnam War. He wrote a book called Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965.

Gideon Rose mentions a book on Vietnam called Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam by Fredrik Logevall. He says that Logevall is one of his favorite authors on Vietnam.

His conclusion for ending wars properly: Start with the end state first and plan backwards. As he says, “reverse engineer” the problem by judging a war’s success based on the political outcomes it produces. Ultimately, military strategy needs to be nested within national strategy. Rose is adamant that this principle has been forgotten. His challenge is for military and civilian planners to stop judging the success of wars based solely on military operations.

“There is absolutely no reason why physical violence, the use of force, especially for political purposes could not be married to the highest degree of intellectual rigor and mental acuity.” -Gideon Rose

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